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Restructuring of
the Steel Industry
in Eight Countries

Introduction
Prior to the 1970s, the industrialized countries enjoyed more than 
two decades of almost uninterrupted prosperity. Labor and manage 
ment participated in a social contract which allowed each to improve 
its position while government policies assisted both parties. The end of 
this unprecedented post-war boom coincided with oil price increases, 
competition from newly developing countries, and a decline in demand 
for heavy capital goods. The new competitive environment challenged 
the steel industry and placed stress on the relationships between labor, 
management, and government.
The purpose of this study is to examine how the cross-national dif 
ferences in the social contract among managers, unions, and govern 
ment influenced adjustment strategies in steel. The restructuring 
process in eight major steel-producing countries, categorized as having 
either an adversarial or a cooperative industrial relations system, are 
studied in order to determine who bore the costs of restructuring  
employers, employees, or government and which industrial relations 
systems were more efficient in restructuring. The study postulates that 
restructuring was more heavily influenced by market forces and new 
technology than by collective bargaining and bargaining power; how 
ever, the nature of the social contract determined who bore the costs of 
restructuring.
The steel industry presents an excellent opportunity for a compara 
tive study because the industry is international in its technology, choice 
of products, raw materials and markets. Steelmaking technology 
crosses national boundaries easily, and the product is undifferentiated, 
which permits international competition. The steel unions have tradi 
tionally been among the most powerful in every industrial relations 
system. The eight countries chosen for this study Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the United 
States are meant to be representative rather than inclusive of the 
major steel producing countries. France and Italy would be included in 
a larger study, while important steel producers such as the former 
Soviet Union and China would be excluded, because they do not meet
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the criteria of possessing democratic unions and market driven econo 
mies.
The crisis in steel among the world©s industrialized countries 
became obvious after 1974. By the late 1960s, important infrastructure 
in the western countries had been completed, and a sharp reduction in 
steel consumption occurred in 1968-69. Even without the oil shocks of 
1973-1974, steel demand would not have continued its earlier rising 
trend (Barnett and Schorsch 1983; Scheuerman 1986; Meny and 
Wright 1986). Table 1.1 presents data on crude steel production for the 
eight countries in this study. These eight countries produced more than 
half (54 percent) of the world©s steel in 1970, but a little more than one- 
third (37 percent) by 1990 (OECD 1991). During those two decades, 
world steel production had expanded, but these eight countries had not 
shared equally in the market increase. Instead, they were forced to 
restructure their steel industries, reduce capacity, and shed jobs. Since 
1970,52 percent of the steel jobs in the eight countries have been elim 
inated (see table 1.2).
Several environmental changes explain the crisis in steel during the 
1970s and 1980s. There was a secular decline in the demand for steel 
due to the changing demand for the products. As economies matured, 
the relative position of heavy steel-intensive industries, such as ship 
building and railroads, gave way to growth industries, such as space 
technology, telecommunications, and biotechnology, which use little 
steel. Steel was also being replaced by aluminum, plastics, resistant 
glass and ceramics. This was particularly true for automobiles, long the 
major customer for the integrated steel companies. At the same time, 
new competition developed; Japan entered in the 1960s, followed by 
South Korea, Brazil, Venezuela, India and Mexico. For these new com 
petitors, steel consumption accelerates above a national income of 
about $500 per capita, and higher levels of capital formation in infra 
structure were reinforced by demand within a growing manufacturing 
sector (Aylen 1983). After 1974, the post oil-shock world recession 
also affected the demand for heavy capital goods. Demand declined at 
that time, particularly in the automobile industry as automakers sought 
to substantially lighten their vehicles in response to rising fuel prices.
Additional causes of the steel crisis included improper investment 
policies, lagging technological change, increased import penetration, 
and increased capacity.
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At the same time that the steel industry in the eight countries faced a 
crisis, their industrial relations systems were also under stress. Indus 
trial relations had enjoyed a measure of stability following the Second 
World War when managers, employees and their unions, and govern 
ment each recognized their position in the social contract forged by the 
need to rebuild their economies. Among the largest and strongest 
unions were the metalworkers and steelworkers, who had negotiated 
high wages for their members. Kassalow (1984) placed the steelwork-- 
ers* compensation at twice the average U.S. manufacturing employee, 
22 percent above average British workers, and 9 percent above average 
German workers. However, the new competitive environment placed 
stress on the relationship among the three actors. Layoffs and plant 
shutdowns created a harsher negotiating climate, and unions were 
asked to accept wage freezes, reductions in benefits and the loss of 
their members jobs (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1987). At the same 
time that the bargaining relationship was changing, the political power 
of the unions was diminished as parliamentary governments, which 
had previously supported the unions, became more conservative.
The theoretical framework of the study (see figure 1.1) is based on 
the traditional collective bargaining model, with the difference that the 
bargaining process and bargaining power are assumed to be environ 
mental forces. Economic factors, the organizational and institutional 
context, sociodemographic factors, and the legal environment affect 
restructuring outcomes. This framework relies heavily on the work of 
the Webbs (1897), Commons (1934), Perlman (1928), and Dunlop 
(1958). However, it differs from their work in one important respect 
The goals and strategies of employers, employees and their unions, and 
government are important environmental factors which affect out 
comes. Borrowing from the work of Kochan, McKersie, and Cappelli 
(1984), the bargaining process in this model goes beyond the tradi 
tional activities of negotiating over wages, hours, and employment to 
include strategic decisions such as type of products, the size of the 
company, and new technology.
The form of structural adjustment discussed in this study may be 
termed internal. Adjustment is carried out within the industry and often 
within a firm or plant by the introduction of new products, a different 
mix of products, the introduction of new technology, improved utiliza 
tion of plant equipment and human resources, and the dismantling of
Table 1.1
Crude Steel Production in Eight Countries, 1970-1990 
(millions of metric tons)
Adversarial
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Canada
11.20
11.04
11.86
13.39
13.62
13.03
13.29
13.63
14.90
16.05
15.90
14.81
11.87
12.83
14.70
Great Britain
28.33
24.15
25.28
26.65
22.38
19.78
22.40
20.47
20.30
21.47
11.28
15.32
13.74
14.98
15.21
United States
119.31
109.26
120.87
136.80
132.20
105.82
116.12
113.70
124.31
123.69
101.46
109.61
67.66
76.76
83.94
Belgium and 
Luxembourg
18.07
17.69
19.99
21.45
22.67
16.21
16.71
15.59
17.39
18.39
16.94
16.07
13.50
13.45
15.29
Cooperative
Germany
45.04
40.31
43.71
49.52
53.23
40.42
42.42
38.99
41.25
46.04
43.84
41.61
35.88
35.73
39.39
Japan
93.32
88.56
96.90
119.32
117.13
102.31
107.40
102.41
102.11
111.75
111.40
101.68
99.55
97.18
105.59
Sweden
5.50
5.27
5.26
5.66
5.99
5.61
5.14
3.97
4.33
4.73
4.24
3.77
3.90
4.21
4.71
Total
320.77
296.28
323.87
372.79
367.22
303.18
323.48
308.76
324.59
342.12
305.06
302.87
246.10
255.14
278.83
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1970-1990
Absolute change
Percentage change
14.64
14.08
14.74
15.19
15.46
12.28
1.08
9.64
15.77
14.77
17.14
19.07
18.80
17.92
-10.41
-36.75
80.07
74.03
80.88
90.65
88.43
88.90
-30.41
-25.49
14.63
13.42
13.09
14.90
14.70
15.03
-3.04
-16.82
40.50
37.13
36.25
41.03
41.07
38.43
-6.61
-14.68
105.28
98.28
98.51
105.68
107.91
110.33
17.01
18.23
4.81
4.71
4.60
4.78
4.69
4.45
-1.05
-19.09
275.70
256.42
265.21
291.30
291.06
287.34
-33.43
-10.42
SOURCE: OECD printout, Paris, 1991.
Table 1.2
Total Employment in Steel in Eight Countries, 1970-1990 
(thousands)
Adversarial
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Canada
47.5
47.0
50.0
45.5
52.5
51.5
49.7
49.7
52.7
53.0
53.2
53.0
43.0
42.0
44.0
Great Britain
222.4
207.5
200.9
196.2
197.7
183.1
183.3
182.0
165.4
156.4
112.1
88.2
74.5
63.7
61.9
United States
549.6
506.8
496.7
521.7
522.6
470.1
469.9
469.9
472.0
478.5
429.3
423.6
323.6
340.8
334.1
Belgium and 
Luxembourg
82.6
82.5
82.9
85.6
86.6
80.8
80.4
74.3
65.3
65.0
60.1
57.5
54.1
52.5
49.9
Cooperative
Germany
237.7
231.0
222.0
228.4
230.6
221.9
220.3
214.4
202.8
204.8
197.4
186.7
175.9
163.7
152.5
Japan
345.2
350.8
339.7
325.2
323.9
324.4
320.3
314.8
302.5
281.5
271.0
269.3
268.5
270.3
264.8
Sweden
41.0
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
51.6
45.8
44.1
41.4
39.1
39.0
38.3
35.8
33.6
33.4
31.6
Total
1,526.0
1,425.6*
l,392.2a
l,402.6a
1,465.4
1,377.6
1,368.0
1,346.5
1,299.8
1,278.2
1,161.4
1,114.1
973.2
966.5
938.8
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1970-1990
Absolute change
Percentage change
42.0
41.0
42.0
40.7
39.5
32.3
-15.2
-32.0
59.1
55.9
54.9
55.1
53.8
52.6
-169.8
-76.3
302.6
273.5
268.4
277.2
274.3
270.2
-279.4
-50.8
47.2
42.8
39.8
38.6
37.6
36.9
-45.7
-55.3
150.8
142.7
133.3
131.1
130.5
127.0
-110.7
-46.6
259.4
251.3
232.3
206.9
198.8
194.5
-150.7
^3.7
31.3
29.9
28.5
27.9
27.6
26.6
-14.4
-35.1
892.4
837.0
799.2
777.5
762.1
740.1
-785.9
-51.5
SOURCE: OECD printout, Paris, 1991. 
a=six countries. 
n.a.=not available.
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excess capacity with corresponding workforce reduction (McKersie 
and Sengenberger 1981). This form of restructuring can be distin 
guished from external restructuring, which is related to the decline of 
some industries and firms and the growth of others and is often accom 
panied by a reallocation of capital and labor (Bluestone and Harrison 
1982). The distinction between these two can be blurred if adjustment 
comes about, as it has in steel, through mergers of firms, product diver 
sification and other forms of industry reorganization.
The typology used in this book (see figure 1.2) permits cross- 
national comparisons. This typology relies on the work of Bamber and 
Lansbury (1987), Katzenstein (1985), Lipset (1986), and Ulman 
(1987). The eight industrialized countries are divided into two types of 
industrial relations systems: adversarial and cooperative. The adversar 
ial systems are Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. Unions 
and employers in these countries have negotiated at arms length from 
one another. Individual demands are framed away from the table, and 
there is a minimum of communication. Government has generally not 
intervened in economic activity, but has allowed the market to dictate 
the outcomes. Worker participation is through collective bargaining, 
which takes place most often at the company level. Income security 
programs are negotiated .with little government assistance. These coun 
tries exhibit the "monopoly" face of unions (Freeman and Medoff 
1984). The bargaining process and outcomes are based on the position 
that unions increase costs and reduce productivity growth. Unions are 
expected to reallocate resources toward labor and away from restruc 
turing and competitive resources.
The cooperative systems examined in this study are Belgium, Ger 
many, Japan, Luxembourg, and Sweden. These countries exhibit a 
social partnership where information is shared and there is joint prob- 
lemsolving. Government has intervened in industrial policy with sub 
stantial and continuous financial assistance. Worker participation is 
through collective bargaining, works councils, and consultation at the 
national, regional, and shop-floor levels. These countries exhibit the 
"voice" face of unions (Freeman and Medoff 1984). The bargaining 
process and outcomes are based on the position that unions enhance 
productivity by reducing turnover which in turn increases employees© 
knowledge of the specific jobs they perform.
Figure 1.1
The Determinants of Restructuring 
A Conceptual Framework
Economic Factors
'Competitiveness of the 
product market 
•Financial assistance
Organizational/Institutional Context
•Managers' goals and strategies
•Unions' goals and strategies
•Governments' goals and strategies
•Bargaining structure, process, and power
•Nature of the relationship
•Form of participation
•Technology
Sociodemographic Factors
Outcomes
•Rules
•Joint committees
•Plant closings
•Product changes
•Downsizing of the 
workforce
•Transfer of products and 
workforce among plants
•Use of new technology
•Mergers and joint ventures
•New products
Legal Environment
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Figure 1.2 
Comparative Industrial Relations Systems Matrix
Environmental issues
Adversarial countries
(Canada, Great Britain,
United States)
Cooperative countries
(Belgium, Germany,
Japan, Luxembourg,
Sweden)
Competitiveness of the Laissez-faire 
product market
Interventionist, some central 
planning
Financial assistance Private and internal External government loans 
or grants and private 
assistance
Managers' goals and 
strategies
Management innovates Management innovates with 
joint participation and 
consultation
Unions' goals and 
strategies
Economic and focused on 
individual members
Economic and political 
focused on membership and 
firm organization
Governments' goals and Laissez-faire and 
strategies noninterventionist
Interventionist; sometimes 
full or partial ownership of 
firms and some laissez-faire
Bargaining structure Decentralized Centralized; employers 
associations and union 
federations or by enterprise
Nature of the relationship Adversarial Cooperative
Form of participation Collective bargaining and 
negotiations; limits on 
worker participation
Codetermination; and 
quality circles
Technology Dependent on management 
and some negotiation
Employee participation
Sociodemographic 
factors
Middle-aged, male Middle-aged, male
Legal environment Not directly related to 
restructuring; law regulates 
health, safety, and the 
environment
Legislation directly 
concerned with 
restructuring and 
rationalization. Plant- 
closing legislation and 
government-sponsored 
studies of impact on 
communities
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There is some difficulty in generalizing the characteristics of the 
eight countries into two broad categories, particularly for Germany and 
Japan, since they possess characteristics of both the adversarial and 
cooperative systems.
In assessing labor's role in the adjustment process, it is necessary to 
determine whether different systems have different effects on restruc 
turing. However, it is important to move beyond describing union- 
management relations in restructuring to assessing the impact of alter 
native approaches to adjustment. This study attempts to provide 
answers to the following questions.
1. What were the differences in the adjustment process between the 
two types of industrial relations systems?
2. Which approach was more efficient from the point of view of 
labor and society?
3. Who bore the costs of adjustment?
The methodology used in this book is inductive and employs case 
study analysis. Beginning in 1982, more then 100 interviews were con 
ducted with managers, union officials, and works council representa 
tives in the steel industry in the eight countries. These interviews were 
supplemented by interviews with government officials and academi 
cians. Preliminary findings were shared with the parties in the eight 
countries. Data reported are from national and local union contracts, 
works council records, company reports, the Commission of the Euro 
pean Communities (CEC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), and the U.S. State Department.
The book is organized in matrix form. The environmental issues 
presented in figure 1.2 are examined across the eight countries. Bel 
gium and Luxembourg are discussed together because their restructur 
ing plans became interdependent.
Chapter 2 examines the environmental factors that affected restruc 
turing. It illustrates the cross-national differences in the role of govern 
ment between the adversarial and cooperative countries. Government 
played a minor role in restructuring in the adversarial countries, except 
in Great Britain. It played a much more central role in the cooperative 
countries.
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Chapter 3 describes union-management negotiations in the adver 
sarial countries. In these countries, the unions focused on the bargain 
ing table. Plants were closed, and in two companies there were lengthy 
and pervasive strikes.
Chapter 4 describes union-management negotiations as well as 
other forms of employee participation in the cooperative countries. 
Plants often closed gradually, and workers were transferred; where 
strikes occurred, they were short. Employee participation in decision- 
making also cushioned the impact on the workers.
Chapter 5 presents the results of negotiations over income security. 
This chapter demonstrates that in adversarial countries, the employees 
and their companies bore the greatest costs of restructuring, while in 
cooperative countries government bore the major cost.
Chapter 6 offers conclusions.
2 
Restructuring in Eight Countries
This chapter describes how restructuring took place in the eight 
countries, and includes the role of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) as well as that of the various governments. The determinants 
presented in figure 1.1 influenced the outcomes. It can be hypothesized 
that adversarial countries would restructure using private resources, 
with little interference or assistance from government. Cooperative 
countries, on the other hand, could be expected to restructure with con 
siderable government assistance, through planning, loans, or govern 
ment ownership.
The basic steel industry is composed of three types of firms: inte 
grated, specialty, and mini-mills. This book concentrates on integrated 
firms. Using the oxygen method, the integrated firm smelts raw materi 
als such as iron ore and coal in blast furnaces and then refines the metal 
into steel in oxygen converters. The final products are primarily flat 
rolled steel, such as plate or hot and cold rolled sheet. Traditionally, 
only mills using the oxygen method have been capable of large-scale 
production; however, this distinction has been blurred in recent years 
as mini-mills have experienced a significant increase in size and pro 
duction capacity. Figure 2.1 compares the production process of the 
integrated mill with the mini-mill.
Integrated steelworks are large and are among the biggest capital 
investments found on a single site in any industry. The technical char 
acteristics of steelmaking give rise to marked economies of scale 
(Aylen 1982). There are major cost advantages to building large plants, 
providing they are fully utilized. There is also a large fixed-cost ele 
ment in steelwork operations arising from supervision and materials 
handling. Manning levels hardly increase as the throughput of a plant 
rises. There is, therefore, a wide gap between total costs and variable 
costs because of high capital intensity and a chronic tendency to 
develop surplus capacity. Economics of scale were reinforced by inno 
vations, such as the basic oxygen furnace (BOF) and continuous cast 
ing, during the 1960s and 1970s.
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Figure 2.1 
The Steelmaking Process
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These integrated steelworks affect the physical environment 
because of their size, requirements for transportation, ore and coke 
yards, high-production facilities, and cooling tanks. Their influence is 
not confined to the principal environment They also affect the region's 
economic structure, since they are often the area's largest employer 
(Hoerr 1988; Schroter 1986; Bradbury 1987). Other industries may be 
repelled, and medium and small firms are discouraged from locating in 
the area, since steel wages are higher than those of other firms compet 
ing for the same employees. Layoffs under these conditions are a bur 
den to workers and their families in a community that has few sources 
of alternative employment (Buss and Redburn 1983).
Adversaria] Systems
Canada
Canadian steel underwent the least restructuring of any of the eight 
countries in this study, and it was one of the two countries to increase 
its production, Japan being the other (Barnett and Schorsch 1983; 
Bradbury 1987). Production increased by 9.64 percent (see table 1.1) 
while employment was reduced by 32 percent (see table 1.2). The four 
integrated iron and steel producers in Canada are Dofasco, which 
merged with Algoma in 1988, and Stelco, both private firms, and two 
smaller publicly owned companies, Sidbec-Dosco and Sydney Steel. 
The privately owned firms have supplied about 80 percent of the indus 
try's output during the past 25 years and have been consistently profit 
able. The two publicly owned companies, however, have had problems 
because of a heavy debt structure involving large interest payments. 
They incurred substantial losses, which resulted in government subsi 
dies from both the federal and provincial governments.
The Canadian steel industry has managed to become one of the most 
profitable in the world, despite the limitations of a small domestic mar 
ket and the importance of size for economies of scale. The strategic 
elements leading to this success are a high degree of product special 
ization to achieve economies of scale and international cost competi 
tiveness, and minimization of interfirm rivalries by virtue of
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specialization. High operating rates have also been maintained by 
bringing in sufficient productive capacity only for markets in which a 
comparative advantage could be realized by taking into account trans 
port costs and tariffs. The Canadian steel industry also has the advan 
tage of supplying the U.S.-owned auto industry. Twenty percent of its 
steel has gone to autos (Algoma Steel 1983). The efficient use of 
energy and power—perhaps half that of the United States and a third 
that of Japan—has also contributed to the success of Canadian steel. 
Excess demand and/or unprofitable markets have been serviced 
through imports. In times of economic downturn, some of the unprofit 
able geographic and product markets have been serviced by the domes 
tic steel producers. New technologies for products and processes have 
been quickly adopted, largely from foreign sources. Dofasco was the 
first company to introduce BOF steelmaking and continuous casting in 
North America.
Canadian steel prepared itself well for increased competition in the 
1980s. The integrated firms made good management decisions regard 
ing capital investment, as well as operating and sales practices. They 
were successful, despite the fact that they had no particular advantages 
in terms of raw materials. Virtually all of their coal comes from the 
United States at a price equal to and in some instances slightly higher 
than that paid by the U.S. steel industry. A significant portion of ore is 
imported, although ore is also obtained from domestic sources. The 
industry has concentrated on the domestic market
In 1982, Stelco built a greenfield site integrated plant in Hamilton 
with a blast furnace, two oxygen converters, a continuous caster and a 
continuous hot-strip mill. Dofasco in the same year, constructed a sec 
ond hot-strip mill and Algoma constructed a seamless-pipe mill.
The worldwide decline in steel demand in 1982 and 1983 also 
resulted in a drop in production, a general loss of revenue, and a 23 
percent decline in steel employment in Canada. However, the steel 
companies and workers were not subject to the same pressures that 
existed for the United States, European, and Japanese steel companies, 
since Canadian steel producers hadn't engaged in the cycle of first 
building overcapacity and then restructuring that occurred in the 
United States and Europe.
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Great Britain
Steel in Great Britain underwent more changes than in any other 
country in this study, with large-scale reductions in the labor force and 
massive plant closings. Production was reduced by 36.75 percent (see 
table 1.1), and three out of four jobs were eliminated (see table 1.2). At 
the same time, the government-owned British Steel Corporation (BSC) 
engaged in extensive and tenacious negotiations with the trade unions. 
These negotiations are discussed in chapter 3.
By the 1960s, steel had come to occupy a very unique place in Brit 
ish party politics, signifying perhaps more than anything else the pol 
icy distance between the Conservative and Labor parties (Ovenden 
1978). With the nationalization of the 14 largest companies into the 
BSC in 1967, the adversarial approach had declined, and by the early 
1970s, consensus politics had emerged. The BSC became a vital sym 
bol of both parties' intent to foster general industrial growth.
British steel policy and its implementation were highly dependent 
on an alliance between BSC and the government which was not always 
smooth. Management at BSC and the government often disagreed on 
policy. Although the BSC was accountable to a cabinet minister and 
Parliament, the power balance of the relationship, in reality, tilted in 
favor of the top management of the BSC with its specialized expertise, 
which was challenged only occasionally by the government (Richard 
son and Duley 1986). At the same time, large sums of public money 
were necessary for the purpose of restructuring. The BSC faced several 
crises in the 1970s. The Ten-Year Program of 1973, developed by the 
Conservative government, called for building a capacity of 38 million 
tons (Bryer, Brignall, and Maunders 1982). This target was questioned 
immediately because of the 1973-1974 oil crisis and a decline in 
demand from autos, shipbuilding, and construction. The plants that 
BSC had inherited from the private sector also had outdated technol 
ogy and a large workforce. A 1970 development plan envisioned pro 
duction of more than 40 million tons per annum by 1980, with the 
construction of major new greenfield works at Redcar and production 
at five large coastal works: Ravenscraig, Tesside, Scunthorpe, Llan- 
wern, and Port Talbot. This plan was modified by a government task 
force which reduced projected capacity to 28 to 30 million tons. This 
strategy was expected to result in the loss of an additional 30,000 jobs
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on top of the 20,000-job loss anticipated by an earlier strategy. The 
Conservative government gave relatively few details of the plants to be 
closed, preferring to take the political approach by giving the BSC the 
responsibility for announcing plant closings.
The return of the Labor party to power in 1974 required the new 
government to resolve its conflict between economic reality and jobs. 
The issue was how to reduce capacity while protecting the interests of 
steelworkers, who represented one of its largest constituencies. While 
the government debated a plan of slow change, the BSC launched its 
own plan involving the closure of unprofitable steelworks, the concen 
tration of production in plants with modern technology, a reduction in 
manpower, an attempt to increase the company's local business iden 
tity, a reduction in central control and managerial overhead, and an 
improvement in direct communications with the workforce. Direct 
communications became part of a social policy aimed at softening the 
effects of change and creating a climate where change would become 
more acceptable. The social policy included a consultation process 
involving employees, trade unions, and local government; counseling 
programs for individual employees; voluntary quit arrangements; early 
retirement; retraining; compensation payments for leaving the corpora 
tion; and job creation programs.
In 1977, BSC had 23 steelmaking centers. Many of these centers 
relied on outdated technology and work practices that inhibited pro 
ductivity growth. Continued operation of these plants increased the 
risk of the Corporation collapsing, and BSC decided to close down all 
costly operations. During the same year, the Labor government aban 
doned its noninterventionist approach when it realized that BSC's 
financial position was deteriorating. It accepted plant closings while 
encouraging BSC to offer large severance payments to laid-off 
employees. The Labor government supported this approach by increas 
ing the BSC's borrowing limit in response to escalating losses ($234 
million in 1979-80). 1
The immense significance of the three-month steel strike at the 
beginning of 1980 is discussed in chapter 3.
In June 1980, lan MacGregor was appointed chairman of BSC under 
a Conservative government, and downsizing continued. The company 
polled its employees on a plan to eliminate 20,000 jobs, and although
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the unions hotly disputed this plan, the majority of the workforce 
accepted it. The issue was preserving some jobs or none.
The Conservative government was anxious to privatize BSC, and 
the company was split into a number of profit centers, taking manage 
ment decisions away from the head office and giving them to local 
management. The new structure was based on product specialization, 
and separate companies were started at the same time that capacity was 
reduced by cutting back on the number of blast furnaces and melting 
shops. BSC also sold its non-steel-related affiliates and ended a num 
ber of joint ventures.
Restructuring brought large increases in labor productivity, despite a 
severe drop in output. Man-hours needed to make a ton of steel at BSC 
were more than halved between the 1980/81 and 1983/84 financial 
years. Labor productivity at the Llanwern works increased six times 
between 1975 and 1984, and Port Talbot also achieved world standards 
for productivity levels.
BSC began to emerge by the mid-1980s as a profitable maker of 
steel and increased production back up to 14.7 million tons. The Brit 
ish government had forgiven most of the loans to the company. BSC 
continued to cut employment, which fell to 53,000 in 1988. By 
improving manufacturing methods and cutting employment, the com 
pany made a large improvement in productivity and reduced the num 
ber of man-hours to produce a ton of steel from 14.5 in 1980 to 5 in 
1988. As of November 1988, British Steel had spent $435, before 
taxes, per ton of steel shipped, compared to industry averages of $445 
in France, $467 in West Germany, $475 in the United States, and $535 
in Japan. The reader should be warned that cross-country comparisons 
of the cost of steelmaking vary from year-to-year and country-to-coun 
try with changes in exchange rates (Wall Street Journal, November 16, 
1988).
BSC showed a profit of $672 million in 1987 after 10 years of defi 
cits (Economist, October 29,1988). This turnaround was capped by the 
British government's privatization of the company in November 1988.
United States
The United States was second only to Great Britain in the relative 
size of the changes in its steel industry, which declined by 25 percent
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between 1970 and 1990 (see table 1.1) and lost half of its jobs (see 
table 1.2). 2 The major structural changes in steel began during the 
recession of 1982 in response to the problems of overcapacity and the 
influx of foreign steel products. Imports entered the domestic market 
during a 116-day strike in 1959 when customers turned to overseas 
steel manufacturers (Goldberg 1986). This import trend continued, 
with substantial increases every three years as customers sought a 
hedge against the impact of a possible strike. In 1975, there were'20 
integrated steel companies with 47 operating plants in the United 
States, but by 1987, the number of companies had been reduced to 14 
with 23 plants. These changes were accomplished by the retirement of 
older, inefficient plants and equipment, a change in pricing policy from 
base point plus shipping costs pricing to competitive pricing, mergers, 
joint ventures, diversification, and divestiture. New labor agreements 
also provided for wage and work practice concessions. This is dis 
cussed in chapter 3.
Most companies used at least one of these strategies, which resulted 
in large reductions in employment The abandonment of sub marginal 
facilities by multiplant firms had a significant impact particularly in the 
historic steelmaking region stretching from Pittsburgh to Youngstown 
(Fuechtmann 1989; Hoerr 1988). One author maintained that closings 
in 1977-1979 were "helter-skelter," and that more gradual phasing out 
of the facilities would have made it possible to transfer some of the 
surplus workers to other operations in order to hold down the enor 
mous separation costs that rise from dismissal. Unprofitable product 
lines and their relevant facilities in surviving plants and firms were 
closed. This trend clearly established more specialization among the 
largest firms.
In a well-designed merger, a steel firm might achieve profitability. It 
becomes much easier to close high-cost facilities without leaving a 
market segment. Large capital outlays may not be necessary, as assets 
are combined and selling and administrative costs are reduced with one 
group of managers instead of two. In 1984, the Youngstown Sheet and 
T\ibe Corporation was acquired by the Jones and Laughlin Corpora 
tion, which was owned by Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV). Subsequently, 
Jones and Laughlin merged with Republic Steel Corporation under 
LTV, forming the nation's second largest steel producer. The merger 
was approved by the Justice Department after an original rejection and
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considerable controversy. The reason given for the initial rejection was 
that it would have created a firm with too large a share of the flat-rolled 
steel market. The key reason for the about-face by government was the 
agreement by the two firms to sell two Republic plants, a flat-rolled 
mill in Gadsden, Alabama and a stainless steel sheet finishing facility 
in Massillon, Ohio. This action cut the resulting market share to an 
acceptable level. The Justice Department's actions served notice of the 
existence of a maximum market share of approximately 20 percent, the 
amount resulting from the amended LTV merger, that could be held by 
any one steelmaker in the flat-rolled steel market. The Justice Depart 
ment also required LTV to retain all pension and debt liabilities at 
Gadsden and Massillon for 10 years. To prevent possible price collu 
sion, the Department prohibited LTV from supplying operating data to 
the American Iron & Steel Institute for a period of 10 years.
Joint ventures were also undertaken by the U.S. firms. This strategy 
is most applicable at a greenfield site where joint ownership can be 
established at the outset. Joint ventures involve mutual division of 
ownership as well as mutual location decisions. In a highly capital- 
intensive industry where capital funds are scarce, a joint venture offers 
the advantages of reducing each firm's contribution and reducing unit 
costs because of higher utilization rates. Bethlehem and Inland Steel 
joined in a venture to produce electro galvanized steel, and USS joined 
with Pohan of South Korea and Worthington Industries of the United 
States.
A number of foreign producers have also invested in the domestic 
steel industry. Nippon Kokan acquired 50 percent of National Steel's 
steel subsidiary in 1984 and another 40 percent in 1990. In 1984, Kai 
ser Steel sold its Fontana, California plant to a joint venture among 
Californian, Brazilian and Japanese companies.
Diversification is another strategy by which many integrated pro 
ducers have sought to give some sense of balance to their income state 
ments. By entering into new businesses, the downside of the steel cycle 
can be somewhat offset and overall corporate profit levels smoothed. 
Good examples are National Steel's acquisition of United Financial of 
California and two other banks and the purchase by United States Steel 
(USS) of Marathon Oil. After failing in its effort to acquire National 
Steel, USS proceeded to spend more than one-half billion dollars to 
buy Canada's Husky Oil Company. With its $3 billion purchase of
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Texas Oil & Gas in 1983, USS appeared to be following a clear path of 
disinvestment in steel, including a renaming of the company to USX. 
USS was kept as the name of the steel division. David Roderick, USX 
chairman, when explaining the rationale for the oil investment, 
declared, "U.S. Steel... will invest our cash flow where we can make 
money. If that leads to further diversification, so be it" With regard to 
divestiture, many firms, in an effort to generate funds for technological 
improvements, have been forced to evaluate the composition of the 
asset side of their respective corporate balance sheets. Raw material 
reserves and unneeded equipment have been the primary items dis 
carded for cash. This move has been an important part of the steel 
industry's strategy, since cash for technological upgrading is one of the 
highest priorities in the industry. The sale of National Steel's Weirton 
plant to its employees in 1983-84 avoided shutdown costs and allowed 
National to continue in steel (Torrence 1989).
USS provides a case study of the typical structural changes that took 
place among the integrated firms. USS had long been the industry 
leader, but the company experienced adversity during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Capital shortages produced imbalances among stages 
of the production process, and new foreign and domestic competitive 
forces caused USS to undergo massive changes between 1977 and 
1984 and embark on a new strategy toward its steel operations.
USS, like other integrated steel producers, decided to make drastic 
changes in technology in its steel facilities in the mid-1970s. At the 
beginning of the 1970s, USS had intended to upgrade both hot-end and 
finishing-end equipment at many facilities, and many USS facilities 
were in the middle of modernization when the steel market began to 
decline. As the market declined, most modernization projects were dis 
continued, which left their mills with severe imbalances in technology. 
Some phases of the process had been modernized and others had not. 
USS decided to develop only four facilities: Fairfield, Alabama; 
Lorain, Ohio; Gary, Indiana; and Baytown, Texas. At Fairfield in 1986, 
following a union agreement to change restrictive work rules and to 
withdraw manning grievances, USS began the construction of a $750 
million seamless-pipe mill and continuous bloom caster. The agree 
ment will be discussed in chapter 3. In 1983, after the reopening of the 
Fairfield facility, which had been closed since June of 1982, USS 
announced plans to build a $200 million dollar continuous slab caster
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at Fairfield Works and improve the hot-strip facility and the cold- 
reduction mill. This upgrade was completed in 1989.
In 1981, USS announced that a new continuous round caster would 
also be built in Lorain. This equipment was meant to reduce energy use 
by 50 percent because of the elimination of ingot pouring, stripping, 
and rolling, and was a part of a $145 million modernization plan at 
Lorain. Also included was computerized process control equipment 
designed to optimize BOF-to-caster performance. This caster was 
designed to work in tandem with the preexisting pipe facilities at 
Lorain. In 1984, modifications were made to the round caster to enable 
it to also produce billets, the basis of rod- and wire-related products. 
Rod operations, which were curtailed with closings at other facilities, 
were moved to Lorain for modern, low-cost production.
In 1982, the old Gary Works slab caster, USS's first, was modern 
ized, and funds were approved for the construction of a second caster 
to provide more durable slab for hot-strip facilities.
USS has also sought to diversify into other lines of business, divest 
itself of unprofitable or unneeded assets, and enter into joint ventures 
with other producers. It began in 1980 to sell off assets, which included 
its large Universal Atlas Cement Company, its corporate headquarters 
in Pittsburgh, an electrical cord division, and a tire cord division. Uni 
versal Atlas was sold to a German firm, primarily because its continued 
profitability would have required extensive capital infusions which 
USS was unprepared to make. The sell-offs also included raw material 
reserves. In the late 1970s, USS sold some 49,000 acres of timberland 
to International Paper and further timber assets to the Mead Corpora 
tion. Conoco entered into an agreement to lease USS coal properties, 
and Soqui agreed to purchase three coal mines and one-fourth of the 
company's coal reserves. At one time, it was estimated that USS owned 
enough unneeded coal reserves to last 100 years at full operational lev 
els.
Restructuring produced results: by 1985, man-hours per ton of steel 
produced had been reduced at USS from 10.18 to 6. In addition, break 
even utilization rates were reduced from 80 percent to 60 percent in 
1981. During one quarter in 1989, USS realized more income from its 
steel operations than it had in the previous 10 years. USS's policies for 
its steel division only partially mirror the rest of the industry. USS 
diversified more than the other firms, particularly into energy, and at
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this writing there are indications that it may sell its steel division. 
Other U.S. firms, such as Bethlehem and LTV, have taken the opposite 
approach and concentrated on their core steel business.
Cooperative Systems
Belgium and Luxembourg
Belgium and Luxembourg are discussed together in this book 
because their steel industries are connected through joint ownership 
and joint restructuring. Steel production in these two countries 
declined by 17 percent between 1970 and 1990 (see table 1.1) and half 
the jobs were eliminated (see table 1.2).
Steel restructuring in Belgium has two characteristics: the rivalry 
between the older steel-producing Wallonia region in the south and the 
newer steel-producing Flemish region in the north, and the very strong 
participation of the central government. State intervention in steel 
moved between 1977 and 1981 from tripartite participation among 
government, the trade unions, and the steel employers association, to 
financial support without control, to a share in the steel firms, and 
finally to a government takeover of Cockerill-Sambre. The government 
first assisted, then became a partial owner, and finally initiated the 
major restructuring plan. 3
Belgium expanded capacity between 1968 and 1975 and switched to 
oxygen steel production during that time. The most marked technolog 
ical developments were in the continuous annealing of sheet, in the 
treating of the surface of sheet, particularly the coating by organic and 
inorganic products and the ever-increasing computerization of the pro 
duction process, with a view to improving the quality of products.
The feud between Wallonia and Flanders was accentuated by the 
creation of the Sidmar complex near Ghent in the north in 1961 and 
dramatized by a strike in May-June 1977 at the Chertal site owned by 
Cockerill, a southern company, against what was perceived as a 
planned increase in capacity at Sidmar. Arbed and the Luxembourg 
government were majority owners of Sidmar, and each region asserted 
that assistance to one steel firm had to be matched by compensation to
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the other. Between 1976 and 1980, Wallonia received $2.65 billion for 
steel assistance, while Flanders received $5.61 million. This difference 
was offset by aid to Flanders for its coal, shipbuilding and textile 
industries. Government aid for Cockerill-Sambre was also viewed by 
the north as threatening the extension of the Flemish steel sector and 
restricting financial aid that would be available to other Flemish indus 
tries, such as textiles. Eventually, a financial limit was set on the cen 
tral government's contribution to Cockerill-Sambre. Above this limit 
the Wallonia region would be responsible for funding within the frame 
work of the national budget. A government share in the steel firms was 
gradually acquired during 1979. By the end of that year, the govern 
ment controlled 28.9 percent of Cockerill, a national planning commit 
tee was created to approve and direct steel investment, and a series of 
plant studies were undertaken to ensure the survival of Cockerill-Sam 
bre.
The question of industrial policy and the threat of rupture between 
Flanders and Wallonia were the major issues. The difficulties of Cock 
erill-Sambre became a test case for the political and institutional future 
of Belgium. The holding companies in steel sought to get the govern 
ment to assume a greater part of the risk without relinquishing their 
decisionmaking powers. The steel industry in Belgium, particularly 
Cockerill-Sambre, suffered from reduced sales for much of the 1970s 
and into the 1980s and had to reduce employment. While Cockerill- 
Sambre's economic strength ebbed, Sidmar, with a modern integrated 
facility, remained healthy. Cockerill-Sambre reduced employment by 
50 percent between 1974 and 1983, while Sidmar increased its employ 
ment by 24 percent during the same period.4 In 1974, Cockerill-Sambre 
accounted for 62 percent and Sidmar 14 percent of total steel employ 
ment in Belgium. However, by 1983, this gap had been narrowed to 47 
percent and 28 percent, respectively.
Important for the maintenance of government assistance to Cocker 
ill-Sambre were the political ties between the socialist General Bel 
gium Labor Federation and the socialist Belgium government. The 
Metal Workers is one of the strongest of unions in the Labor Federa 
tion. The central government received strong support from the socialist 
Metal Workers Union, and assisted Cockerill-Sambre. Tripartite agree 
ments between the government, unions, and companies resulted in cen 
tral government aid for modernization and the repayment of Cockerill-
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Sambre's debt The employment implications of this agreement are dis 
cussed in chapter 5. In 1980, a system was installed called "advanced 
recuperable funds." Cockerill-Sambre was able to borrow money using 
a government guarantee for its loans, while the government handled 
Cockerill-Sambre's payments. After five years, the company, was to 
reimburse the government. However, because of the continued decline 
of the company, this assistance continued after 1985.
A shift in the government took place in December 1981 from the 
socialists to a Catholic-liberal coalition. This coalition had consider 
able voter strength in the north, and the new government sought to 
change the state's role in assisting Cockerill-Sambre. At the same time 
the EEC set quotas and mandated restructuring for steel production. 
The EEC's role in restructuring is discussed at the end of this chapter. 
In order to meet EEC's requirements, a plan for revitalizing the steel 
industry was developed in 1984 called the Gandois Plan, after Jean 
Gandois, a French steel expert hired by the Belgium government to 
examine Cockerill-Sambre and by the Luxembourg government to 
study Arbed. First, an agreement to share restructuring was sought with 
the Netherlands. When this fell through, the Gandois Plan anticipated 
meeting the EEC quotas by combining steel facilities in Belgium and 
Luxembourg. The Gandois Plan integrated the steel in the two coun 
tries. Maximum rolled steel output was set, the number of steel forges 
reduced from four to two, cold-rolling mills were reduced from five to 
four, semifinished products were transferred between Liege and Char- 
leroi, and external supplies were arranged through international pro 
duction agreements. In September 1983, the Belgium government 
acquired 22 percent of Arbed, the Luxembourg steel firm, by subscrib 
ing to an Arbed loan. Several older plants in Charleroi, Liege, and Lux 
embourg were slated to be closed, including Liege's modern Valfil steel 
wire rod mill, in favor of an Arbed plant in Schifflange, and quotas 
were to be assigned to enable Cockerill-Sambre and Arbed to meet 
EEC limitations. At the same time, Arbed would close its hot-strip mill 
in Dudelange in 1985 and transfer its production to Cockerill-Sambre's 
Carlam works. Plant closings were traded for the avoidance of layoffs. 
Plant closings were expected to eliminate 1,000 jobs in Belgium in the 
near term and eventually between 7,900 and 9,000 jobs in Cockerill- 
Sambre between 1983 and 1985. Layoffs were to be avoided, with 
reductions coming by early retirements, attrition, and transfers.
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Employment policy is discussed in chapter 5. A1984 plan further inte 
grated steel in the two countries.
Arbed restructured in 1984, the Luxembourg government increased 
its share in the company to 24.5 percent, and the major banks provided 
rolling loans (Hargreaves 1984). Arbed and Cockerill-Sambre agreed 
to cooperate in the establishment of product specialization. Arbed's 
Luxembourg Works were to specialize in nonflat rolled products, Sid- 
mar in hot- and cold-rolled flat products, Liege in cold-rolled and 
coated flat, and Chaleroi in hot-rolled flat.
The new central government in Belgium also sought to limit its 
involvement in bailing out the Wallonia-based Cockerill-Sambre by 
fixing the amount given to the company at $155 million for early pen 
sions and $52 million for economic development. An ending date of 
1985 was set for the central government assistance. After that date, the 
burden was to be shifted to the southern regional government, and all 
future financing for Cockerill-Sambre was to come from the Wallonia 
regional government's revenues augmented by its share of the inherit 
ance taxes collected by the central government. The restructuring plan 
was presented to the trade unions in the hope of getting their support 
before submitting it to a referendum of the workforce; however, the 
unions resisted and the plan was dropped.
The key aspects of Belgium restructuring were the issue of equal 
treatment for northern and southern steel and the role of the EEC, dis 
cussed at the end of this chapter. The leverage that the EEC used was 
the loss or suspension of a loan for specific investments in Belgium 
steel.
The steel industry in Luxembourg was more dominant in that coun 
try's economy than steel in any of the other countries in this study. 
About one-third of the workforce had been employed in iron and steel 
production, the highest proportion among all European countries. The 
rapid decline in the industry's workforce, by more than 50 percent 
between 1976 and 1982, and the difficulty in providing the workers with 
alternative employment encouraged cooperation between Arbed, the 
trade unions, and the government. The Steel Tripartite Commission 
adopted a restructuring agreement in 1979 (Schneider 1980). The par 
ties set up an Anticrisis Division for Arbed and a smaller firm, which 
had the task of finding new jobs for redundant steelworkers. A tight 
network of labor-management information and consultation was estab-
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lished by the parties to work out joint solutions to the problems of 
restructuring. The Anticrisis Division will be discussed in chapter 5. 
There was close cooperation between the public authorities, the steel 
companies, and the trade unions in attempts to attract investment for 
the creation of employment. Collective agreements provided for vari 
ous forms of financial assistance, which supplemented state unemploy 
ment benefits and benefits granted under an agreement between the 
government and the EEC. Tight government controls were introduced 
to curtail overtime and restrict the employment of persons who had 
reached the age of retirement.
Germany
German steel production declined by 15 percent from 1979-90 (see 
table 1.1) and eliminated almost half of its jobs (see table 1.2). 
Restructuring was a combination of public and private efforts, with 
strong union opposition to plant closings. Federal and state govern 
ment support was concentrated in the Saar (Goldberg 1986).
In 1970, half of the value of the Saar's production was in raw and 
rolled steel, and it was this dependency on steel that forced the govern 
ment to bolster the industry in the hope of avoiding a regional decline. 
However, the Saar was disadvantage^ Its location was poor, it 
depended on ore and oil imports, and it had access only to high-cost 
local coal. Steel consisted of a large number of small to medium-sized, 
often family-owned, plants, with no steel-using customers down 
stream. In 1976 and 1977, the state and federal governments guaran 
teed loans of $69 million to keep Neukirchen Eisenwerke (NE) open. 
When NE and Rochling Burbach threatened to shut down their Saar 
plants, the state found a buyer in Arbed, and the government and the 
unions accepted Arbed's plans for restructuring the facilities and the 
workforce. The new firm, Arbed Saarstahl, used the same labor market 
programs in the Saar as it had employed in Luxembourg. These are dis 
cussed in chapter 5.
The federal and state government continued to support the Saar as it 
suffered a 23 percent job loss in steel between 1977 and 1978. Federal 
labor programs provided funds for regions with special labor problems. 
Companies could claim funds to retain the unskilled and long-term 
unemployed and to set up new jobs in the social services. Most of the
Restructuring in Eight Countries 29
money was used in the Saar, with 83 percent being used for retraining 
between 1979-1980. In spite of slashing crude steel production by 37 
percent from 1977 to 1982, the Saar remained in trouble. It was bailed 
out by state funds in 1982 and 1983, but was still in trouble in 1984 
when steel in the Ruhr also encountered difficulties.
Production of German steel was concentrated in seven companies 
which produced 94.1 percent of all crude steel in 1979 and 33 percent of 
the EEC's crude and rolled steel (Esser and Vath 1986). The largest 
center of steel production was in the Ruhr with Thyssen, Krupp, Hoe- 
sch and Klockner. While most of the European countries were building 
new plants on the coast, which would give them access to overseas ore 
and coal, German companies chose to modernize the best of the exist 
ing plants in the Rhine and Ruhr regions.
German firms have restructured in the same manner as those in the 
United States, through mergers and diversification. Hoesch joined with 
Hoogovens and Thyssen with Rheinstahl. Krupp, Mannesmann, and 
Thyssen developed into conglomerates. Krupp reduced its emphasis on 
steel and moved into industrial construction and turnkey projects. 
Mannesmann moved into machinery, and Thyssen into heavy goods 
and industrial construction. For Thyssen, losses in steel of $160 mil 
lion were covered by gains in other sectors.
The government's role is illustrated by the cases of Hoesch and 
Krupp in 1981. When Hoesch sought help in restructuring its debt of 
$1.6 billion and Krupp asked for a loan guarantee, the government sug 
gested the merger of the two companies into Ruhrstahl. The companies 
came up with a plan for restructuring production and reducing labor in 
October 1981. The government sought to assist the companies though 
the creation of a program of job replacement at steel sites, transition 
projects for employees over the age of 50, extension of the research 
program for steel, and an investment grant over three years for restruc 
turing and modernizing. This plan for a new, larger firm was blocked 
by the unions.
In January 1983, proposals for restructuring were presented by a 
group of independent experts and included marketing proposals and a 
regrouping of the steel industry into a Rhine Group (Thyssen and 
Krupp) and a Ruhr Group (Hoesch, Peine-Salzgitter, Klockner-Max- 
hutte). Germany was the last member of the EEC to resort to a govern 
ment bailout of its steel industry and was reluctant to agree to EEC
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quotas on steel production. Germany viewed steel firms in the other 
EEC countries as responsible for the crisis by failing to restructure and 
by allowing nationalized firms that were not profitable to be kept open 
with public subsidies. Criticism centered not on the aid for displaced 
workers, but on retention of capacity. In return for reducing their 
objectives, firms achieved concessions under the EEC quota system. 
The EEC quota system will be discussed in the last section of this 
chapter.
When the German cabinet finally approved a restructuring plan in 
June 1983, it authorized $1.17 billion in government subsidies to help 
German steel companies cover the $4.28 billion in costs for restructur 
ing and the slashing of capacity to 13 million metric tons. Half of the 
subsidies would be paid by the central government and half by the state 
governments. Three groups were proposed: Rhine (Thyssen and 
Krupp), Ruhr (Hoesch and Peine), and Klockner. Before the plan was 
ever approved, however, the Ruhr Group fell apart. Krupp-Stahl AG 
was in receivership and was not included in the plan.
Restructuring faced another setback when plans for merging Thys 
sen and Krupp dissolved at the end of 1984. Krupp had another merger 
planned with Klockner and CRA Ltd. of Australia which would have 
created one of West Germany's largest steel companies (Wall Street 
Journal, October 25, 1984). Krupp and Klockner hoped to save $89 
million (in 1984 U.S. dollars) annually from these mergers. Because 
the merger would result in the closure of a mill and the loss of 1,200 
jobs in the state of Lower Saxony, the unions and Lower Saxony vehe 
mently opposed the merger. The merger ultimately failed when Lower 
Saxony refused to pay its one-third share of the $250 million the com 
panies wanted in government subsidies to cover costs of restructuring. 5
Despite the failures to restructure, German steel continued to pros 
per, and the large firms modernized while holding down costs and 
prices at the same time that they were diversifying. However, lean 
times began again in 1986 because of the weaker American dollar, U.S. 
steel import restrictions, imports of less expensive non-European steel, 
and increased government subsidies to the steel industry in other EEC 
countries. Further cuts were made in steel production and employment, 
and the federal government took further steps to help its ailing steel 
industry by excusing Arbed Saarstahl from repaying $335 million of 
the $850 million it had received. The Saarland government also waived
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$238 million it was owed by Arbed Saarstahl. Once the company was 
debt free, the government planned to buy a 76 percent share and then 
sell part of its holdings to Dillinger, a French firm who would assume 
management control. This was accomplished. Since 1978, Saarstahl 
had received $1.25 billion in government subsidies (Economist, March 
29, 1986). In October 1987, the West German government also 
announced a $333 million aid plan to help the 35,000 workers sched 
uled to be eliminated from the steel industry by 1989. The costs of the 
program were to be shared by the federal government, the steel produc 
ing states and the EEC. Steelmakers, such as Thyssen, planned to con 
tribute close to $666 million in additional aid to the workers (Wall 
Street Journal, October 6,1987).
In November 1987, another attempt to restructure part of Germany's 
steel industry was proposed as Thyssen, Mannesmann, and Krupp 
announced a plan to cut costs by merging parts of their operations in 
the Ruhr valley. The three companies hoped to save money, reduce 
overcapacity, and comply with EEC demands for output reductions 
(Wall Street Journal, November 27,1987). The plan called for the clos 
ing of Krupp's plant at Rheinhausen, but when the plant workers heard 
of the plan, they held some of the angriest demonstrations in decades, 
blocking roads and bridges in the Ruhr (Economist, January 23,1988). 
Krupp was forced to modify its position. It still planned to close the 
Rheinhausen mill, but it proposed creating substitute jobs or giving 
early pensions to all but 1,300 of the affected workers (Wall Street 
Journal, January 28, 1988). A social plan for Krupp was worked out 
with the cooperation of Mannesmann and Thyssen. These companies 
pledged to hire some of the Krupp workers, and the phase-out contin 
ued until the end of the 1990.
Restructuring after 1975 was characterized by a distinction between 
the severely disadvantaged Saar, which required massive government 
financial assistance, and the Ruhr, where the companies initially pur 
sued private measures. The unions strongly resisted plant closings, and 
by 1983-1987 the government had contributed $1.72 billion to restruc 
turing (Economist, March 7,1987).
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Japan
Japan is the only country in this study, other than Canada, to 
increase its production between 1970 and 1990 (18 percent) at the 
same time that it also reduced employment by 44 percent6 The Japa 
nese steel industry began to think about restructuring in 1978 in order 
to maintain its position in the world steel market. Several producers 
considered closing unnecessary plants and cutting back their capacity. 
The Nippon Steel Corporation (NSC), Japan's leader, made plans to 
shut down its Kamaishi plant, which employed 8,000 people and repre 
sented 80 percent of the local economy. By 1981, the prediction was 
for a decrease of 2 to 3 percent a year in output. The industry projected 
lower demand in Japan and overseas because of a recession in Europe 
and a generally sagging world economy. Sumitomo reported only six 
out of its ten blast furnaces were operating. However, technology was 
still improving and the newest Japanese steel plants could produce 
1,800 tons of steel per man year at 90 percent capacity utilization, up 
from 1,000 tons per man year in 1977.
By 1984, only 39 of the nation's 65 blast furnaces were operating, 
and those only at 63 percent of their capacity. Because American pro 
ducers had also suffered losses, the Japanese were forced to control 
their exports to the United States to avoid "dumping" charges. Overall, 
steel production had risen to 106 million tons in 1984, while using only 
65 percent of its capacity.
Japanese steelmakers experienced a further drop in production in 
1986, due to the continued strength of the yen. This was coupled with 
strong competition from South Korea and a worldwide decline in 
demand. In response to this, NSC announced further cutbacks and 
plans to suspend at least three of its twelve blast furnaces over the next 
five years beginning in April 1987. Japanese steel production overall 
fell to 98.5 million tons. In February 1987, Kawasaki announced plans 
to shut down its rolled-steel mill in Chiba. In the same year, plans were 
announced for bringing Nippon Kokan (NKK), the second largest steel 
company, back to a position of profit-making by the end of March 
1989. It was hoped that by the end of fiscal year 1991, NKK would 
once again be a world competitor. Its plan presumed that Japan's 
annual crude steel production would total about 90 million metric tons 
by 1990. NSC expected to suffer losses of about $650 million in 1987,
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but in November the steelmaker began to report slight recoveries and 
profits as domestic demand rose and employment was reduced. Out of 
NSC's twelve blast furnaces, five were idled and one reblown, bringing 
the total number operating to eight in 1990. Of NSC's eight integrated 
steelworks with blast furnaces, four were expected to be shut down.
Restructuring in Japan has taken the form of diversification, joint 
ventures, and a reduction of capacity. However, there has been a great 
deal of coordination of investment and policy intervention by the Min 
istry of International Trade and Industry (MITT) (Yamawaki 1988). 
Steelmakers initially pursued entry into new businesses that had some 
relationship to their traditional product. They began to sell their by 
product gases to chemical companies as "feedstock," allowing the 
chemical companies to reduce their reliance on petroleum. NKK went 
into engineering and construction in the shipbuilding, bridge-building 
and pipeline construction industries. Foreseeing an expansion into oil 
and gas treatment, NKK began to construct liquid natural gas storage 
tanks, drilling facilities, and offshore platforms. NKK also developed a 
division dealing with the engineering and construction of iron and 
steel making equipment and pollution control facilities for improved 
working conditions. In 1976, NKK helped build a $52 million plant in 
the Soviet Union to produce 500,000 tons of steel
Japanese firms, because of their success, became a model for steel 
firms in other countries and began to use their experience to assist 
competitors with their restructuring. In 1981, Nuova Italsider, Taranto 
Steel Corporation of Italy, called in NSC for assistance in restructuring 
(Masi 1986). It was noted that the Kimitsu facilities were averaging 10 
percent higher yields than Taranto, while consuming 12 percent less 
energy. Also, Kimitsu made better use of its equipment and achieved 
20 percent greater output from its workforce. Kawasaki collaborated 
with Italy and Brazil to build an integrated steelworks in Tubarao, Bra 
zil.
Diversification, however, was much broader than technology trans 
fer. Steel companies went into joint ventures with foreign and domestic 
electronics and computer companies. One competitor joined with a 
steelmaker to produce silicon wafers for semiconductor gate arrays and 
very large scale integrations for telecommunications circuits. In some 
firms, such as NSC, diversification was from steel to chemicals and 
then engineering and electronics, information, communication, social
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and cultural development (urban redevelopment) and biotechnology. In 
the spring of 1990, NSC opened Space World, a theme park on the site 
of a closed plant.
The results from diversification have been mixed. High-tech busi 
nesses are difficult to master. NSC opened and then closed a mail-order 
business and shut an international business communications center. 
Ventures by NSC in electronics, specialty materials, and biotechnology 
are growing slowly.
Japanese firms, at the beginning of a major slump in demand in 
1982, also began to enter into joint ventures in the United States 
(Peterson 1990). They sought access to U.S. markets, particularly to 
the business of their transplanted auto companies. In April of 1982, 
NSC joined with Reed Tabular Productions Company to establish 
Reed Nippon Corporation, a specialized tool manufacturing and drill- 
pipe processing company. Also in 1982, NKK began negotiating with 
Ford Motor Company to purchase its Rouge Steel plant outside 
Detroit. And, in December, the Toyota Motor Corporation and NSC 
jointly developed a new sheet steel for car bodies to prevent rust and 
corrosion, called Excelite. The metal is a bonded double layer of iron 
and zinc alloy.
NKK, the world's second largest steelmaker, agreed in 1984 to 
acquire 50 percent of National Steel's subsidiary National Intergroup 
Incorporated. NKK was to pay $292 million to National and the sub 
sidiary was to be run as a joint venture. In 1990, NKK owned 90 per 
cent of the sixth-largest steel producer in the United States.
On July 16,1984, Kaiser Steel Corporation reported it had agreed to 
sell its Fontana Works to a joint venture between a Southern California 
business, a Brazilian company, and a Japanese company. The venture 
was to be called California Steel Industries, and the technical advisor 
was Kawasaki Steel Corporation. In December of 1985, Kawasaki 
Steel announced that it might raise its stake in California Steel from 
one-quarter to one-third of the ownership. Also in 1985, LSI Logic 
Corporation agreed with Kawasaki Steel Corporation to build a $100 
million manufacturing plant in Japan to be called Nihon Semiconduc 
tor, Inc.
NKK and National planned in 1986 to invest in ceramics, polymer 
products, new metals development, and computer technology, rather 
than simple steel production. In 1986, NSC announced an agreement
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with an American company to investigate a new area of expansion and 
diversification of the steel industry in the field of producing super 
minicomputers in Japan.
On March 23 of 1987, NSC and Inland Steel Corporation were 
reported to have finalized their agreement to build a $400 million plant 
near South Bend, Indiana for an 800,000 ton-a-year coating plant.
The Japanese found a willing partner in the United States because 
U.S. steelmakers wanted access to Japanese technology.
Sweden
Swedish steel restructuring was characterized by the development of 
a single nationalized company, the Swedish Steel Corporation (SSAB), 
and the major role played by the unions. The full participation of the 
unions in restructuring was greater than in any other country in this 
study and is discussed in chapter 3. Production was reduced by 19 per 
cent (see table 1.1) and employment by 35 percent (see table 1.2). 
Swedish steel had been suffering since the 1960s from declining profits 
due to increased competition from imports and losses in its overseas 
markets. Although Sweden is not a member of the European Common 
Market, its economy is closely tied to activities in the Common Mar 
ket, and the situation for steel was quite similar to that of the other 
European steel-producing countries in this study.
Swedish steel restructuring began in February 1976. The steel indus 
try council, composed of the integrated steel manufacturers, estab 
lished a government-sponsored Commission of Inquiry on commercial 
steel to examine the possibilities for restructuring the industry (SSAB 
Annual Report 1978). The Commission presented its report in March 
1977, proposing to raise productivity through changes at the crude-steel 
and rolling-mill stages. The Commission suggested that the production 
of market-ready steel should be apportioned among the major rolling 
mills, which were owned by the three largest producers: Granges AB; 
Norrbottens Jarnverk AB, which was state-owned; and Stora Koppar- 
bergs Bergslags AB. To supplement the Commission's work, the Min 
istry of Industry established the Steel-Town Group in May 1977, so that 
the county administrators could have input into the economic and 
employment effects of these recommendations on their communities.
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After the Commission's report, the three major producers began 
talks about the formation of a single steel company. The Ministry of 
Industry and representatives of the central unions, particularly the LO 
(blue-collar) and the PTK (white-collar) union confederations, were 
involved in these discussions from the beginning. Under the Swedish 
Co-Determination Act, the unions were required to have a voice in all 
matters affecting the employees' welfare. An agreement to form SSAB 
was signed in December 1977. The government would own 50 percent 
and Granges and Stora 25 percent each. This agreement also included 
projected financial support from the government, which was crucial in 
the deal because of two reconstruction loans, totaling $687 thousand, 
and a capital projects loan of $235 thousand.7 The Swedish Parliament 
agreed to support the restructuring in April 1978, but stipulated that 
employment in all the affected companies would be unchanged until 
March 31,1983. The three companies merged in May 1978, retroactive 
to January 1,1978, after considerable negotiation over the respective 
values of the facilities that the two private companies had contributed 
to the new company. This was important to the private firms because it 
would determine their percentage of ownership of the new company. 
The value of the carbon steel plants was exchanged for shares in 
SSAB. Each company contributed $156 million, all carbon steel 
plants, and equipment. Norrbottens Jarnverk AB, which was state- 
owned, contributed an additional $155 million in cash for the remain 
ing 50 percent of the shares. Restructuring also covered the mines and 
railroad owned by Granges and the mines owned by Stora. The govern 
ment loan was used to buy the railroad, which became part of Swedish 
Rail. These mines and railroads had been the source of losses for the 
private firms.
One estimate of the cost of the additional guarantee of no change in 
employment from March 1981 to March 1983 was $64 million (SSAB 
Memo). The first structural plan calculated that 3,500 jobs would be 
eliminated and perhaps 2,000 created. All personnel in the three com 
panies initially received offers of employment on unchanged terms. 
However, if the government required SSAB to take steps which would 
involve the Swedish labor market policy, SSAB would be compen 
sated.
SSAB's initial strategy for reorganizing was to make Domnarvet the 
strip and sheet manufacturing facility, Oxelosund the heavy gauge and
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industrial plate facility, and Lulea the heavy and medium gauge facil 
ity. The billets would come from Lulea and Oxelo'sund. The mining 
operations would be severely reduced, since domestic ore could not 
match imported iron ore prices, and most of the mines were closed. 
Overall, some operations would be shut down at each of the three sites 
to reduce excess capacity by 25 percent or 3.1 million tons and to adjust 
to the projected international and domestic markets. At the same time, 
new investments would be made at some of the facilities and there 
would be a changeover to the more efficient continuous casting. 
SSAB's plan was to move towards an integration of the three facilities 
into a single company.
A new strategy was adopted in August 1981, based on the continued 
poor international market for steel. After negotiations among the three 
owners, Stora Kopparberg's shares were purchased by the government, 
which now had a 75 percent stake, and Granges, which had a 25 per 
cent stake. The government and Granges both agreed to increase their 
equity capital, close the mines, and allocate products among the three 
sites. The government had also funded SSAB by $872,611 billion 
(1982 $ US) in reconstruction loans, debenture loans, and equity capi 
tal. The new five-year plan called for the reduction of crude steel 
capacity by 25 percent in order to increase productivity and decrease 
costs in the remaining capacity. The blast furnace at Domnarvet was 
closed and dismantled.
SSAB's annual report at the end of 1982 listed a profit of $4 million 
(1982 $ US), after depreciation and interest. SSAB (Annual Report 
1982) attributed these results to "cost reduction, mainly ascribable to 
the concentration of production to fewer units, the adoption of more 
efficient technology, and sheer hard work." It also projected a new 
five-year plan into 1987, in which it would seek to further reduce costs 
through continued restructuring and the introduction of new technol 
ogy. New investments were allocated among the divisions.
By the mid-1980s, however, SSAB was having a new crisis. Man 
agement had relinquished control of distribution channels, entered into 
a number of company takeovers, and encountered difficulties in 
restructuring. The board and chief executive were replaced at the end 
of 1986, and a new plan for restructuring was drawn up. This new plan 
differed considerably from the early restructuring plans, and there were 
serious differences of opinion between the unions and management
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and among the unions themselves (Larsson 1987). The unions wanted 
to develop SSAB rather than close down more facilities. They didn't 
want to concentrate on sheet steel or to place SSAB on the stock mar 
ket. Government support continued to subsidize operating expenses, 
with grants totaling $857 thousand in 1986 (SSAB Annual Report 
1986).
At the end of 1986, the government agreed to purchase Granges' 25 
percent holding, and the state then sold a third of the shares in SSAB to 
a consortium of pension funds. A plan proposed in 1987 called for the 
closing of the mines at Grangesberg and Dannemona, innovation in the 
steelmaking units of Lulea, Oxelosund, and Domnarvet (so that steel 
was completely ore-based and sheets could be manufactured for flat 
products), and closing of the electric steel mill in Domnarvet.
The European Economic Community
EEC steel policies are based on the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which led 
in 1953 to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Commu 
nity. Coal and steel were expected to lead the way to further economic 
integration.
The sharp change in demand and decline in steel prices provoked a 
call for community action early in 1975. In that year, producers were 
asked to give monthly notification to the Coal and Steel Commission 
of actual and likely employment. The history of steel restructuring in 
the EEC is a gradual move from voluntary action to mandated quotas, 
since the problem was both political and economic. The metal unions 
were an important source of support for the political parties and there 
fore unemployment was also a political issue. European parliamentary 
governments were reluctant to proceed with plant closings, which 
could cause a bitter struggle and social unrest. The Thatcher govern 
ment's battles to close coal mines and steel mills were risks that other 
European governments chose not to take.
The objective was to restore the competitive position of the EEC 
companies. The Coal and Steel Commission first undertook short-term 
measures to bolster steel prices through voluntary approaches, such as
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reductions in supply and production and the issuance of minimum pro 
cess and guidance prices. With a few minor changes, this voluntary 
system was extended or renewed in December 1975 and again in 
December 1979. Voluntary commitments to limit production were very 
difficult to achieve among the member countries because the steel 
industry represented the powerful interests of both the firms and the 
unions at home.
In 1978, the Coal and Steel Commission signed 15 voluntary agree 
ments on export restraints with the main foreign suppliers of steel to 
the Community. This was part of the anticrisis plan where surplus 
capacity was not seen as a temporary phenomenon but rather as a 
structural problem, and steel producers were strongly encouraged to 
close down their old and inefficient plants. The reduction of productive 
capacity in the steel sector was to be accompanied by investment in 
new technology to raise productivity and competitiveness. Plans for 
reductions, however, did not prevent the member countries from assist 
ing their own firms with subsidies allowing them to continue to pro 
duce at prices not sufficient to meet average costs. Fear of employment 
loss, as well as the need to preserve national self-sufficiency in steel, 
prompted the member countries to continue their help.
The Coal and Steel Commission believed its main task was to pro 
mote the restructuring of European steel. The leverage it used was con 
trol over subsidies for innovation, and it held out the promise of social 
funds for employees. Between December 1974 and 1981,245,000 steel- 
workers lost their jobs in the EEC, with Britain, France, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg carrying the main burden of adjustment in the form of 
plant closures. In 1980, the European Coal and Steel Commission 
imposed mandatory quarterly production quotas and laid down guide 
lines on price increases by steel product. A code in state aids called for 
governments to end all subsidies, interest rebates, and capital and loan 
guarantees to the steel companies by the end of 1985 and provided the 
Coal and Steel Commission with the basis for closing the least viable 
plants. The system of monitoring the steel industry and setting produc 
tion quotas is known as the Davignon Plan, named after Etienne Davi- 
gnon, the European Community's commissioner for industrial policy. 
The move to mandatory quotas to force downsizing was based on the 
forecast that world economic growth rates would be low, world con 
sumption of steel would decline, and reserves of steel capacity would
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continue to exist in Japan and the most efficient EEC producers. The 
Coal and Steel Commission would give aid or its approval only if the 
capacity increases resulting from proposed investment were offset by 
capacity reductions elsewhere.
Production quotas under the Davignon Plan were based on the max 
imum production estimates for 1980. See table 2.1 for these quotas. By 
January 1984, each member state was to inform the EEC of how it 
planned to restructure, that is, which plants would be shut down. Vol 
untary reductions made by the Common Market countries since 1980 
were counted towards the required reductions in capacity. It can be 
inferred from table 2.1 that the greatest efforts at restructuring prior to 
the Davignon Plan had been achieved by Germany, France and Great 
Britain.
At the same time that the EEC was moving towards mandated quo 
tas, member governments were still responding to internal pressure 
from powerful interest groups to increase government assistance. The 
Coal and Steel Commission, in order to reduce the impact of this con 
tinued assistance, mandated the end of all aid after 1985. In January 
1984, the Commission agreed to a two-year extension of steel produc 
tion quotas designed to share orders in Europe's depressed steel mar 
ket. By 1985, however, pressures began to build on the Coal and Steel 
Commission to return the steel industry to free market conditions, and 
the Coal and Steel Commission agreed to a plan that would gradually 
make steel production dependent on market conditions. Further cuts in 
capacity though plant closures were resisted by the members, who 
argued that this might require closing of their only rolling mill.
The EEC countries, with the exception of Great Britain, have histor 
ically avoided reducing employment through layoffs and discharges. 
These countries first attempt to maintain employment either through 
transfers or retraining or to soften the effects of employment reduc 
tions through voluntary resignations, and then to encourage both early 
and normal retirements. Table 2.2 presents data on employment dis 
placements in steel for the four EEC countries of this study from 1980 
to 1988 by how the displacement took place. The data support one of 
the hypotheses that follows from the comparative industrial relations 
systems matrix that Great Britain used dismissals, while Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and West Germany preferred to reduce steel employment 
through retirement.
Table 2.1 
Common Market Steel Industry Quotas by Country
Maximum possible 
production in 1980
Country (percent in parentheses) 
Tons (000)
Closures made and
capacity reductions
volunteered by member
states since 1980
Tons(000)
Contribution called for
by commission
Tons (000)
Contribution plus
reductions since 1980
(percent in parentheses)
Tons(000)
Federal Republic 
of Germany
Belgium
Denmark
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Total
53,117 
(31.6)
16,028 
(9.5)
941 
(0.6)
26,869 
(15.9)
22,840 
(13.5)
36,294 
(21.5)
5,215 
(3.1)
7,297 
(4.3)
168,601
4,810
1,705
66
4,681
4,000
2,374
550
250
18,436
1,200
1,400
n.a.
630
500
3,460
410
700
8,300
6,010 
(11.3)
3,105 
(19.4)
66 
(7.0)
5,311 
(19.7)
4,500 
(19.7)
5,834 
(16.1)
960 
(18.4)
950 
(13.0)
26,736
SOURCE: European Economic Community, Economic Community Bulletin, 6-1983, p. 9.
Table 2.2 
EEC Steelworker Reductions by Type, 1980-1988
Belgium
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total
Dismissals
588
376
240
919
994
250
454
1,653
347
5,821
Voluntary 
resignations
492
295
223
177
175
233
183
229
2,007
Retirements
1,154
1,869
1,067
2,229
2,753
3,354
693
897
14,016
Early retirements
1,104
1,838
989
2,186
2,708
3,314
657
823
13,619
Other reasons
1,633
1,126
1,727
1,291
1,577
1,057
1,474
9,885
Total
588
3,126
5,875
4,324
7,313
7,177
8,932
4,243
3,770
45,348
Great Britain
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
40,039
13,739
7,816
6,846
1,687
2,094
2,029
1,045
1,773
1,133
717
822
836
850
734
9,037
5,166
3,796
1,006
1,241
1,647
1,148
8,515
4,940
3,689
880
1,054
1,372
875
3,047
3,312
2,156
1,734
1,540
1,093
40,039
33,064
22,102
18,360
6,551
6,959
7,438
4,895
1988
Total
333
75,628
779
7,644
1,029
24,070
725
22,050
1,287
14,169
4,153
143,561
Luxembourg
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total
35
40
20
31
13
18
25
27
31
240
315
312
312
342
396
140
92
113
158
2,180
603
1,150
1,075
713
743
726
851
834
6,695
255
782
829
522
514
528
527
578
4,535
1,865
914
1,094
615
337
750
413
5,988
350
1,210
4,129
3,191
2,738
2,030
1,727
2,268
2,014
19,657
West Germany
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total
4,123
3,904
2,479
2,029
942
902
1,398
2,841
984
19,602
5,835
3,033
1,781
1,582
1,619
2,049
1,888
4,054
19,631
5,370
6,721
8,923
10,243
4,610
8,527
5,477
1,844
53,925
4,380
5,832
7,597
9,588
3,939
7,811
4,771
3,333
47,251
10,795
7,268
12,091
7,723
9,746
9,491
9,861
66,975
4,123
19,489
28,860
27,598
34,446
18,793
29,531
24,468
17,866
205,174
Table 2.2 (continued)
Total Four Countries
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total
Dismissals
44,785
18,059
10,555
9,825
3,636
3,264
3,906
5,566
1,695
101,291
Voluntary 
resignations
315
8,412
4,773
3,063
2,977
2,770
3,224
2,918
3,010
31,462
Retirements
16,164
14,906
14,861
14,191
9,347
14,254
8,169
6,814
98,706
Early retirements
14,254
13,392
13,104
13,176
8,215
13,025
6,830
5,459
87,455
Other reasons
17,340
12,620
17,068
11,363
13,200
12,391
13,035
97,017
SOURCES: European Economic Community, Eurostat, Employment and Unemployment, 1988, p. 177 and UECSC, Employment Iron and Steel, 1987, 
p. 4.
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Financial assistance was the carrot used by the EEC to force the 
downsizing. Based upon the Coal and Steel Treaty of 1951, assistance 
is provided "if the introduction of new technical processes or equip 
ment should lead to an exceptionally large reduction in labor require 
ments in the coal and steel industry, making it particularly difficult in 
one or more areas to re-employ redundant workers." The Commission 
may pay for unemployment (tide-over) allowances, resettlement allow 
ances and vocational retraining. The same aid is available if there are 
"fundamental changes." European Coal and Steel Community funds 
may be used to pay allowances in order to "enable them to continue 
paying such of their workers as may have to be temporarily paid as a 
result of the industry's change of activity." This aid, which comes from 
an annual tax on coal and steel firms, is nonrepayable and is condi 
tional upon matching funds by each country. Financial aid was 
extended by the Treaty of Rome (1952), which provided for the estab 
lishment of a European Social Fund with the task "of rendering the 
employment of workers easier and of increasing their geographical and 
occupational mobility within the Community."
The quotas imposed in the 1980s were backed up by the social pro 
grams begun in 1984. Aid from the Social Fund and Readaptation Aid 
were made available for: voluntary early retirement, short-time work 
ing, tide-over allowances, training and retraining, severance pay, and 
other benefits. Table 2.3 presents the data on Social Fund commitments 
to the four EEC countries of this study for 1973-1985.
Comparisons among the four countries in their use of the Social 
Fund are difficult because of the differences in the size of their employ 
ment reductions. Germany had 31.61 percent of the total employment 
reduction between 1974-1984, and during this same period received 
55.21 percent of the total Social Fund disbursement. For the same 
period, the figures for Great Britain are 52.69 percent and 40.00 per 
cent, respectively. Great Britain appears to have used less of the total 
appropriations, although its job losses were greater than West Ger 
many's. There is some discussion in the literature that the BSC and the 
British government failed to apply for all of the Social Fund's monies 
to which they were entitled (Iron and Steel Confederation).
Readaptation Aid to steel workers was in the form of income mainte 
nance during unemployment, supplements to early pensions, training 
allowances, mobility assistance, severance payments and short-time
Table 23
Social Fund Commitments for Steel in the Four EEC Countries, 1973-1985
(Millions of $ US)
Country
Year
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Total
Percentage
Belgium
8.50
8.22
9.35
8.87
13.29
15.83
22.98
38.37
25.17
22.81
26.05
63.39
93.27
356.10
7
Great Britain
67.78
78.30
128.46
120.22
305.05
159.32
283.23
309.72
270.27
428.28
455.14
616.81
494.13
3,716.71
74
Luxembourg
.05
.01
.03
.08
.17
.50
1.44
1.22
.61
.45
.79
.36
.80
6.51
1
West Germany
23.55
35.12
48.63
50.19
91.29
85.72
76.25
141.38
81.00
88.23
88.17
58.41
100.55
968.49
19
Total
99.88
121.65
186.47
179.36
409.81
261.37
383.90
490.69
377.05
539.77
570.15
738.97
688.75
5,047.81
(a)
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the Council, Eleventh Report on the Activity of the European
Social Fund, June 30,1983, Eurostat for 1983-85 data.
NOTE: The ECU©s have been converted to $ US. The ECU to $ US exchange rate used in this table and tables 2.4 and 2.5 for the years prior to 1979 was
furnished by Eurostat.
a. Does not sum to 100 because of founding.
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working. Part of the EEC's contributions were financed by a special 
program for steel begun in 1981. The data in table 2.4 indicate that 
Great Britain and Germany, with the largest steel employment, 
received the most Readaptation Aid. Great Britain used less of the 
Social Fund and more of the Readaptation Aid than Germany. Great 
Britain received 79 percent of the funds for 48 percent of the workers, 
while Germany received only 14 percent of the total aid for a slightly 
smaller proportion, 43 percent, of the total workers.
A study of Readaptation Aid concludes that "tide-over allowances" 
or income maintenance during unemployment became an early retire 
ment aid (Commission of the European Communities 1988). That is, 
workers drew it until early retirement payments were received. As 
income maintenance, it was useful only for younger workers who 
sought new jobs. Social security systems also affected the type and use 
of Readaptation Aid in each EEC country. In Great Britain and Bel 
gium, Readaptation Aid was used as a substitute for social security 
payments. In other countries, it served as a small subsidy to top off the 
system. The study also concludes that Readaptation Aid made the 
restructuring process more acceptable by reducing the costs to the gov 
ernment and the firms. This allowed firms to make concessions to the 
unions and created a better climate for the unions to accept restructur 
ing.
The EEC's contribution could make up as much as 50 percent of the 
cost of general assistance and was concentrated in income supports 
such as early retirement rather than job creation. In Luxembourg, 
reemployment into a lower-paid job was subsidized for 18 months. 
Income support paid a percentage of the difference between the old 
wage and the new wage (95 percent for the first six months, 90 percent 
for the next six months and 85 percent for the final six months). Early 
pensions in Luxembourg covered up to three years and as high as 85 
percent of the former wage for 12 months, 80 percent for 12 months 
and 75 percent for 12 months. The EEC's contribution for the first year 
would have been 50 percent of the difference between unemployment 
benefits and 85 percent of the former wage, for the second year 50 per 
cent of the difference between two times the unemployment benefits 
and 80 percent of the former wage, and for the third year, 50 percent of 
the difference between 0.8 times unemployment benefits and 75 per 
cent of the former wage.
Table 2.4 
EEC Readaptation Aid for Steel, 1954-1983
($US)
Country
Belgium
Year
1954-75a
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Total
Percentage
Aid
4,665,292
2,942,937
841,616
3,201,590
2,534,860
129,977
n.a.
n.a.
3,539,824
17,856,096
4
Workers 
covered
10,790
1,957
526
1,619
812
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1,317
17,021
8
Great Britain
Aid
567,544
2,084,128
2,110,472
15,666,141
31,158,378
63,181,325
95,714,369
58,388,115
51,592,113
320,462,585
80
Workers 
covered
1,139
2,633
2,792
13,025
14,366
20,102
29,258
12,102
7,392
102,809
48
Luxembourg
Aid
13,532
n.a.
n.a.
1,924,878
1,531,658
3,744,801
303,670
n.a.
n.a.
7,519,539
2
Workers 
covered
220
n.a.
n.a.
541
894
450
193
n.a.
n.a.
2,298
1
West Germany
Aid
4,665,292
821,364
273,495
1,089,112
6,042,282
3,249,445
17,953,006
9,301,049
13,283,700
56,678,745
14
Workers 
covered
42,118
2,286
521
3,381
7,691
3,656
10,783
8,264
12,769
91,469
43
Total
Aid
9,991,660
5,848,428
3,225,583
21,881,721
41,267,178
70,305,549
113,972,040
67,689,163
68,415,638
402,516,960
Workers 
covered
54,267
6,876
3,839
18,566
23,763
24,208
40,234
20,366
21,478
213,597
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, mimeographed, Brussels, 
a. ECU = 1.06981 $ US in 1964. 
n.a. = Not available.
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Funds for income maintenance, which relieved the pressure on the 
unemployment insurance funds of each of the countries, amounted to 
$669 billion for 317,555 workers in the four countries from 1954 to 
1990. The largest percentage went to Great Britain, although Germany 
had the largest percentage of workers covered. Table 2.5 presents 
income maintenance expenditures.
The Coal and Steel Commission debated the production quota and 
capacity reduction issues for several months. Finally, in January 1988, 
it decided to exclude steelmakers with an annual output of less than 
200,000 tons from the quota system and to extend the quota system for 
other steelmakers until June 1988, at which time the quota system 
would end entirely (Wall Street Journal, January 7, 1988). The use of 
quotas and employment reductions were never fully accepted by EEC 
members. Some countries, such as Germany, thought that they had 
made severe voluntary reductions in steel output while their neighbors, 
such as Italy, had ignored the quotas, expanded production, and still 
prospered. One of the principal incentives for restructuring was the 
offer of the Social Fund monies transferred from the EEC general trea 
sury. When the EEC council refused to transfer any more of these 
funds, one of the major incentives for reductions in capacity was elim 
inated, and the quota system ended. After five years of production quo 
tas, 1980-1985, the steel community had taken 23 percent of its hot- 
rolling capacity out of use, and after eight years, 1980-1988, it had 
eliminated 280,000 jobs.
Conclusions
How well did the characteristics of the adversarial and cooperative 
categories describe what actually happened in the eight countries on 
the issue of restructuring and the role of government? Figure 2.2 pre 
sents a comparative summary of restructuring and illustrates the con 
clusion that restructuring in the various countries did not always fit the 
expectations of the typology.
The Canadian steel industry combines characteristics of both the 
adversarial and the cooperative categories, since there are several large 
private firms and several small public firms. The private firms restruc-
Table 2.5 
Income Maintenance for Steel in EEC Countries 1954-1990
($US)
Country
Belgium
Year
1954-75
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Total
Percentage
Income
2,945,292
813,452
4,370,402
3,350,982
772,858
614,202
2,652,500
1,924,272
2,662,573
1,481,069
8,242,376
269,206
3,757,377
974,724
306,045
1,085,197
36,222,527
5
Workers 
covered
10,790
610
2,986
2,186
472
610
2,354
1,142
1,756
807
4,285
332
1,716
125
141
297
30,600
9.6
Great Britain
Income
6,547,709
2,084,131
2,110,411
15,666,141
31,158,378
63,181,325
95,714,369
58,388,115
51,592,113
10,240,061
17,071,209
10,390,105
11,068,473
8,701,279
3,332,277
7,167,510
394,413,606
59
Workers 
covered
12,059
2,633
2,792
13,025
14,366
20,102
29,258
12,102
7,392
1,770
4,477
2,891
2,161
1,123
595
1,606
128,352
40.4
Luxembourg
Income
13,532
n.a.
n.a.
1,924,878
1,531,658
3,744,801
304,670
n.a.
n.a.
6,419,444
4,275,461
n.a.
n.a.
3,900,068
n.a.
11,184,132
33,298,644
5
Workers 
covered
202
n.a.
n.a.
541
894
450
193
n.a.
n.a.
6,087
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1,100
n.a.
3,217
12,684
4
West Germany
Income
4,665,292
821,364
273,495
1,089,112
6,041,561
3,249,445
17,953,006
9,301,047
13,283,700
10,839,258
15,288,972
27,993,101
4,587,968
50,692,671
19,038,382
19,897,761
205,016,135
31
Workers 
covered
42,118
2,286
521
3,881
7,691
3,656
10,783
8,624
12,769
9,332
10,490
9,133
1,459
13,162
4,603
5,411
145,913
46
Total
Income
14,171,825
3,718,947
6,754,308
22,031,113
39,504,455
70,789,773
116,624,545
69,613,434
67,538,386
28,979,832
44,878,018
38,652,412
19,413,818
64,268,742
22,676,704
39,334,600
668,950,912
Workers 
covered
65,169
5,520
6,299
19,633
23,423
24,818
42,588
21,868
21,917
17,996
19,252
12,356
5,336
15,510
5,339
10,531
317,555
SOURCES: Commission of the European Communities, 
Brussels, December 1991. 
n.a. = Not available.
mimeographed and Annex to the 7990 Report on the Activities of the ECSC Readaptation Aid,
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tured without government support, while the public firms received sup 
port, particularly from the provincial governments. Canada did not 
undertake a great deal of restructuring. It added to capacity slowly and 
suffered less from the crisis than the other countries studied, particu 
larly since it had a steady domestic market and the U.S. auto firms as 
customers.
Figure 2.2 
Comparative Restructuring
Environmental issues
Categories 
and countries
Adversarial
Canada
Great Britain
United States
Cooperative
Belgium and 
Luxembourg
Germany
Financial 
assistance
Private and 
provincial 
governments
Government
Private
Government
Private and state 
government
Initiative
Management
Management
Management
Government
Government
Outcomes
Form of restructuring
New technology
Plant closings
Plant closings, mergers, 
diversification
Plant closings, mergers
Mergers, plant closings, 
diversification
Japan Private Management, Partial plant closings, shifting of
government products among plants, 
diversification
Sweden Government Management, Mergers 
government
At first glance, the British steel industry appears to closely resemble 
the cooperative category. BSC, a publicly owned firm, received large- 
scale loans, most of which were forgiven. In practice, however, the 
company behaved very much as an adversarial enterprise in develop 
ing its own strategies, closing plants, eliminating jobs, and bargaining 
tough with the unions. In these activities, it received the support of 
both Conservative and Labor governments who had no choice when 
faced with the company's survival. Britain undertook deep restructur 
ing and eliminated plants and jobs.
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The U.S. steel industry fits the adversarial category well, since it 
restructured without government assistance. There were some excep 
tions in the form of import protection, trade adjustment assistance, and 
investment tax credits. The United States undertook deep restructuring 
with mergers, plant closings, job cuts, and diversification.
Belgium and Luxembourg fit the cooperative category well, since 
there was often tripartite decisionmaking. Belgian firms, particularly 
Cockerill-Sambre, received considerable government assistance, while 
Luxembourg steel restructured without aid for new capital but with aid 
for workforce reductions.
Germany fits both the adversarial and cooperative categories since 
the large companies restructured at first without government assis 
tance, while the smaller firms in the Saar received considerable gov 
ernment aid in the form of loans, particularly from the state 
governments. The German firms vocally protested the receipt of gov 
ernment aid by their competitors in the other EEC countries; however, 
by the middle of the 1980s, the German government was supporting 
creation of two steel centers. Germany undertook restructuring by 
modernizing and diversification.
Japan resembles the adversarial category and to some extent the 
cooperative category. A small number of large firms compete within a 
cartel headed by Nippon Steel. Government aid is not in the form of 
loans, but through the encouragement of planning from MITI, which 
acts as a source of data-gathering and dissemination. Japan undertook 
restructuring by downsizing, diversification, and reductions in jobs.
Sweden fits the cooperative category, since the merger of three firms 
into one was undertaken after government loans were assumed and 
government aid continued.
NOTES
1. All financial statistics presented in the text or tables were converted to US dollars based on 
the period average of the exchange rate reported by the International Monetary Fund (1990). It 
should be noted that these dollar values will fluctuate with changes in currency market exchange 
rates and can distort comparisons because they do not take account of different price levels.
2. For a review of the U.S. competitive position, see National Research Council (1985) and 
Crandall (1981).
3. See Capron (1986) for a detailed discussion of the changes in the Belgium steel industry.
4. Leon-Ulric Houard, Personnel Director, S.A. Cockerill (May 1984).
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5. See Economist (April 20,1985 and July 13,1985) and Graham (1983) for a discussion of the 
plan.
6. Japanese employment figures do not include large numbers of contract workers. If contract 
workers were included, employment levels would have been higher in 1970 and subsequent reduc 
tions much larger.
7. Orvar Nyquist, Executive Vice President of SSAB (May 1986).

Collective Bargaining 
in Adversarial Countries
This chapter discusses how the bargaining process and the relation 
ship among employers, unions, and government affected restructuring 
in adversarial countries. The United States section includes a case 
study of restructuring at the Fairfield, Alabama plant of United States 
Steel (USS). John P. Hoerr (1988) concluded that the Fairfield agree 
ment set a pattern for the industry in labor relations and new conces 
sions by other local unions around the United States. Expectations 
from the comparative systems matrix for the adversarial countries are 
that employers and unions would bargain over the impact of restructur 
ing on the workforce, and that unions would not participate in corpo 
rate strategy decisions. Unions in these countries are expected to 
hinder adjustment and raise the costs of restructuring.
Canada
Collective bargaining in Canada is decentralized. Between 1974 and 
1981, over 90 percent of the workers who bargained were in a single 
union bargaining structure, and 70 percent were in a single union/sin 
gle employer structure (Gunderson and Meltz 1987). Collective bar 
gaining has remained relatively stable over the past decade, and union 
membership has grown from 1974 to 1985, particularly in the public 
sector. This growth is related to favorable economic factors and public 
policy changes. The unions have been more militant than their U.S. 
counterparts, and labor disputes increased from 1965-1983 relative to 
1946-65.
Roy J. Adams (1988) characterized industrial relations at Stelco as 
conservative and adversarial over the years. He maintained that the 
steps the company took to turn itself around in the mid-1980s were 
nothing "new" and well within the bounds of the traditional labor-man-
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agement relationship practiced at the company. This traditional rela 
tionship at Stelco includes an accord agreed upon in the 1940s 
whereby Stelco made no attempt to undermine the union. If new plants 
are opened, there is a general understanding that management will vol 
untarily recognize the steelworkers as the bargaining agent. The union, 
on its part, makes no efforts to get involved in strategic decisions.
Bargaining became more centralized in the 1980s. The United Steel- 
workers of America (USW) locals formed a joint committee. However, 
Local 1005 at Stelco's Hilton Works still provided the leadership. It is 
considered one of the most militant locals in Canada. Traditionally, the 
Hilton Works, the company's largest site and an integrated mill, has set 
the wage and benefit pattern for the rest of the company, as well as for 
Dofasco, its closest competitor. Dofasco, a nonunion company, has 
consistently paid its workers the same rates as Stelco (Williams 1988).
A strike occurred in 1981 at the Hilton Works, located in Hamilton, 
Ontario. It involved approximately 12,800 workers and lasted for 125 
days from July 31,1981 to December 3,1981 (Adams 1988). The dispute 
occurred in the context of joint and coordinated bargaining involving 
other Stelco plants and the United Steelworkers locals, which idled 
approximately 18,000 employees at 15 plants in 10 different locations. 
The Hilton Works local, as in previous negotiations, was part of a bar 
gaining structure that included two-tier joint bargaining. The Stelco 
plants coordinated their bargaining with the locals at Algoma, the other 
major unionized firm in the industry. The pattern was that the Hilton 
Works Local 1005 would negotiate on economic issues for all of the 16 
Stelco plants that were organized. This pattern would not be broken 
until 1988. Adams (1988) argues that at Stelco, management was able 
to react to market shifts quickly without union opposition, since it was 
operating within the terms of an adversarial collective agreement 
where unions do not participate in corporate strategy. He also main 
tains that the conditions at Stelco did not lend themselves to union 
avoidance, since union acceptance is assisted by the Canadian indus 
trial relations environment.
Following the strike, Stelco's market share declined, employment 
costs rose, and Stelco's customers sought steel first domestically and 
then from the U.S. or Europe. Hilton has been important to Stelco and 
strikes at that plant, such as the one in 1981, were viewed by manage 
ment as causes for losing customers. This strike coincided with a
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downturn in the Canadian economy, and the demand for steel declined. 
Firms that bought steel in the U.S. paid more than they had for Stelco's 
product. On the other hand, foreign competitors gained from the strike, 
and firms that purchased steel in Europe reported prices no higher than 
they were paying for Stelco steel, even after duty and transportation 
were included.
By 1984, the company had turned itself around, closing three finish 
ing plants and a coal mine. They laid off 8,000 employees by 1986. In 
1984, Stelco sought an early agreement to maintain uninterrupted pro 
duction. This agreement was followed by layoffs and raised doubts in 
the membership's minds of the value of early settlements (Williams 
1988).
Negotiations in steel take place at the local level. In 1984, when 
Stelco sought to reduce its workforce, close its Canada Works, and 
consolidate several process, it negotiated an agreement with the locals 
for the transfer of surplus workers to the finishing works. This agree 
ment became the model for other plant closings in the company. The 
principal sections of the agreement included credit for full seniority 
when employees transferred; those employed prior to January 18,1984 
had rights to bid on jobs elsewhere, and if they were not employed as a 
result of bidding, they would be offered a job held by an employee 
hired after January 15,1984. Finally, a joint implementation committee 
was created, made up of three local union officials and three manag 
ers. 1
Stelco's reorganization in January 1988 into three companies was 
viewed by the union as an attempt to break the pattern coming from 
Hilton.
Great Britain
During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a definite trend toward 
decentralized bargaining. This was somewhat modified by the incomes 
policies, installed by the government during 1974-1979, which operated 
at the industry level. As political power has alternated between the 
Labor and Conservative parties from the early 1970s to the present,
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labor legislation has either been passed or revised to be consistent with 
the views of the political party in office (Bain 1987b).
The changes in union growth that started in Great Britain in the 
1960s continued in this past decade. Trade union membership rose by 
over 3.2 million during the 1970s, and in 1979, reached a peak of 55 
percent of the labor force. The decline in the traditional union sectors 
of shipbuilding, coal, and textile was more than offset by increases in 
the public sector. However, in the 1980s, this growth could not offset 
the loss of members in steel and coal (Price and Bain 1983).
Negotiations in steel were peaceful over the years. Most of the col 
lective bargaining took place locally without industrywide negotia 
tions. An arbitration procedure, established in 1969, referred local 
disputes to "neutral committees" consisting of two employer and two 
union representatives from another works. Steelworkers were repre 
sented by 18 unions. The Iron and Steel Trade Confederation, with a 
strength of 90,000 in 1980, represented about 50 percent of the work 
ers. It can be considered a conservative union (Eason 1990). Other 
unions in steel included the National Union of Blast Fumacemen, 
which joined the Iron and Steel Trade Confederation in 1985, the 
Transport and General Workers Union, and the General and Municipal 
Workers Union.
When the British Steel Corporation (BSC) was formed in 1967, it 
found itself bargaining with 23 different unions at two levels of negoti 
ations: national and local. These negotiations were formal, and the 
union branches were involved. Directors and union leaders might 
negotiate some broad agreements at the national level, but it was the 
local officers on each side who implemented, modified, or ignored 
them (Bamber 1984). Most aspects of blue-collar workers' jobs were 
regulated at the local level, including tonnage bonuses, manning agree 
ments, and productivity agreements. For white-collar workers, general 
pay increases were negotiated at the national level by the unions, while 
the detailed salary structures were determined locally.
BSC management wanted to centralize negotiations with the unions, 
and the Trades Union Congress formed a Steel Committee composed 
of one representative from each of the six largest unions. The forma 
tion of the Steel Committee was crucial to restructuring, because it 
provided BSC with an institutional framework through which the prob 
lem of job loss could be negotiated (Bryer, Brignall, and Maunders
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1982). Bamber argues that the unions had acquired control over the 
lines of promotion by exercising job control through seniority. The 
unions had a tradition of cooperating with the employers to exert 
power over the workplace, and Bamber says that this cooperation, 
combined with the unions' control over jobs, helped BSC to rationalize 
the industry without generally having to confront concerted union 
opposition (Bamber 1984).
Bryer, Brig nail, and Maunders concluded that from BSC's creation, 
large-scale job losses were envisioned. One of the first agreements 
reached with the Steel Committee was on layoff procedures. They 
maintain that instead of questioning the rationale for the layoffs, the 
Steel Committee merely asked the government and BSC for help in 
managing them. The Trades Union Congress asked for earlier and fur 
ther consultation over closures, help in dealing with local resistance 
from BSC senior managers when they visited the sites, and assistance 
in getting the Regional Industrial Directors through the Minister of 
Industry to survey the effects of plant decisions and set up joint 
regional committees. Bryer, Brignall, and Maunders said that the Steel 
Committee placed itself in a situation where it was shouldering all of 
the collective bargaining responsibility for the closures, including par 
ticipation in BSC's job creation efforts.
A joint agreement in January 1976, allowed additional layoffs by 
shifting negotiations on manning levels to the plants. This is the same 
approach taken a little later by U.S. Steel at its Fairfield Plant. It pro 
vided BSC with the ability to negotiate early closings at the local level 
based on its ten-year development strategy (1973). Tradeoffs between 
jobs and retirement payments were easier to achieve at the local level.
The history of restructuring goes back to the Ten-Year Program of 
1973. Under this plan, the industry was to be restructured by concen 
trating on the five large coastal "brownfield" sites of Ravenscrage, Tee- 
side, Scunthorpe, Llanwern and Port Talbert. Redcar would be 
expanded, and many of the smaller sites would be reduced. There was 
also reaffirmation that the Beswick plants were high-cost and over 
manned relative to international standards. The investment strategy in 
the 1973 plan for new technology and facilities was to be coupled with 
closings at inefficient facilities. However, by mid-1977, no closures 
had occurred because the Steel Committee and the Iron and Steel Trade
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Confederation at the national level refused to accept closure where 
employment alternatives were not provided (Upham 1980). The results 
of BSC management's ability to shift negotiations to the local level 
were demonstrated when the local unions at the Clyde Iron Works con 
cluded a plant agreement in 1977. This agreement gave them enhanced 
layoff payments for surrendering their jobs and broke the national 
united strategy of the unions. After the Clyde settlement, each site 
negotiated its own solutions. Within weeks, the Steel Committee, in 
order to regain some power, had negotiated a slightly better settlement 
for Hartlepool which closed that plant.
Most of the local unions traded retirement payments for jobs, since 
there appeared to be no prospect of keeping the mills open. What was 
negotiated was the structure of payments to favor the age structure of 
the workforce at the site (Grieves 1985). In March and April 1978, the 
East Moors site and the EbbwVale Steel Works were closed. In June 
1978, Shelton was closed, even though there had been no national 
negotiations over its closing. Later that year, Bilston was temporarily 
kept open when the Iron and Steel Trade Confederation threatened a 
national strike if the plant was closed without an agreement with the 
union.
Plants didn't close without conflict, however, and local agreement 
was not always forthcoming. Some locals fought closing and resisted 
their national unions' attempts to negotiate peaceful closings. In Febru 
ary 1979, BSC announced that it wanted to close the Corby site, which 
had 5,500 employees (Maunders 1987). The plant was well organized 
with militant local unions, and local union officials did not invite the 
Steel Committee into town for a period of eight months. The local 
strategy was to establish a trade union policy group to look at ways of 
ensuring Corby's survival as an integrated works, and the policy group 
engaged academics from the University of Warwick and Cambridge. In 
September, the company and the local parties met, but BSC issued 
notice that they would close the plant in January 1980, and there was a 
community strike. In November, the unions presented a series of ques 
tions to management, and the unions withdrew from all consultation 
meetings including the works councils. Nevertheless, Corby was grad 
ually closed during 1980 and the buildings torn down.
The collective bargaining relationship between the BSC and the Iron 
and Steel Trade Confederation could have been considered cooperative
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until 1979. However, the company's insistence that it had no more 
money to buy out plant closings with lump sum payments and still pro 
vide wage increases in plants that remained appeared to push the 
unions towards conflict In the summer of 1979, the BSC proposed a 
consolidated pay settlement which amounted to about 2 percent, dating 
from Phase II of the Labor government incomes policy and also up to 
10 percent in quarterly payments from local bonus plans. The union 
considered this merely the honoring of a commitment made the previ 
ous year. The bonus schemes appeared to the unions to put a ceiling on 
reward for improved performance and offered no guarantees. The local 
lump sum bonus plans put into place after the three-month 1980 strike 
were a bonus calculated at the end of each quarter based on the entire 
plant rather than the traditional shift-by-shift bonus. Management 
wanted to move to plant-level bargaining and more subcontracting 
among its plants. There was also conflict between the Steel Committee 
and the individual unions. The Committee, after nationalization, had 
emerged as the leading negotiator with BSC on nonpay matters such as 
pensions, holidays and job security; however, the individual unions did 
not want to surrender their bargaining rights to the Steel Committee 
with respect to pay, which included a system based on cost-of-living 
and production quotas.
Management and the unions appeared to be on a collision course, 
for while the unions had been gearing themselves for direct action, the 
BSC and its steel users had made their own preparations. The BSC 
sales force manned telephones on a 24-hour basis to ensure last minute 
steel supplies, and the BSC announced that "they were prepared to 
help customers by securing steel from other sources and arranged to 
import supplies from Europe if necessary" (Financial Times, Decem 
ber 21, 1979). By Christmas Eve 1979, most steel stockers had the 
equivalent of between 16 and 17 weeks' supply of steel in their ware 
houses.
The national steel- strike of 1980, led by the Iron and Steel Trade 
Confederation, was the largest strike to occur in Great Britain since the 
Second World War, and the first national strike in the industry since 
1926 (Docherty 1983; Hartley, Kelly, and Nicholson 1983). The strike 
was called by a union famous for its moderation after enormous pres 
sure from the BSC-sponsored Thatcher government, which sought to 
accelerate the pace of closures and privatize steel. It lasted for 13 weeks
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and involved about 150,000 workers. The major issues were wages and 
jobs. The BSC offered steelworkers a 2 percent pay raise and local 
lump-sum bonuses tied to increases in productivity, rather than a 
national settlement. The company also wanted to trade these wage 
increases for job reductions and more closings. The Iron and Steel 
Trade Confederation felt they were being asked to meet the BSC losses 
through large- scale dismissals and moderate wage gains to support an 
investment strategy to which they had not been a party, and the union 
criticized the company for not involving it in strategic planning.
The strike ended on April 1, 1980, when the Iron and Steel Trade 
Confederation voted by a narrow majority to accept the recommenda 
tion of the Lever Commission of a 15.5 percent wage increase, 11 per 
cent across the board and 4.5 percent from local productivity 
agreements. Local agreements, such as the one at Llanwern, provided 
for quarterly lump-sum bonuses and payments to those who would lose 
their jobs as a result of the "slimline" plan. These local bonus plans 
were negotiated across all the unions in the plant. 2
Worker Directors
BSC experimented with an additional form of worker participa 
tion—worker directors. This form of participation was not legislated, 
as the works councils discussed in the next chapter, nor were their 
duties outlined. Still the evidence indicates they had moderate success. 
Worker directors were introduced experimentally at both the local level 
and on the main board in the BSC at its start-up. 3 Both management 
and labor supported the idea. The BSC chairman, Charles Villers, and 
the general secretary of the union of the Post Office Workers, who was 
a member of the BSC Board and advisor on the development of per 
sonnel, industrial relations, and social policy, were in favor of increas 
ing worker participation in the running of the company. At the same 
time, the steel unions were pressing for worker input into strategic 
planning at each level of the company (Brannen 1983). The unions 
looked upon the nationalization of the steel industry as an opportunity 
to introduce the concept of sharing the power of managing with worker 
representatives. Worker directors were introduced on an experimental 
basis, and three worker directors were appointed to each of the four 
group boards. The Steel Committee received nominations from indi-
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vidual unions and created a short list of candidates to present to the 
BSC chairman, who appointed them. Attempts were made to ensure 
equitable representation by trade, occupation, and region. One criterion 
was that the individuals selected should have the necessary intellectual 
capacity to be acceptable members of the board. Extensive trade union 
and public service experience were taken not only as a proxy for this, 
but also as indicating familiarity with and ability to perform on com 
mittees and in the bureaucratic contexts. The worker directors tended 
to be older employees. Their average age was 55, and white-collar 
workers were overrepresented relative to their proportion of the work 
force. The worker directors were appointed for a period of three years 
and paid at the same rate as nonexecutive directors. The worker direc 
tors continued with their normal employment when not engaged in 
board duties. Union positions had to be resigned, and the worker direc 
tors were not allowed to take part in parliamentary political parties or 
to disclose any confidential information.
Initially, the other directors of the British Steel Corporation were 
hostile to the concept of worker directors and saw their appointment as 
redundant and illegitimate. They had largely been opposed to the 
nationalization of the industry and saw the worker directors as another 
move towards employee ownership. However, when they were inter 
viewed one year after the scheme had begun, a majority of directors 
favored the idea of worker directors. The majority of middle managers, 
employees, and union officials were also in favor of worker participa 
tion (Brannen 1983). But different groups attached different meanings 
to the concept of participation. These philosophical difficulties were 
reflected in attitudes towards worker directors. The major criticisms of 
the plan were that some viewed it as political, others as cosmetic, and 
there was a lack of accountability of the worker directors to either the 
shop floor or to the trade unions.
The 12 worker directors were reported to be very committed to their 
new role and displayed a great deal of enthusiasm. The boardroom was 
the main area of activity in the initial stages, and the worker directors 
were entering a symbolic world that had belonged to the full-time 
directors. They had to learn the language of the boardroom, its cus 
toms, its patterns of work organization, and its rules, as well as the cus 
toms for drinking and dressing. The interests of directors could be 
viewed as separating them from the interests of the workers. The social
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dynamic of the boardroom is to be a good board member; that is, to be 
a good director rather than a good worker. There were also pressures 
on the original board members to accommodate the new group and fit 
the new members into the regular board structure. Not to do so was to 
invite external threat to the board from the government and the unions, 
who had been responsible for nationalization, and internal instability 
within the board itself. The worker directors saw themselves as links 
between the senior management and the workforce, as well as the 
unions. They felt that the aim of the scheme was moving towards 
industrial harmony, and they laid stress on communication, mutual 
exchange of ideas, and the creation of a meeting point between man 
agement and the workforce.
The worker directors were sent to a five-week training course tai 
lored to their specific needs, which was jointly organized by the Steel 
Industry Management College and the Steel Committee. Training was 
a version of a middle management course and spread out over two seg 
ments of two weeks and one final week. The worker directors were 
exposed to the management philosophy of the British Steel Corpora 
tion and its management techniques. During the breaks between train 
ing, the worker directors worked at their regular jobs. The objectives of 
the course were to provide: an appreciation of the national economic 
framework within which the steel industry operated; increased aware 
ness of the issues facing the British steel industry, particularly the 
nationalized sector, and the organization and policies that the BSC was 
adopting; a discussion of some major aspects of trade union and Trades 
Union Congress policies; an introduction to modem thinking about 
management and relevant management techniques; an opportunity to 
formulate views about the role of the part-time director on group 
boards; and the opportunity to develop socially and personally in a 
learning environment (Banks and Jones 1977).
The training program enabled the worker directors to develop their 
own views as to what their roles as worker directors were. An initial 
job description was formulated for the worker directors. All full-time 
directors had functional responsibilities, and part-time directors were 
recruited for some special knowledge and influence. The worker direc 
tors were seen as experts on the shop-floor practice. This role limited 
their scope of action because issues related to labor relations formed a 
very small part of the board proceedings, and when they did, the focus
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was on the control of labor costs. There were several constraints on the 
worker directors, and they often found that they did not have the infor 
mation the other directors had. To maximize the impact of their pres 
ence, the worker directors got involved in committees and working 
parties in order to successfully integrate themselves into the manage 
ment structure. The director's role was strengthened at the expense of 
his worker role. Despite the condition of appointment that they drop 
involvement in union activities, the worker directors attempted to rees 
tablish relations with their own unions and other unions. Their role as 
directors gave them a formal status and a degree of authority in relation 
to the management system; however, they had no formal status in rela 
tion to the trade union system.
The initial plan had several weaknesses, particularly the lack of a 
clear relationship between the worker directors and the trade unions. 
The experimental scheme was to be reviewed after the first three years 
in office, but because of the reorganization of the Corporation, it was 
decided to extend the experimental period to April 1972. The Corpora 
tion also decided in July 1968 that an independent academic study of 
the scheme was appropriate, and research was conducted by a team. 
Based on the report of the team, meetings were held between the Steel 
Committee and the BSC, with the result that a new job description was 
formulated. In 1973, it was agreed that the worker director idea should 
become a permanent feature of the BSC structure instead of an experi 
ment. Several changes were made, including the greater involvement 
of the unions in the selection process for worker directors. The divi 
sional directors of BSC also agreed that worker directors should not be 
barred from holding "non-negotiating" union posts. Discussions were 
opened with the unions, and it was decided that each union could select 
its own candidates to be considered by the Steel Committee, who then 
submitted a short list to a joint union-management committee. The 
joint committee then submitted the list of selected candidates to the 
chairman of BSC for final decision and approval. It was understood 
that where the joint committee was unanimous, the chairman accepted 
their view. Where there was disagreement, the chairman would make 
the final selection. This system operated for the first time in 1974 and 
ensured a better link between the worker directors and the trade union 
movement, as well as a higher degree of support for the worker direc 
tors.
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In 1974, a BSC working party, which included worker directors, pro 
posed to increase the number of worker directors at the divisional level 
and recommended appointing worker directors to the main board The 
chairman proposed in 1975 that three worker directors be appointed to 
the main board: however, this suggestion was rejected by the govern 
ment through the Secretary of State.
A second level of employee participation was encouraged by the 
Employment Act of 1982, which required companies employing more 
than 250 employees to include in the annual director's report informa 
tion on action taken to introduce, maintain, or develop employee 
involvement. The BSC reported regular meetings with the Steel Com 
mittee. This committee reported that meetings had occurred at the 
national, "business" and local levels, but that it felt that these meetings 
had "very limited value." The Steel Committee argued that manage 
ment didn't bring the unions into the formative stage but presented pol 
icy as an accomplished fact that had to be pursued in order to survive.
Collective bargaining, as related to restructuring, was characterized 
by a lack of cohesion among the unions in the BSC. Although the Iron 
and Steel Trade Confederation (ISTC) was dominant, the other 13 craft 
unions negotiated separately. It was not until 1982 that the 14 unions 
met, and not until 1983, after the strike, that they agreed on a joint 
wage strategy. The ISTC represented about half of the BSC employees, 
but this percentage shifted over time as plants closed, production 
declined, and workers were laid off. At the same time the Iron and 
Steel Trade Confederation attracted nonsteel workers whose numbers 
were increasing. This raises the question of whether the ISTC resisted 
layoffs as vigorously as it might have had it been faced with large 
losses in its total membership. Vaizey (1974) argued that the ISTC was 
traditionally under the control of a right wing group and identified with 
the objectives of management.
The Trades Union Congress attempted to overcome the problem of a 
lack of cohesion when it set up the Steel Committee, which coordi 
nated the six largest unions. The BSC negotiated with the Steel Com 
mittee on employment but not over wages. During the course of plant 
closings there was even resistance by local union leadership to an 
appearance by the Steel Committee. The feeling was that if the Steel 
Committee was brought in, the priorities of the local plant workers 
would be compromised. The Steel Committee was caught by the strike
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without its own plan for restructuring. BSC management took the posi 
tion that its poor competitive position, relative to steel producers in 
other countries, was primarily due to overmanning and high labor 
costs. The BSC sought to decentralize bargaining, while the Iron and 
Steel Trade Confederation advocated negotiations at the corporate 
level. In the 1970s, management committed itself to giving advance 
notice of plant closures. This was supposed to be a two-year notice, but 
was later shortened to one. After 1977, bargaining with regard to 
restructuring was decentralized. Management of those plants that were 
closing negotiated with the unions concerning the conditions of clo 
sures, including special compensation for the workers concerned with 
out looking at the entire company picture. The ISTC came under 
pressure not to call a national strike over closings from those plants 
that were not faced with the problem.
Negotiating over payments to workers due to plant closings allowed 
the BSC to close plants sooner than the publicly announced dates. The 
payments were usually less than the full wages that BSC would have 
had to pay if the plants had stayed open to the last date. Finally, the 
workers at the threatened plants were more effective in resisting clos 
ings than the central structure of the trade unions. The local action 
committees were independent of the national leadership of the trade 
unions, and their main tactic was to hold a long series of meetings with 
the BSC in order to press the economic case for the retention of the 
threatened works in some form or other. The Youngstown Ecumenical 
Committee in the United States came closest to these action commit 
tees (Fuechtmann 1989).
United States
Collective bargaining in the United States during the 1970s may be 
characterized as following the principles and patterns of the New Deal 
Model developed in the post-World War Two years, and this was also 
true for steel (Kochan and Katz 1988). Since the organization of the 
integrated producers in the 1930s, collective bargaining has operated 
under the umbrella of the U.S. Steel Corporation and the United Steel- 
workers of America. The USW and the eight largest steel firms that
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formed the Coordinating Committee Steel Companies sought to main 
tain the status quo and prevent excessive competition in labor costs by 
industrywide bargaining.
Following a lengthy strike in 1959, when U.S. firms lost customers 
to foreign competitors, wage and benefit increases were uniform for 
bargaining rounds (Kalwa 1985). Steel firms were willing to pay more 
in labor costs rather than give up business and suffer from the frantic 
hedge buying that accompanied uncertain negotiations. On the union 
side, there is some futility to the use of a strike, since steel is not differ 
entiated by company label (Fischer 1986). The steel crisis and the 
specter of rising imports in the 1970s drove "Big Steel" and the USW 
toward a limited form of cooperation. In 1973, the two sides signed the 
Experimental Negotiation Agreement, which granted an annual wage 
increase of 3 percent plus a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) tied to 
the consumer price index, plus a bonus at the first signing. In 
exchange, workers pledged not to strike and to lend support to lobby 
ing efforts against imports. The Experimental Negotiation Agreement 
was clearly an attempt to avoid crisis bargaining in an already sagging 
industry. However, negotiated increases were not coupled with capital 
improvements, and increases in productivity did not keep pace with 
increases in labor costs. As a result, real wages rose well in excess of 
productivity improvement. Between 1973 and 1979, wages in the mills 
rose 119 percent, compared with a 63 percent rise in the consumer 
price index (Kassalow 1984). At the same time, the rate of productivity 
improvement slowed; it had grown at only 2 percent per annum since 
1962. By 1982, total hourly compensation in iron and steel was $23.78, 
or approximately double the average for all manufacturing. From 1976 
to 1983, total compensation for production workers in steel increased 
by 94.5 percent, while for the same period for all manufacturing 
employees, the increase was 81.1 percent.
As the competitive position of the steel industry began to suffer in 
the 1970s, industrial relations altered. Firms were forced to look for 
ways to cut costs; they began to accept the idea that to survive they 
would have to bargain an agreement specific to their own company. In 
the late 1970s, attention turned toward serious reductions in labor 
costs, focusing on wage and benefit rates at the national level and on 
work rule issues at the local level. Work rules were seen as restrictive 
to competition because of their requirements for more manpower and
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jurisdictional restrictions over what tasks could be performed. There 
was a move to negotiate changes in manning levels, in jurisdictional 
rules, and in the combination of jobs. This was coupled with attempts 
to reduce wage and benefit levels and introduce more subcontracting 
arrangements into the workplace. Companies used the labor cost issue 
as the key to keeping a struggling facility open and as a bargaining 
chip in situations in which there was a choice of where to place new 
technology.
The 1980 agreement was considered an example of USW restraint. 
The total cost of the settlement was estimated at approximately 35 per 
cent over three years. The union gained prenotification of plant clos 
ings, and the Experimental Negotiation Agreement was "decoupled" 
from the contract, with a decision on its renewal deferred (Kalwa 
1985). The contract was reopened in July 1982, and August 1, the date 
of the next wage and cost-of-living increases, was set as a tentative 
deadline concerning "discussions" of the current contract. USW pro 
posed diversion of scheduled raises to Supplementary Unemployment 
Benefits or lifetime security payments, investment in steel facilities, 
and employee stock ownership. However, the companies appeared to 
be dragging their feet by continuing to detail their financial situation 
without offering any specific proposals. In late July, the Coordinating 
Committee proposed a concession package, amounting to $6 billion 
worth of savings to be derived from cuts in COLA. The companies 
were adamant about the need for concessions, and negotiations were 
set against a background of company-initiated job combinations and 
eliminations and threats of plant closings throughout the industry. This 
led to hostility from the locals and rejection of proposed company con 
cessions by the union at the end (Hoerr 1988). However, it appeared 
that management sought to achieve large concessions in a single bar 
gaining round under U.S. Steel's aggressive leadership, and some of 
the other firms questioned this approach. The parties failed to reach 
agreement, but, returned to the table. The steel companies reaffirmed 
their united stand on labor policy, and continued layoffs resulted in a 
more conciliatory attitude from the USW. In September 1982, the 
USW convention recognized the need to balance wage gains with 
employment security, and they voted to resume negotiations. A key 
problem was COLA, which had accounted for 70 percent of wage 
gains since 1972. The issue was how to moderate COLA increases
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while retaining protection against inflation. In November 1982, the 
parties reached a tentative agreement, which would have reduced labor 
costs by 11 percent in the first year through a $1.50 per hour wage cut, 
elimination of two COLAs, and other concessions. The proposal was 
defeated in the union's Basic Steel Industry Committee, in spite of 
USW President McBride's support, by a 241-131 vote (Kalwa 1985). 
Two factors in its defeat were that many local presidents viewed con 
cessions as futile in preventing layoffs and shutdowns, and the confer 
ence did not have adequate time for detailed deliberation concerning 
the proposals.
Negotiations began again in February 1983, after Roger Smith, 
chairman of General Motors, telephoned McBride and warned that 
steel contracts for the 1984 model year were to be awarded by March 
of 1983. The March 1 deadline was met after the USW agreed to con 
cessions that amounted to 7 percent in labor cost savings in the first 
year. Costs were expected to rise by 11 percent over 41 months. Still, 
the immediate wage cut was reduced to $1.25 from the $1.50 sought in 
the ill-fated November 1982 negotiations, but it was a first in steel- 
worker history (BNA 1983). The USW held firm on COLA, and only 
six periodic COLA adjustments were not made. The companies prom 
ised to avoid contracting out, and the union agreed to accept negotiated 
combination and elimination of jobs at the plant level. The companies 
also agreed to reinvest the labor cost savings in existing facilities, but 
were free to close down operations and the Experimental Negotiation 
Agreement was not renewed (Ahlburg et al. 1987). The USS purchase 
of Marathon Oil was the catalyst for the inclusion in this agreement 
that required the companies to invest all savings from the wage conces 
sions in the modernization of steel (Block and McLennan 1985; Busi 
ness Week, July 21,1986).
As the union locals either resisted or adapted to management pro 
posals, the structure of bargaining in basic steel began to disintegrate. 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh withdrew from the employers' Coordinating 
Committee, followed by Allegheny Ludlum and National Steel. In 
1985, coordinated bargaining ended. The 1986 negotiations on a com 
pany-by-company basis were of two types. In one, companies felt that 
the only way to improve productivity was to seek a more cooperative 
arrangement with the union (Gerhart 1989; Sherer 1990). The second 
approach was taken by USS, which engaged in tough negotiations over
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reductions in labor costs. Settlements for the first group were arrived at 
peacefully. At LTV, Bethlehem, and Inland, the workers' take-home 
pay was reduced but concessions were offered in return. At National 
Steel, employment security and smaller wage reductions were agreed 
to, and the union guaranteed assistance and cooperation in reducing the 
workforce by a significant margin in future years. At USS, there was a 
six-month strike, which resulted in pay and benefit reductions of about 
10 percent. USS succeeded in reducing their costs below those of 
Bethlehem, their largest competitor. At the same time that the compa 
nies began to negotiate separate agreements, plants and locals began to 
negotiate their own arrangements. Some of these plant differences 
appeared in national contracts, while others were confined to a single 
site. Negotiations at the USS Fairfield Works, just outside of Birming 
ham, Alabama, set a precedent for other local negotiations (Hoerr 
1988).
The end of coordinated bargaining encouraged the decentralization 
of negotiations to the plant level. This created a problem for the USW 
leadership, which now had to reconcile its members' goals of preserv 
ing their jobs at each plant against the leadership's need for a coordi 
nated strategy.
The Fairfield Works
Plant-level negotiations at the Fairfield Works in Alabama are an 
example of the relationship between restructuring and local negotia 
tions in an adversarial setting and the tradeoff between site preserva 
tion and union concessions.4 The five-year period covered by this case 
study is characterized by continuous requests by the company for 
reductions in manning, coupled with the threat of permanent closure. 
The union was caught between wanting to hold on to what they had 
previously achieved and not knowing whether each management 
request was to be the last concession, or whether, even with conces 
sions, Fairfield would still close. The Fairfield Works is also an excel 
lent example of how USS undertook restructuring one department at a 
time at a brownfield site. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the production 
process and facilities prior to and after restructuring.
The Fairfield Works had been affected by the competitive pressures 
that began in the 1970s when the southern market for steel was hit hard
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by foreign competition. USS announced the elimination of its Southern 
Division, which had been headquartered in Fairfield, and its absorption 
into the Eastern Division. Rumors began to surface that Fairfield 
would close.
In December 1978, the new 5,500-ton-per-day, number 8 blast fur 
nace began operation, replacing older blast furnaces and ending a 
seven-year modernization program designed to make "hot-end" opera 
tions at Fairfield Works more efficient and in compliance with environ 
mental standards. More than $500 million was spent between 1975 and 
1978 on three new Q-BOFs, a huge, modern blast furnace, and a new 
battery of coke ovens. However, Fairfield employees remained unsure 
of what USS had planned. The company was in the process of deciding 
which of its product lines and plants would be closed as part of a ratio 
nalization plan. Stevenson, the Fairfield manager, in a letter to the 
employees, stated that "action had to be taken or things would not go 
on," hinting at a total shutdown of the facility. Stevenson reinforced his 
statements to employees by emphasizing that the letter was not meant 
to be a "scare tactic" aimed at pressuring the union into management- 
desired changes, but instead was meant to inform the employees of the 
severe crisis facing the Fairfield Works if changes were not made. 
Stevenson listed the problems at Fairfield as high absentee rates, fre 
quent tardiness, and large amounts of unnecessary overtime. Mainte 
nance workers were particularly criticized by Stevenson. Stevenson 
also cited the large number of USW locals at the mill—12 of them in 
1979—as a problem that required change. Each plant at the site had 
originally had its own local. In the opinion of the company, more locals 
meant the consent of more local presidents over local issues and made 
the flexibility of work assignments difficult to attain. Figure 3.3 indi 
cates the reduction in locals as a result of restructuring.
The union blamed plant problems on outdated equipment, excessive 
supervision and inexperienced managers. The company blamed the 
sites' problems on employee absenteeism and tardiness, excessive 
overtime and overmanning, and the large number of locals.
Table 3.1 presents the employment changes at Fairfield from 1955 
through 1984 as the company restructured. It indicates a continuous 
reduction in jobs. Employees were laid off and sometimes recalled as 
the company modernized different stages of the production process. 
The largest reductions took place between 1955 and 1970, when capac-
Figure 3.3 
Reduction in Locals at Fairfield, 1975-1984
Locals in 1975 Locals eliminated 1976-1980 Locals eliminated 1981-1984 Locals in 1984
1013 Steelmaking Shops 
1131 Sheet Mill 
1489 Ensley 
1700 Wire Mill 
1733 Pratt Car Shop 
2122 Tin Mill 
2210 Office & Clerical 
2405 Coke Plant 
2927 Plant Protection 
3662 Rail Transportation 
4203 Ore Processing 
2421 Bessemer Mill
1700 Wire Mill 
2421 Bessemer Mill
2405 Coke Plant 
1489 Ensley 
1733 Pratt Car Shop 
4203 Ore Processing
1013 Steelmaking Shops8
1131 Sheet Mill
2122 Tin Mill
2210 Office & Clerical
2927 Plant Protection
3662 Rail Transportation
SOURCE: E.B. Rich, Sub-District Director, USWA District #36.
a. Also includes pipe mill workers, some former coke plant workers, and any remaining maintenance workers. Included workers from plate mill shut down
in 1979.
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ity was reduced and the mining division eliminated. U.S. Steel contin 
ued to use the carrot of modernization to achieve concession in the 
1970s.
David Roderick, in November 1979, expressed his opinion that 
Fairfield could be transformed into a profitable operation; but, along 
with this declaration of confidence in Fairfield came the announcement 
that the Fairfield Works wire mill would close, putting more than 100 
additional employees out of work. Wire products were produced at a 
lower cost by foreign competitors and mini-mills. The closing of the 
plate mill was also made permanent.
Table 3.1 
Fairfield Employment and Restructuring, 1955-1984
Month Year Employment Type of restructuring
1955 
1960 
1970 
1975
July 1979
June 1980
December 1980
January 1981
October 1981
November 1981
April 1982
June 1982
January 1984
22,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
9,500
3,000
4,800
5,300
3,800
4,600
4,000
0
2,400
Iron ore mining discontinued
New Q-BOFs, Bessemer mill closed
Remaining Ensley facilities closed
Plate & wire mills closed, all hot-end shut down
Number 8 blast furnace started up
Ensley rail mill comes up
Number 8 blast furnace shut down
Number 7 blast furnace started up
Coke battery shut down
All hot- and finishing-end down
Q-BOFs, blast furnaces, pipe mill all begin 
operation under the new December agreement
SOURCE: Birmingham News, various dates.
In May of 1980, discussion of the possible shutdown of the smaller 
Number 7 blast furnace became public, as did a large rollback in the 
ranks of management personnel. Approximately 70 management posi 
tions were affected, and there were reductions in pay and job classified-
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tions for a small number of assistants to division supervisors and a 
large number of general foremen. Management at USS had been 
reduced by 13,500 between 1980 and 1983.
Less than two weeks later, the official announcement came that the 
Number 7 furnace would be shut down, with the layoff of over 200 
steelworkers; five days later, the company announced that an addi 
tional 700 steelworkers would be laid off due to production cutbacks 
resulting from an overall reduction in demand for steel. At the end of 
May, employment at Fairfield stood at approximately 6,000. The com 
pany announced that steel orders for the Fairfield facility were almost 
gone, and that a complete shutdown could become a reality within a 
few months. USS said that conditions had deteriorated to the point that 
the demand for Fairfield's steel had fallen to just 70,000 tons a month, 
which was only 58 percent of the 120,000 tons a month needed to 
break even.
Three days later, the news came from officials that Fairfield Works' 
large Number 8 blast furnace, the only furnace in operation, would 
shut down along with the Q-BOFs. All of the workforce would go on 
layoff, with the exception of those who would temporarily remain in 
the finishing end to work on inventories. This was the first complete 
shutdown in the facility's history.
On August 20,1980, the smaller Number 7 blast furnace was desig 
nated to be put back into operation bringing approximately 700 
employees back to work. The rationale given by management for the 
restart was a need to fill existing orders. Emphasis was placed on the 
fact that the demand for steel had not improved, and that the future was 
still very uncertain. Later that week, management and local USW offi 
cials disclosed that negotiations were underway to streamline the 
alleged inflexible Fairfield workforce into a competitive position. 
There were differences between plant management and union officials 
over how the streamlining would be done. To management, streamlin 
ing was necessary to reduce overhead and produce a profit, but for the 
employees, this meant the possible permanent loss of jobs. Privately, 
union officials admitted that some changes were needed and that they 
were "willing to work to improve efficiency, but not at the expense of 
work rules they had fought for and won over the years."
In 1981, USS added the carrot of building a new seamless-pipe mill 
and a continuous bloom caster. What it sought were concessions from
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the union and taxing agencies. The importance of modernization, from 
raw materials through the finishing process, is underscored by Crandall 
(1981) who maintains that efficiencies in steel production are realized 
only when all stages of the process have been modernized.
The roadblock to getting the pipe mill was removed on April 4, 
1981, when USS and the USW reached a memorandum of understand 
ing on changes in work rules at the Fairfield facility. The Pipe Mill 
Agreement called for changes in crew sizes, job duties, and work rules, 
and established new levels of man-hours in areas where hours were 
excessive. The pact called for no cuts in wages, benefits, or incentives 
and no consolidation of the numerous locals at Fairfield Works. The 
agreement had two components: a relinquishing of gains won in the 
arbitration of 15 grievances, and changes in manning practices. Com 
parisons had been made between manning practices at Fairfield Works, 
such as relief workers and helpers, and those at other USS facilities. 
The grievances given up by the union, with one exception, dealt with 
unilateral moves made by management in an effort to reduce manning 
levels in areas where it thought they were noncompetitive. Relief 
cranemen in two areas were eliminated, as well as helpers not used at 
other plants. Jobs, such as car repairman and laboratory utilityman, 
which were responsible for tasks no longer performed, or which were 
being performed elsewhere, were eliminated along with crew size 
arrangements which had been known to cause double-manning in 
some shifts.
However, a year after the Pipe Mill Agreement, the mill had not yet 
been built and the workforce had been reduced to just 4,000. The com 
pany continued to use shutdowns to pressure the union. It announced 
an extended total shutdown and hinted that it could become permanent, 
or at least last a long time, if some changes were not made. The union 
resisted wage concessions, but proposed other changes which could be 
made to cut costs. The steelworkers felt that the company wanted to lay 
off everybody and close down Fairfield until the starting of the pipe 
mill, a period of some 18 months.
In May, management announced a shutdown until early 1984 to 
pressure the union. Management had presented the USW district offic 
ers with a proposal to eliminate more than 100 jobs, as well as a num 
ber of changes in work rules. These changes were to involve the 
combining of jobs, assigning hourly work to supervisors, and the use
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of outside contractors to perform work normally done by union mem 
bers. The proposal was rejected by the local presidents and chairmen in 
a unanimous vote. The union felt that the company had not made a 
commitment to keep Fairfield open, even if all of the concessions were 
met, since previous concessions had been followed by permanent lay 
offs. The union thought that the company wanted to use its refusal of 
concessions as an excuse to shut down Fairfield for 18 months until the 
pipe mill was ready. The union sought a promise in writing that USS 
would continue to keep Fairfield open if the union agreed to conces 
sions. It pointed out that it had made concessions at the Ensley Rail 
Mill, and that the company had still moved its rail production to Gary, 
Indiana. The union was determined to make its position the bottom 
line. Under the concessions in the pipe mill agreement, the union had 
given up crew size grievances, many of which they had already won, 
and agreed to a "watering down" of an agreement that protected USW 
craftsmen while outside contractors were working in the plant. How 
ever, the complete shutdown occurred and laid-off steelworkers did not 
easily find new work in the Birmingham area. Prospective employers 
asked them to sign statements agreeing not to return to the mill, 
because Birmingham firms feared that former steelworkers would 
eventually return to their previous wage rates and excellent pension 
plans at USS. Prospective employers' fears were borne out in Decem 
ber of 1982, when USS announced that it would soon begin the pro 
cessing of steelworkers' bids on the new jobs to be created by the pipe 
mill. These jobs would require extensive computer and technical train 
ing in such locations as Italy and Germany. Access to the jobs was 
based on seniority, experience, and the results of union-approved skill 
tests. Those with the longest seniority who were approaching retire 
ment were expected to decline the pipe mill jobs because of the proba 
bility of losing large amounts of seniority.
Negotiations continued during the shutdown. USS sought to con 
tract out maintenance previously performed by a central maintenance 
shop and offered to improve the hot-strip facilities and construct a new 
$100 million continuous slab caster which would require the employ 
ment of 1,600 workers.
Negotiations broke down in November 1983 and the union's district 
leadership went to the USW Executive Board in Pittsburgh and con 
vinced it to pass a resolution which would prohibit local unions from
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entering into any local agreement which would violate the industry 
wide master contract. The resolution of the Executive Board accused 
some steel companies of provoking "job wars" by trying to "force or 
entice" additional concessions by individual locals. The resolution was 
an attempt to prevent management from pitting one local against 
another in concessions. The USW Executive Board resolution, how 
ever, stopped short of forbidding work rule changes within the individ 
ual plants, and this became the key to the local agreement from the 
union; the site was kept open because the USW Executive Board 
allowed the district leadership to honor local agreements previously 
made with USX. The position of the local leadership was reported in 
the Birmingham News.
We knew that U.S. Steel would go to the Mon Valley or to Lorain 
and cut a deal with them if we did not do something fast. They 
would have shopped around, and our twenty percent would have 
been zero. We did have a problem, however, because we then had 
to convince Lynn Williams to let us violate the resolution. We told 
him we had made prior commitments that we had to uphold, so he 
left it alone. (Rich 1988)
The local union presidents at Fairfield supported the district leader 
ship, but the tradeoff advantage was very small. If maintenance was 
contracted out, 1,500 jobs would be lost in order to reemploy 1,600 
members. Local negotiations had a deadline of December 27, when the 
USS board was to meet to announce the second phase of rationaliza 
tion and additional plant closings.
Alabama Governor George Wallace mediated a settlement and on 
December 24, 1983, an agreement was reached allowing Fairfield 
Works to restart operations. The union had been convinced that the 
company would shut down the plant and take some of the equipment to 
its Gary plants if concessions were not made by the date of the Com 
pany's board meeting. Local union leaders initially played down the 
results of the agreement, claiming that the company had failed in its 
attempt to gain the major concessions that it once sought, but later evi 
dence would show that the items contained in the "December Agree 
ment" had cut very deeply. The agreement covered all present and 
future Fairfield Works facilities, and it had two major sections. In the 
first part of the agreement, there were "give backs" in work rules 
which had been won over the years, including drastic changes in Fair-
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field's maintenance shops. All work rules that were part of local agree 
ments or that were part of mutual understandings would be eliminated. 
Rules governing such issues as crew size, manning levels, job assign 
ments, hours of work, late starts, early quits, wash-up time, coffee 
breaks, lunch breaks, off days, and shift selection were discarded. A 
blanket statement was included to restrict any other practices not men 
tioned in the agreement that would hinder the future competitive oper 
ation of the Fairfield Works. According to Jerry Meyer of USS, "We 
tried at one time to do an inventory of the various 'arrangements' at 
Fairfield, but we couldn't get them all nailed down, so we put in the 
statement to cover ourselves for the ones we forgot."
The second part of the agreement related to maintenance employees. 
They were combined into plantwide shops to serve all of Fairfield 
Works from one location. Several maintenance shops had developed 
over the years with duplication of manpower. It was agreed that these 
shops, with the exception of line crews and the electronics shop, would 
be totally phased out through attrition. USS would, during and after 
attrition, reserve the right to contract out any work over and above the 
ability of the remaining maintenance personnel. This clause would 
result in the eventual loss of all but 85 of the 294 highly paid mainte 
nance jobs at Fairfield. Also included in the agreement was a 35 per 
cent cap on incentive payments, contracting out of 30 refuse and 
janitorial jobs.
In return for its concessions, the union was promised a continuous 
slab caster, which would be one of the most modern available, and it 
regained jobs for 1,600 steelworkers. The caster would require 200 to 
300 fewer workers per day because of the elimination of the pouring, 
stripping, and reheating and rolling of ingots. Along with the caster 
would come improvements in hot-strip facilities.
Through restructuring the Pipe Mill Agreement and the December 
Agreement, the number of locals at Fairfield was reduced by half, from 
twelve to six (see figure 3.3). The new pipe mill employees and the 
centralized maintenance shops were both put into Local 1013, the larg 
est of the Fairfield locals. Other locals had disappeared when Fairfield 
and Ensley facilities were closed. The Bessemer and wire mill locals 
disappeared as those facilities were closed, as did locals at the coking 
plant, the railroad car shop, ore conditioning lines, and the Ensley 
mills. Hoerr (1988) contends that because the Fairfield pact gave man-
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agement great flexibility, it became the USS model for negotiating at 
other plants, but that the agreement was implemented without holding 
a ratification vote, and other locals felt the master agreements clause on 
manning was being abrogated. By the end of 1989 both the structure of 
the production process and labor-management relations had changed at 
Fairfield.*
Conclusions
Figure 3.4 presents a comparative summary of negotiations over 
downsizing in the adversarial countries. At Stelco, in Canada, where 
there was little restructuring, there was a stable and adversarial rela 
tionship in negotiations. The union was not involved in restructuring 
strategy, and bargaining focused on wages. Great Britain, on the other 
hand, presents, a mixed picture of both adversarial and cooperative sit 
uations. The steel unions, affiliated with the Labor party, were conser 
vative and preferred not to strike. Because of this affiliation and the 
nationalization of steel, the unions as represented by the Trades Union 
Congress Steel Committee were brought into the restructuring early. In 
the 1970s, the relationship between the company and the unions was 
cooperative, with the Steel Committee accepting some closings and 
plant consolidations in return for keeping other plants open. Continued 
layoffs and plant closings, however, pitted the Steel Committee against 
the union branches at the individual sites that wanted to actively resist 
downsizing. The Steel Committee was also forced to alter its position 
from cooperative to adversarial by the BSC's strategy of negotiating 
worker reductions on a plant- by-plant basis. The severity of cuts and 
local resistance forced a long national strike in steel in 1980.
In the United States, there was a stable adversarial relationship 
between the steelworkers and the largest companies. Changes in mar 
ket competition resulted in the breakup of multiemployer bargaining. 
At USS, the company sought concessions in manning and work prac 
tices from the locals. Locals were pitted against each other with the 
alternative of focusing on either plant closings or receiving new tech 
nology. The parties focused their negotiations on economic issues, and 
most of the companies settled quickly to keep their customers from
Figure 3.4 
Comparative Bargaining in Adversarial Countries
Environmental issues
Countries
Canada
Great Britain
United States
Bargaining 
structure
Decentralized 
(pattern)
Centralized to 
decentralized
Centralized 
(pattern) to 
decentralized
Nature of 
relationship
Adversarial
Cooperative to 
adversarial
Adversarial
Form of 
participation
Negotiations
Negotiations
Negotiations
Principal 
rules
Wages
Pensions
Pensions
Outcomes
Joint 
committees
Yes
Yes
No
Form of restructuring
Wages
Employment adjustments
Work rules, employment
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going to overseas competitors. However, USS took a tougher stand, 
resulting in a lengthy strike in 1986. At the USS Fairfield, Alabama 
site, the company sought concessions in job classifications, contracting 
out and crew sizes. It threatened to close the site and withheld new 
technology, pending concessions from the locals. The union allowed 
the district to negotiate concessions and exceptions to the national 
agreement, which would not have been approved by the national bar 
gaining committee.
The adjustment strategies used in Great Britain and the United 
States were: first, to stop hiring and allow normal attrition, quits, and 
retirements to reduce employment; second, to encourage voluntary 
early retirement; and third, to permanently lay off workers, but provide 
income supplements. The decentralized nature of collective bargaining 
in the United States limited the steelworkers' access to companies' 
decisionmaking process, and the breakup of industrywide bargaining 
resulted in pitting one company against another and one plant against 
another. The same events occurred in Great Britain; when BSC insisted 
on plant-by-plant negotiations, labor-shedding was negotiated locally, 
with the Steel Committee on occasion excluded from the table.
NOTES
1. Memorandum of Agreement Re Canada Works Consolidation Between Stelco, Inc. and 
Five Steelworkers Locals, April 27,1984.
2. British Steel Corporation, Llanwern Works and the Trade Unions, Memorandum of 
Understanding, May 20, 1980.
3. Material in this section is taken from Brannen (1983) and Banks and Jones (1977).
4. Material for the Fairfield case study was obtained by David Williams from interviews with 
E.B. Rich, Director, USWA District 36, Howard Strevel, redred Director, USAW District 36, 
Jerry Meyer, General Manager, Arbitration and Labor Relations Administrator, USS, and reports 
in The Birmingham News.
5. In 1990, the federal government indicted and brought to trial USX and two United 
Steelworkers district officers on the charge that they conspired to negotiate the 1983 Fairfield 
agreement in return for receiving pension credits which allowed six union officers to begin 
receiving their pensions. In September 1990, USX was fined $4.1 million and the two 
Steelworkers officials were sentenced to jail. The sentences have been appealed. For an 
alternative view of the bargaining relationship, see Fischer (1990).
4
Collective Bargaining 
in Cooperative Countries
This chapter discusses how the bargaining process and the relation 
ship among employers, unions, and government affected restructuring 
in the cooperative countries. The expectation from the comparative 
systems matrix for the cooperative countries is that government would 
join employers and unions in bargaining, not just over the results of 
restructuring, but also over how restructuring would take place. Unions 
in these countries would be expected to facilitate adjustment and 
reduce the costs of restructuring.
The cooperative countries also have other forms of employee partic 
ipation. Works councils in Belgium, Luxemburg, Germany, and Swe 
den are the result of codetermination legislation. The essential features 
of the institutional arrangement are often works councils, workers' rep 
resentatives on the supervisory boards of companies, and labor direc 
tors on their management boards. The central institution is the works 
council in every establishment elected by all the workers, whether they 
are union members or not. Works councils are primarily consultative, 
except in Germany where they may also be co-decisionmakers, receive 
information, or negotiate. The unions have extended their influence to 
the shop-floor level by running union members for plant works coun 
cils. The expected effect of works councils on restructuring is not clear. 
It could be argued either that joint decisionmaking raises costs by caus 
ing delays and expensive adjustment programs, or that works councils 
assist restructuring by increasing worker cooperation.
Belgium and Luxembourg
Collective bargaining in Belgium is a multitiered process. It can 
take place at the national, regional or company level. Since 1975, there 
have been few national agreements. What does exist is a combination
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of national consultations and multiemployer bargaining. Two forms of 
consultation are the National Labor Council and Joint Parity Commit 
tee for each sector. The National Labor Council proposes general 
agreements on such issues as: part-time work (1981), the hiring and 
selection of new employees 0983) and the introduction of new tech 
nology Q983). The Joint Parity Committees can also negotiate con 
tracts and propose company settlements. However, the usual forms of 
negotiation are either between employer associations and unions by 
industrial sector on a regional basis, usually for one year, or at the com 
pany level, usually for two years. Workers are covered by both national 
agreements and local contracts. National agreements cover broad 
issues such as technological change, while local agreements cover 
wages and hours. 1
About 70 percent of the population is organized, with the unions 
affiliated with one of the confederations. The major confederations are 
divided along political lines, each supporting either the Christian or 
Socialist parties. The Christian Trade Union Confederation is strongest 
in the north, and the General Belgium Labor Federation is strongest in 
the south. The Christian Trade Union Confederation's metal trade 
union claimed 231,551 members in 1982, and the Belgium Labor Fed 
eration claimed 211,289 in 1980 (Blanpain 1984).
Exclusive jurisdiction does not exist in Belgium, and competition 
between the two metal trade unions is strong, particularly at the plant 
level. Employee representation at the plant level is provided by three 
groups: the union delegation, the works council, and the Committee for 
Health and Safety. The unions indirectly control these other forms of 
employee representation, either by directly appointing the union dele 
gates to the Health and Safety Committee or having exclusive rights to 
nominate the works council.
Employer associations and individual companies both negotiate 
contracts in Belgium. The major employer association in Belgium is 
the Federation of Belgium Enterprises, which is composed of 39 sec 
toral associations covering 35,000 companies. It represents about 75 
percent of the companies employing more than 10 workers. The 
employer association in the metal industry is Fabrimetal. In collective 
bargaining, it is organized on a regional basis to either assist employers 
or to directly negotiate regional contracts (Windmuller and Gladstone 
1984).
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Belgium steelworkers protested restructuring more actively than 
steelworkers in the other seven countries. Each new restructuring plan 
brought opposition from the unions in the form of strikes and demon 
strations (Capron 1986). Reductions in employment projected by the 
Claes Plan of 1978-80 were sharply scaled down from 4,675 to 1,380 
because of union resistence. Table 4.1 shows the employment reduc 
tions first proposed by the government and the final agreement after 
union resistance. The basis of both the blue-collar and white-collar 
agreements, which included early pensions and hours of work, was a 
report by the McKinsey consulting firm. McKinsey has played a major 
role in steel restructuring around the world because its recommenda 
tions for downsizing based on international performance standards 
have been widely applied.
Table 4.1 
Reductions in Employment Under the Claes Plans
Company
Boel
Clabecq
Fabrifer
Cbarleroi
Leige
Phenix
Sidmar
Usines aTubes de la mense
Possible maximum reduction
First agreement
0
650
60-75
2,300 - 2,800
700-1,150
0
0
4,675
Final agreement
0
10-60
0
600-650
500-600
50
0
20
1,380
In the first half of 1982, the Belgium steel unions protested at both 
the European Economic Community (EEC) offices in Brussels and in 
the steel towns. In February and March, they protested in Brussels, and 
the government was concerned that the demonstrations would lead to 
longer strikes in the steel towns of Wallonia. The workers there had 
engaged in a number of short strikes in March and April to protest the 
austerity policy of the Martens V government and its plans to close the
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plants of Liege and Charleroi. The Social-Christian participation in the 
Martens cabinet placed that party in Wallonia in a difficult position. It 
had to decide whether to support the Belgium Labor Federation strikes 
or its own government. By the end of March, the Christian Trade 
Union Confederation decided to condemn the multiple strike actions 
and follow the national line which broke the common union front.
The Gandois Plan of 1983, discussed in chapter 2, was also resisted 
at the local level, rather than by the national federation, when workers 
in the steel towns where Cockerill-Sambre had plants demonstrated. 
This is similar to the British and U.S. cases, where the greatest resis 
tance was at the local rather than national level. The intensity of resis 
tance by each of the union confederations depended upon its political 
alignment with either the party in office (Catholic-Liberal) or the party 
out of office (Socialist), as well as its strength in the regions. Resis 
tance to the Gandois Plan was strongest in the Metalworking Union, 
the Belgium Labor Federation affiliate which supported the Socialist 
party. The Christian Workers Union of the Christian Trade Union Con 
federation was reluctant to strike, since it supported the Catholic-Lib 
eral coalition which had helped develop the restructuring plan. The 
May 1983 contact, which called for an overall decrease in wages of 
between 5 and 10 percent, was rejected. The Martens V government 
had taken the position that, since Cockerill-Sambre was benefiting 
from public aid, the workers should make a contribution towards 
restoring the company's competitiveness by accepting a wage reduc 
tion. It put pressure on the unions and management by withholding aid 
to cover the company's short-term cash drain. Resistance from the met 
alworkers appeared to be less over steel restructuring and more over 
the loss of wage indexation. The government was forced to withdraw 
its idea of submitting the plan to a vote by the workers. Restructuring 
in steel was resisted through the spring of 1984 because it coincided 
with the institution of austerity wage programs in both Belgium and 
Luxembourg.
The metalworkers unions from the Belgium Labor Federation and 
Christian Trade Union Confederation contested elections at Sidmar. 
The Labor Federation protested wage freezes and plant closings, and 
succeeded in increasing representation at Sidmar between 1967 and 
1979 (Van Den Hof 1984). The economic regulations of the works 
council at Sidmar detailed its organization as well as the information it
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was to receive about the firm's competitive position, production fig 
ures, finances, personnel costs, budget, future, plans, and research 
expenditures.
Luxembourg employs the concept of "social partnership" in labor- 
management relations with comprehensive conciliation arrangements. 
About 70 percent of the workers are covered by contracts, and negotia 
tions take place either at the sectoral level or at the company level as at 
Arbed. The unions are divided along religious and political lines. The 
principal federations are the Socialist Confederation with 33,000 blue- 
and white-collar members, the Socialist-Christian Confederation with 
15,000 members, and the nonaligned private-sector white-collar orga 
nization with 15,000 members. On the employers' side, the principal 
association is the Federation des Industrials Luxembourgeois, which 
provides guidance but does not directly engage in collective bargain 
ing.
Unions and employers are represented on a number of joint and tri 
partite committees such as the National Economic and Social Council, 
the Employment Supervisory Board, the Steel Tripartite and General 
Tripartite Commissions. Six statute-based occupational chambers rep 
resenting different industries and employees (private, manual, non- 
manual, and public) are consulted on all legislation affecting their 
members.
The conciliation system was reinforced in a tripartite conference in 
1977, which set as its objectives the prevention of unemployment, 
maintenance of social peace, helping the steel industry recover, and 
softening social consequences and human suffering due to the eco 
nomic crisis. A steel tripartite conference was also established, which 
called for a reduction in the steel labor force by 31 percent between 
1974 and 1979 (from 29,000 to 20,000 workers), with expectations of 
a 43 percent drop in steelworkers over 10 years to 16,500. The pro 
grams that aided this transition are discussed in chapter 5.
There has been tripartite cooperation in the matter of restructuring. 
The 1981 agreement in steel said, "The signatories recognize the need 
for technological progress. They are aware of the fact that rationaliza 
tion and modernization lead to changes in the employment structure 
which may result in transfers and displacement" (Committee on Tri 
partite Coordination 1981, p. 3). The same agreement provides for 
wage guarantees for the workers affected by such changes. The agree-
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ment also states that, in view of the strained economic and financial sit 
uation of the companies, the trade unions do not demand a general 
wage increase or a general reduction in hours of work. This commit 
ment would cease if there was considerable improvement in steel pro 
duction. The agreement called for a 3 percent increase in white-collar 
salaries and no increase in blue-collar wages for 1981-1983, the estab 
lishment of an anticrisis division for laid-off workers rescinding the 
automatic cost-of-living increase of 1.5 percent, and delaying the cost- 
of-living adjustments by one month.
There are three forms of employee participation in Luxembourg. 
Worker committees engage in dialogue about employee matters relat 
ing to working conditions, job security, and social legislation. These 
committees are required in companies with more than 1500 employees. 
There is also the Joint Works Council, which is an advisory body in 
major decisions related to investment in plant, manufacturing process, 
or working conditions. These are required in plants with 150 or more 
employees. Finally, there are employee representatives on manage 
ment boards. Representatives of the workers and trade unions occupy 
one-third of the seats on the board of directors of iron and steel compa 
nies. There are continuous negotiations during restructuring between 
management and the worker committees in steel.
Germany
Collective bargaining in Germany is conducted between employer 
associations and the unions on a geographical basis. Contracts are 
negotiated that cover a single state (Lander) or part of a state. The 
employer associations are composed of firms in a number of related 
industries and represent both large and small employers with different 
competitive conditions. For example, the metals industry covers autos 
and electrical equipment, as well as steel. There are two separate 
employer associations: one for iron and steel and one for metalwork- 
ing. The logic for this separation is that in iron and steel, the labor 
director, who is often a former union member, sits on the corporation's 
supervisory board; this could result in a union member representing the 
employer association. In steel, the labor director has often come out of
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the union, since codetermination requires approval of this position by 
the employee representatives on the managing board of the company. 
The union counterpart to the employer association is IG Metal 1, the 
largest German union. Unions are not only strong participants in col 
lective bargaining, but they have exerted considerable influence on 
political and social life. Some of the unions' strength comes from their 
role in institutionalized participation in codetermination. Codetermina 
tion provides for employee representation at the plant and company 
levels and will be discussed later in this section.
A typical IG Metall negotiation starts when goals are discussed 
among union members at the plant level, which makes recommenda 
tions to the union. The union then informs the company of its position 
before termination of the contact. Next, a negotiating committee is 
established, and bargaining starts two weeks before the expiration date. 
No strike or lockout may occur until four weeks after the expiration 
date of the contract. Unions do not have exclusive jurisdiction in Ger 
many, as they do in the United States, and several unions may repre 
sent the workers in a plant. In practice, IG Metall has the largest 
membership and maintains offices to service its members and larger 
districts, and local offices are located near large plants. Isolated plants 
with a small number of union members are provided with fewer ser 
vices. Since negotiations at the plant level are conducted by the works 
council, the unions have developed informal arrangements at the shop- 
floor level to maintain worker loyalty. The unions have shop stewards 
or vertrauensleute (men and women of confidence) to whom members 
can go for an informal solution to grievances. The vertrauensleute in 
the plant may be appointed by the union or elected by the organized 
employees of the plant. These union representatives are the communi 
cations link between union members and the union. If the shop steward 
cannot settle the grievance informally, then it goes to the works coun 
cil. The metalworkers maintain ties to the works councils by offering 
technical services on such issues as the setting of wage rates and the 
timing of line speeds and conduct training sessions. Finally, the union 
may be represented on the supervisory board of the steel companies 
through full-time union officers who have been elected by the employ 
ees under codetermination. Information reaches the union from the 
plant through its members on the works council and its shop stewards.
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The role of collective bargaining in German steel restructuring can 
be understood within the context of a labor movement that cooperated 
in German economic development after the Second World War. The 
Social Democratic party dominated parliament, and it was expected to 
guarantee a risk-free capitalist economy along with government plan 
ning and codetermination. Among the social partnership's greatest suc 
cesses were the establishment of codetermination in steel and coal in 
1951, and its extension in a different form to other firms. In the Co- 
Determination Act of 1951, workers' representatives were included in 
the company structure. Parity in workers' representation (five workers 
and five shareholders' representatives, with a neutral eleventh member) 
was prescribed for supervisory boards. The shareholders elect the 
supervisory board, which designates the management board. In the 
steel and coal industry, management boards must include a "labor 
director" who can be appointed or dismissed only with the consent of 
the majority of the workers' members on the supervisory board.
IG Metall and the employers had a relatively peaceful partnership 
during restructuring. The union accepted the need for implementing 
layoffs, but pressed for early retirement rather than discharges. It also 
sought layoffs concentrated in groups with low conflict potential and 
high compensation to soften the impact. Esser and Vath (1986) argue 
that IG Metall had in mind a priority list of workers who were to be 
defended. They maintain that from the most to the least protected, the 
thinking was: most efficient workers, other workers, the young, the 
unemployed, and finally foreign workers. IG Metall, particularly in the 
Saar, was able to keep the number of direct dismissals low. There is a 
consensus in Germany that codetermination in steel made a substantial 
contribution to the general climate of cooperation and industrial peace 
in steel. However, scholars differ in their views of the effects of code- 
termination on steel restructuring, and these are discussed later in this 
section.
The overall agreement for workforce changes was drafted first in 
1975 and updated in 1978; discussions included unions and the works 
councils. The issue arose concerning whether the union should be 
included in discussions concerning workforce reductions, which is a 
topic where works council participation is required. Political pressure 
was exerted to include the unions. Disputes also occurred among the 
works councils in multiplant firms. The works councils at the three
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major Thyssen locations had different interests. Hie works councils in 
the two plants facing the largest cutbacks sought to insure the mainte 
nance of jobs for their members. The deputy director of IG Metall was 
also a member of the supervisory board of Thyssen, and the unions 
took an active role in discussions about employment reductions.
The cases of Hoesch and Krupp are additional examples of how the 
unions and works councils used their political power to effect restruc 
turing. Estel, the holding company formed by Hoesch and Hoogovens, 
faced a reduction in demand. In February 1980, the first social plan 
was agreed to between the firm and its works council under which the 
workforce was reduced by 2,000. (Social plans will be discussed in 
chapter 5.) In the implementation of the plan, the estimate of job loss 
ran from 4,000 to 10,000. Hoesch requested a federal subsidy to help 
build a new plant, and both the works councils and IG Metall pressured 
the federal government and the state government of North-Rhine West 
phalia to assist with a low-interest loan. When Estel decided to scrap 
its plans for a new plant, union members felt sold out by the company. 
A number of strikes took place, and 15,000 Hoesch workers at two 
plants went on strike on October 31, 1980 and demonstrated outside 
the company's offices. These worker-led demonstrations were similar 
to those carried out by union members rather than their union leaders 
in Britain and Belgium.
At a Dortmund Conference in December 1980, the works council in 
Estel accepted a new social plan with less favorable conditions and the 
possibility of dismissals. The works councils and the unions faced the 
same conditions as their counterparts in Britain who had been told to 
accept employment reductions at established sites or face the possibil 
ity of plant closings and the development of new sites. The unions and 
works councils in Germany, however, in accepting these reductions, 
also accepted a share of the responsibility.
The strength of the metalworkers is evident from their ability to 
block the first restructuring plan of Hoesch and Krupp to form one 
company. This plan was proposed by the federal government, but 
blocked at the state level, and a new plan developed with worker con 
sultation was substituted. In May 1981, IG Metall proposed that the 
restructuring of the steel industry must not lead to new overcapacity; 
plants must not be shut down before replacement jobs are available in 
the neighborhood; diversification in the Ruhr should be combined with
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the diversification of individual steel firms; there should be cuts in 
working time; and finally, restructuring should require the participation 
of the works councils and trade unions. The recent union efforts have 
been aimed at reducing the workweek in order to preserve jobs.
Steel and coal mining were the first industries to come under code- 
termination in Germany through the Works Constitution Act of 1951 
and the Works Constitution Act of 1952 (Streeck 1984). Works coun 
cils and unions have separate jurisdictions. The unions negotiate 
annual contracts covering wages, while works council approval is 
required in setting work time, temporary short time, overtime work, 
piece rates, pay systems, suggestion schemes, holiday schedules, mon 
itoring of performance, wages above the negotiated rate, and the work 
environment. They must also be consulted in personnel selection and 
training, holiday and vacation pay, selecting of wage rates for new 
jobs, and the reevaluation of pay when employees are transferred 
between jobs. Consultation with the works council is required for tech 
nological change. Although works council members are frequently 
union members, the two are formally separate organizations. The union 
is represented at the plant level by shop stewards. The Hamborn plant 
of Thyssen in Duisberg, with 21,000 employees in 1982, also had four 
works council committees: wage and salary, work time, health and 
safety, and social.
Worker participation on the supervisory board is another vehicle for 
implementing codetermination. The supervisory board of steel firms is 
composed of an equal number of representatives elected by the share 
holders and the employees, with an additional neutral member. The 
shareholders elect five, the union appoints three, and the employees 
elect two members. A second board, the management board, is respon 
sible for the daily operations of the company and is similar to the U.S. 
firm's executive committee. None of the management board members 
are on the supervisory board. The industrial relations vice-president or 
labor director (arbeitsdirektor) serves on the management board. In the 
steel industry, the labor director serves at the pleasure of the workforce 
and has the approval of the union, while in other industries, such as 
autos, the labor director's appointment and responsibilities are clearly 
received from management. In a multiplant firm, a member of the plant 
works council serves on the company works council, and the chairman
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of the works council also serves as deputy chairman of the supervisory 
board.
There is a difference in opinion concerning how well the works 
councils represent employees' interests, and how much information is 
shared by management (Altmann 1984). In large multiplant compa 
nies, plant works councils appear to be quite removed from the shop 
floor. Works council chairmen under these conditions get their infor 
mation about shop-floor sentiments from the shop stewards. The works 
council members are often former line workers, and they may be at a 
disadvantage in negotiations with management, particularly on matters 
that require technical knowledge and scientific skills, such as the intro 
duction of new processes. The Duisberg steel area has held a series of 
joint study groups for the works councils of the steel companies and 
the shop stewards to discuss rationalization and technological change. 
Works councils often have to rely on union experts who are few in 
number and not available for the smaller companies.
Diversification of the steel firms into other products has resulted in 
steel declining to a minority percentage of some of the companies' 
business, and the question has come up whether steel firms are still 
covered by the 1951 legislation. Firms that diversify out of steel can 
switch out of the 1951 to the 1972 legislation under which workers have 
less influence on the supervisory boards. However, when Mannesman 
sought to reorganize in 1972 to escape the 1951 Law, the reorganization 
was not allowed and was opposed by the unions and the Social Demo 
crats. This switch was again blocked by the unions in 1981-82.
The unions and works councils have reacted to economic restructur 
ing and technological change at three levels: politics, collective bar 
gaining, and code termination. IG Metall has been most successful in 
affecting the pace of economic restructuring through the political pro 
cess. It has been able to prevent the closing of plants and the shifting of 
production by the use of its political strength, and companies have 
backed down from their plans when faced with political opposition. 
The German Labor Federation successfully opposed the restructuring 
of steel into two divisions. At the national level, there have been few 
guidelines for restructuring, and both Socialist and Conservative gov 
ernments have refrained from interfering in the codetermination pro 
cess.
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Restructuring has proceeded at both the industry level and the plant 
level, and the activities of the unions and works councils have over 
lapped. Negotiations at the industry level have focused on wages and 
reduction of the hours of work. The trade union objective is the 35- 
hour week. The unions have agreed that a reduction in working time 
would maintain and even increase the number of jobs. This argument 
has been strongly rejected by the employers. In 1984, a long strike 
affecting the metal industry ended in an agreement on the introduction 
of the 38 1/2-hour week. A refinement of this principle was achieved in 
the industrywide metals agreement in October 1984, which provided 
for a 38-hour week. IG Metall has argued that this reduction of work 
ing time affected job security by saving 7,000 jobs. However, the 
employers disagreed and point out that opinion polls among steelwork- 
ers show that they prefer early retirement to a further reduction of the 
weekly working time. Workweek reductions have been negotiated 
three times, and the 35-hour week will begin 1995.
There has been no industrywide negotiated agreement on workforce 
reductions. Negotiations at the company level with the union and at the 
plant level with the works council have focused on workforce reduc 
tions. Public policy requires management to consult the works council 
over reductions of operations, closure of the whole establishment or 
significant departments, as well as significant changes in the organiza 
tion, purpose, or plan of the establishment, and the introduction of 
entirely new work methods and production processes. In law and prac 
tice, works councils are closely associated with decisions about termi 
nation of employment and measures to avoid or mitigate the effects of 
dismissals. In 1974-75, the works council and state government were 
able to prevent a plant closing and forced the company to reduce 
employment at all of its facilities rather than at a single site.
The works council and management must also negotiate a "social 
plan" if there is to be a layoff of 100 or more workers or a plant clos 
ing. This plan often provides for compensation to workers whose 
employment is terminated. Social plans have been negotiated in all of 
the steel companies, and some examples are presented in chapter 5. 
Plans vary, but will often include reductions in work time (with some 
form of financial compensation for the ensuing loss of earnings), spe 
cial payments in addition to public unemployment benefits, old-age 
pensions for those who accept early retirement, and various forms of
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severance pay. Social plans supplement the benefits which workers 
have received from the EEC, as well as those to which they are entitled 
under statutory unemployment benefit programs and old-age pension 
programs.
At Bonier, a small steel company, a social plan was negotiated in 
1981 because of the reduction of 880 workers at its Dusseldorf plant 
(Lehnek 1982). The social plan was in force until all claims over work 
reductions were settled. Reductions were accomplished by early retire 
ment, transfers, and dismissals. Those over 57 were eligible for retire 
ment. Transfers to other plants were negotiated for those 40 years of 
age with 25 years of service or 50 years of age with 10 years of service. 
Those who faced dismissal received severance pay based on age, 
seniority and pay level. The average dismissal payment was $4,425. 
Hie Bonier plan required that workers transferred be matched with 
new jobs based on their qualifications or their ability to be retrained 
after no more than a six-week program. For a worker who was offered 
a job and refused it for a lower-paying job, the higher-paying job 
offered was considered the wage guaranty basis.
There are two positions with regard to the effects of codetermination 
on steel restructuring in Germany. Thimm (1980; 1987) represents the 
position that works councils made change more difficult, and Thelen 
(1987) represents the position that codetermination assisted in the 
cooperative climate.
Thimm examined the impact of codetermination on restructuring at 
Arbed-Saarstahl in the 1980s. Arbed-Saarstahl was the result of a 
merger and restructuring subsidies from Luxembourg and the German 
State of Saarland. Marginal plants were to be closed. In this case, man 
agement needed the union representatives on the supervisory board to 
assist them in gaining the support of IG Metall and the Social-Demo 
cratic legislators in order to obtain subsidies. Thimm argues that the 
company could not have survived without these subsidies, and that the 
high cost of layoffs undermined the financial stability of the company 
and absorbed potential investment funds. Codetermination, he says, 
provided a formal structure and justification for delaying the hard deci 
sions of restructuring by searching for consensus. Further, he contends 
that labor's influence through codetermination created rigidities, espe 
cially in wages and employment, and that made successful adaptation 
and economic change more difficult. Codetermination encouraged the
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formation of a coalition of local labor representatives, steel managers, 
and regional politicians to stall or block adjustment. Together they lob 
bied for state assistance, which delayed restructuring.
Thimm appears to contradict himself when he argues that the 
strength of German steel is due to union and works council support of 
investment policies during the 1970s. Up to 1978, codetermination 
helped the transition. After that, government became more important in 
the adjustment process. Thimm concludes that codetermination has not 
had a negative effect on the major German steel companies, and points 
out that with the exception of 1975-1977 or 1981-1987, German steel 
has remained profitable.
Thelen, on the other hand, argues that German steel responded 
effectively and peacefully in the marketplace and with regard to indus 
trial conflict and labor participation. Adjustment has been consensual 
and less disruptive in Germany, and codetermination has provided the 
institutional framework for achieving the political settlement necessary 
for successful adjustment. She concludes that codetermination shifted 
managers' attention from quick fixes to long-term solutions by causing 
joint discussions. At a relatively early stage, labor was brought in to 
discuss who was to bear how much of the cost of adjustment, and 
codetermination offered a forum for the political conflicts that accom 
panied economic change. Thelen's evidence is that, since 1974, Ger 
man steel has shed 40 percent of its workforce without national unrest 
and without mass layoffs, through early retirement and voluntary sev 
erance schemes.
In a rebuttal to Thimm, Thelen pointed out that Arbed-Saarstahl is 
an exception. It is Germany's most subsidized steel firm, receiving sub 
sidies from the government from 1980 to 1985 that equalled all other 
German steel producers combined. For the other firms, government 
support was explicitly tied to restructuring plans that would result in 
capacity reductions. She pointed out that while Thyssen and Krupp 
moved to change their technology and product mix, U.S. and French 
firms developed coalitions for protection and subsidies.
Thelen also argues that wage and employment flexibility may not be 
what firms have to seek in order to make them more competitive. That 
is, the systems that emphasize sharp reductions in wages and levels of 
employment may not become most competitive. Rather, an examina 
tion of comparable plants in Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands indi-
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cated that the two main sources of productivity advantage for the 
plants was through capacity utilization and the organization of labor. 
Maintenance flexibility was crucial, and versatility became important. 
She argues that the flexibility of American managers in regard to 
wages and employment may provide a superficial flexibility through 
short-term relief without facing the more fundamental sources of com 
petitive difficulties. On the other hand, German managers have to 
assume a longer term perspective.
Schroter (1986) presented another example of the role of codetermi- 
nation in German steel restructuring. He traced the history of Hoesch 
in Dortmund, and reported that in 1979, when management presented a 
new strategy of allowing steel production in Dortmund to stagnate, 
concentrating at one site and reducing the number of employees with 
out dismissals, the workers' answer was that no further agreement 
would be given to rationalization and reduction of employment with 
out a comprehensive plan. The union at the plant demanded that no fur 
ther reduction of jobs be made without creating alternative jobs to 
compensate for lost workplaces. However, the workers' representa 
tives at the shop floor and on the board and the works council could not 
agree on this demand. In 1979, the workers' demand moved from the 
company to the regional government, and a demonstration was held in 
Dortmund in November 1980. Hoesch's problems were no longer 
internal, and a plan was agreed to by government, management, and 
the workers to build a new plant and reduce jobs by 4,200. This was 
tied to a state commitment for assistance in the form of a loan and no 
dismissals. Reductions were to be accomplished by unemployment 
grants, firm subsidies, early retirement, and normal attrition.
Japan
Collective bargaining in Japan is generally conducted at the com 
pany or plant level between a company union and management. Atyp 
ical multiplant firm bargains with labor at the company level, the plant 
level, and at subdivisions within each plant (Levine 1981). At the com 
pany level, agreements are reached on general working conditions, 
such as working hours, wages, and conditions of employment, union
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activity including the number of full-time union officials and their 
treatment, and grievance procedures. At the plant level, agreements are 
reached on local grievance and joint consultation procedures, the num 
ber of full-time union officials at the plant level, union use of company 
facilities, and application of companywide rules, such as working 
hours. At the plant subdivision level, agreements are reached on appli 
cation of company- and plant-level agreement (Kozo 1984). Wage 
negotiations are conducted in the spring and bonus negotiations in the 
summer and winter.
At Nippon Steel Corporation (NSC), discussions between labor and 
management are conducted according to the labor agreement, and min 
utes of the meetings are prepared for all discussions (Abe 1989). In 
addition to these formal discussions, informal discussions and 
exchanges are used to inform the union of company policies and obtain 
the union's opinion. The labor agreement stipulates that, "The com 
pany shall discuss matters common to all the company with the federa 
tion at the head office and matters concerned with each worker with the 
union at the works."2
The structure of collective bargaining at NSC is divided into three 
levels: headquarters, individual works, and individual plant. At the 
headquarters and works levels, collective bargaining is carried out 
through the management council and the labor-management commit 
tee. Collective bargaining covers wages and the contract. The manage 
ment council functions as a forum for the transmission of information. 
It meets on a quarterly basis at the headquarters level and gives the 
union information on managements policies, the balance sheet, and 
production plans. At the works level, it gives the union information on 
production, the installation of new technology, and possible shut 
downs. The labor-management committee both negotiates and trans 
mits information. It meets as the occasion demands at the headquarters 
level and twice a month at the works level. Among the topics discussed 
are changes in personnel, employee housing, and monthly production 
plans.
The shop-floor level has a joint production committee composed of 
the superintendent and 10 management members, and the union local's 
chair and nine union members. They meet once a month to trade infor 
mation on production, technology, shutdowns, and sales.
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Spring wage negotiations are held between NSC and the trade union 
federation. The federation is made up of 12 unions, each of which has 
locals in the plants. Negotiations over personnel reductions occur at the 
works level through the joint labor-management committee composed 
of the general manager and the officers of the local union. The local 
union officers report to the local chapters and receive the responses of 
the members from the local chapters.
Sweden
Collective bargaining for blue-collar workers follows a three-stage 
format. The first stage is the frame agreements or branch agreements. 
The Swedish Employers Confederation and the Swedish Trade Unions 
Confederation negotiate economywide standards as a floor for com 
pensation, which includes pay increases, "wage-drift" differentials for 
affected groups, supplemental pay provisions for classes of workers 
receiving low pay, overtime rates, rules regarding shift work, and nor 
mal workweek hours. At the second stage, employer associations affili 
ated with the Employers Confederation and trade unions affiliated with 
the Trade Unions Confederation use the frame agreement to conclude a 
contract at the sector level. Subjects include hours of work, shift work, 
and overtime pay. The provisions in the economywide agreement have 
usually served as minimum standards for sector trade unions, which 
attempt to negotiate additions. The Swedish Steel Corporation (SSAB) 
is not part of the Employers Confederation, since it is considered a 
public-sector company and public-sector companies have their own 
confederation. The third, or local, stage negotiates over issues such as 
safety or the introduction of new technology and the distribution of the 
money. Union affiliates of the Central Organization of Salaried 
Employees follow a somewhat different three-stage process.
Approximately 90 percent of all blue-collar workers and 80 percent 
of all white-collar workers are organized (European Trade Union Insti 
tute 1983). The metalworkers union (Metall) was the largest national 
trade union in the Trade Unions Confederation, but lost its position to 
the municipal workers union with the growth in the public sector. In
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1983, decentralized bargaining became the norm when the engineering 
employers association insisted on separate negotiations with Metall. 3
The Employee Participation in Decision Making Act of 1977 gave 
unions the authority to operate at the strategy level of restructuring. 
The Act replaced former agreements over works councils and extended 
coverage beyond the former 25 employee minimum to all companies 
with one or more union employees. The Act was broad and could be 
interpreted to cover almost any workplace activity; it clearly placed the 
unions in a central role, since it required negotiation over important 
changes and guaranteed a level of employee participation in decision- 
making which exceeded the unions' role through collective bargaining. 
Under the legislation, the employers were obliged to provide informa 
tion to the trade unions, on their initiative, concerning production, 
finance, and employment policy.
The basis of labor-management relations in Sweden is the Employee 
Participation in Decision Making Act and the 1982 agreements between 
the Trade Unions Confederation, the Federation of Salaried Employ 
ees, and the Employers Confederation. Both were to be operationalized 
at the local level, but this has created a problem for the unions. Gospel 
(1983) concluded that in Sweden, unions are particularly well devel 
oped and powerful at the national level; however, plant-level organiza 
tion is relatively underdeveloped, certainly in comparison to shop 
steward committees in Britain and union locals in the United States. 
Companywide union organization is even more limited in Sweden. The 
implication is that there exists a mismatch in sophistication between 
the unions and management at the two levels of decisionmaking. The 
unions have the sophistication at the national level but not at the com 
pany and shop-floor levels. Since the first agreement under the 
Employee Participation in Decision Making Act, the unions have 
focused on the issue of getting the companies to pay for consultants for 
the union to help them at the company and local levels in the analysis 
and interpretation of information relevant to decisionmaking. This was 
done at SSAB. They have also requested employer-sponsored educa 
tion programs for union members on company boards of directors.
Another issue of union participation is the timing with which infor 
mation is made available to the union. From the union point of view, 
the recognition and sorting of alternatives in a decisionmaking situa 
tion is just as important as having a voice in choosing which of the
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final alternatives is implemented. The common complaint among 
unions is that they are not required to be included in this initial sorting 
of alternatives, and when they are brought into the process, the infor 
mation provided by the employer is focused only on those alternatives 
that have survived the employer's unilateral decision. Labor court rul 
ings (1978-1980) determined that the employees had the right to inves 
tigate alternatives prior to negotiation.
The merger of Sweden's three major steel companies into SSAB 
provided the first national opportunity to test the impact of the codeter- 
mination legislation of 1977 on corporate policy and strategy (Hedberg 
1979). Labor-management relations had been different in each of the 
three companies. Domnarvet, owned by Stora, was the largest steel 
works in Scandinavia. It had a tradition as a research-oriented multi 
purpose steelmaker, which had engaged in an ambitious investment 
program in the early 1970s with a new, wide-rolling mill. The trade 
unions in this company were strong, with an emphasis on traditional 
collective bargaining and wage negotiations. There was little coopera 
tion between the white- and blue-collar unions. Lulea, owned by Norr- 
bottens Jarnverk AB, was a multipurpose factory complex which had 
suffered continued losses and quality problems. The unions were 
strong at this site and had used their political connections to gain con 
tinued government support for the steelworks. Oxelo'sund, owned by 
Granges, specialized in heavy steel plates for ships. The site had a pro 
gressive management and close cooperation among its unions (Bain 
1987a).
The blue- and white-collar labor federations asked for representa 
tion at the outset on the government commission that was to produce a 
corporate strategy. The unions also formed a task force and study 
group, which would be available to independently evaluate the com 
mission's work. When serious negotiations among the three firms 
developed in the spring and summer of 1977, Oxelosund sent a delega 
tion that had both management and union representatives. This set the 
tone for future negotiations, and both management and union represen 
tatives from each of the three companies were present at negotiations. 
The union representatives requested a task force of employees from all 
of the affected units, including steel, mining, and railroads; they also 
called in a consultant, Allan Larsson, who represented the unions dur 
ing negotiations. In return for their role at the strategy level, the unions
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used their political power to push for government loans that would 
guarantee the continuance of the new company with the purchase of 
private property, patents, and equipment (Larsson 1986).
Bjorn Wahlstrom, president of the new company, presented a plan in 
November 1977 that was based on the work of the three joint commit 
tees. These joint committees had both union and management repre 
sentatives, and the union's participation in the development of this plan 
appeared to commit them to Wahlstrom's proposal. The unions resisted 
acceptance of Wahlstrom's plan, however. They felt that worker input 
and code termination had been shunted off to a number of internal 
boards with no power, and a compromise was reached by the creation 
of a joint union-management interim organization to handle the transi 
tion for six months (Nyquist 1986). The unions needed this time in 
order to deal with their internal problems. The blue-collar and white- 
collar labor federations had negotiated separately and needed time to 
study the issues and implications of the merger and to establish a joint 
union strategy. They had to establish a strong united front made up of 
the different unions and separate production sites, develop a role for 
the union representatives in the decision bodies at each site, and allow 
a large number of union representatives to be exposed to SSAB's prob 
lems.
The unions represented a much broader constituency with a political 
agenda, while management was more homogeneous and was repre 
sented at the top by the new company's president and vice-presidents. 
The vice-presidents each participated in one or more of the division 
management groups. At the plant level, management was already in 
place. The unions, on the other hand, had never coordinated their activ 
ities among the three companies and in some cases not amongst them 
selves at each steel site. The employees in the steel works belonged to 
the metalworkers unions. These unions were coordinated by the Trade 
Unions Confederation. The white-collar workers cooperated under the 
national bargaining umbrella of the Federation of Salaried Employees 
and were represented by three different unions: one for the first-line 
supervisors, one for the white-collar employees, and one for the civil 
engineers. The mine workers were also part of the Trade Unions Con 
federation, and the railroad company had both blue- and white-collar 
unions.
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The unions, instead of waiting for a plan that they would then have 
to negotiate issue by issue, wanted to be part of an interim organization 
that would develop the overall strategy for restructuring. The principal 
aspects of the arrangement arrived at in the fall of 1977 were that the 
unions were committed from the beginning to the merger and restruc 
turing and had already approved of the idea. The unions' commitment 
was reinforced by their involvement in lobbying for government sup 
port for the loan guarantees. The difficult problem of deciding which 
facilities would be shut down and which would receive new invest 
ment was postponed by the creation of the joint interim organization, 
which would deal with the issues through a number of working groups.
The joint interim merger organization was composed of the central 
project management group, which included top management and union 
representatives from the different trades and units. There were also 
eight central project groups, each in a different functional area with 
both union and management representatives. The central project 
groups represented one place that the information and negotiation 
aspects of codetermination were carried out. Finally, local project 
groups coordinated the activities at the three major sites. As the discus 
sions continued, an additional layer—the Division Management 
Groups—with both management and union representatives, was 
added. These division groups would later form the basis for the perma 
nent new divisions in SSAB.
Allan Larsson and a research team from the Swedish Center for 
Working Life assisted the unions. The research team consisted of three 
members who were already involved in the central project groups, 
while others took a support role and engaged in special studies 
requested by the unions. Between project group meetings, the union 
representatives, Allan Larsson, and the Working Life team met to eval 
uate the issues and frame their own amendments and positions.
Negotiations proceeded at the national and local levels. Economic, 
market, and technological strategies were set at the national level, 
while the locals negotiated over how restructuring would take place, 
particularly how the workforce would be affected. Early in 1978, the 
more than 200 union representatives on the major committees and task 
forces determined that they were unfamiliar with the merger process 
and hadn't formed a cohesive position on many of the issues, and they 
asked for additional time beyond the six months to consider all of the
106 Collective Bargaining in Cooperative Countries
issues. The union representatives opposed early retirement in the first 
plan, threatening to submit everything to formal negotiations if they 
were not given an extension, and they were.
The Employee Participation in Decision Making Act of 1977 placed 
considerable emphasis on the local union, which explains why bargain 
ing over restructuring was carried out at the three sites and why sepa 
rate local agreements were negotiated. The steel plants were extremely 
important to the economic health of each of the communities. Table 4.2 
presents employment at the SSAB plant in Oxel&sund relative to the 
city.
Table 42 
Oxelosund City and Plant Employment, 1957-1983
Population of city
Employment at 
plant
Plant as a per 
centage of city
1957
6,000
800
13.3
1962
12,000
3,000
25
Year
1978
14,000
3,700
26.4
1979
14,000
3,890
27.8
1983
14,000
3,119
22.2
SOURCE: SSAB, Oxelosund facility.
Internal union problems developed among the three locations and 
between the unions at each site. At the local level, the unions defended 
their own site as a viable production unit and as a site to maintain over 
all employment within the larger plan. The sites were in competition 
with each other over where the cutbacks would take place and where 
new technology would be installed. The mining towns in central Swe 
den particularly would suffer if the production of raw steel was elimi 
nated at Lulea, the central steel site; on the other hand, if Domnarvet 
lost its raw steel production, it would lose jobs, including jobs in the 
surrounding mining district. The unions were pressured to use their 
influence at the national political level to gain government help for the 
mining towns. The locals and the national unions had to work together 
in a unified front to press for companywide solutions to labor force
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changes. The national level also had to undertake a strong "selling job" 
to the locals on the business strategy plans.
A consultant to the unions concluded that the union representatives, 
even in the Swedish case where they were brought in at the beginning, 
had a difficult time affecting strategy (Hedberg 1979). He contends that 
the unions were usually modifying management's arguments and were 
torn by regional interests. However, the analytical skills of the white- 
collar workers were particularly useful. One of the union's achieve 
ments was calling attention to the impact of changes on local employ 
ment and getting the Ministry of Industry to grant special support for 
the mining towns. One assessment was that the union representatives 
on the personnel team, where they had expertise, managed to obtain a 
very good policy on workforce reductions, while the accounting/con 
trol group members, with little prior knowledge, had little effect. The 
union's collective bargaining experience appeared to have the greatest 
impact in the employment area. Bo Hedberg (1979), who was a mem 
ber of the Working Life Center's team that consulted on the merger, 
concluded that the union's influence on the final plan was marginal, but 
that their greatest influence was in dealing with surplus workers and 
their participation on committees during the merger provided employ 
ees with the opportunity to learn a great deal about the industry and the 
new company; insights which would be useful to them later.
Allan Larsson (1987), took a different approach. He maintains that 
the unions were convinced that the merger was necessary and that the 
unions were able to exert considerable control in shaping the direction 
of the new organization, in changing its financial reconstruction, and in 
the introduction of new technology.
The restructuring of steel presented the first large opportunity to test 
codetermination, with Larsson participating in the three-person 
restructuring committee and the unions employing the Working Life 
Center as consultants. The use of the Working Life Center was an 
attempt to build up information and evaluation on the union side as a 
means of supplementing or replacing the information presented by 
management. A study by Jonas Leffler (1983) of some SSAB facilities 
went further and projected the union not just as a receiver of informa 
tion but as a processor in setting up its own information system.
Schiller (1988), argues that the Employee Participation in Decision 
Making Act was not suitable for dealing with Swedish steel's closures
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and mergers. Hie unions were allowed to participate and were supplied 
with financial data, and their economic consultants presented alterna 
tives, but the alternatives implemented were decidedly these provided 
by the companies based on economic reality. He concludes that politi 
cal intervention played a larger role than code termination in softening 
the impact of restructuring on the workforce.
Conclusions
Figure 4.1 presents a comparative summary of negotiations over 
downsizing in the cooperative committees. Negotiations in Belgium 
were a mix of adversarial and cooperative. The unions' ties to political 
parties dictated their reaction to restructuring plans proposed by the 
government. Unions that supported the party in power backed restruc 
turing, while those out of power resisted. Militant local action raised 
the cost of restructuring by receiving government assurances that 
workers would not be dismissed. In Luxembourg, where the unions 
were cooperative, the unions were involved from the beginning in tri 
partite negotiations.
In Germany, Metall attained its objectives through both its political 
ties to the Social Democratic party and negotiations. When the conser 
vatives assumed power, the union shifted its strategy to negotiations 
and took an adversarial position. It was able to resist restructuring 
plans or force their modification. The unions were assisted by their 
control over works councils and sympathetic company labor directors.
Japan, categorized as cooperative, consulted with the unions. The 
unions were aggressive in pursuing their annual wage demands and 
cooperative in restructuring. Their cooperation on employment was 
assured since steelworkers kept their jobs somewhere in the firm.
Sweden was the clearest confirmation of the typology. The unions 
were involved in shaping restructuring strategy from the outset. This 
involvement was consistent with the tripartite economic and labor pol 
icies that had fashioned the "Swedish Model." The unions lobbied Par 
liament for financial aid in return for their participation in strategy at 
each level. They insulated their members from the first stages of
Figure 4.1 
Comparative Bargaining in Cooperative Countries
Environmental issues
Countries
Belgium
Germany
Japan
Luxembourg
Sweden
Bargaining 
structure
Centralized
Centralized
Decentralized
Centralized
Centralized
Nature of 
relationship
Cooperative to 
adversarial
Adversarial
Cooperative
Cooperative
Cooperative
Formal 
participation
Negotiations
Negotiations
Consultation
Partnership
Partnership
Principal rules
Plan for restructuring
Pensions
Transfer of workers
Plan for restructuring
Plan for restructuring
Outcomes
Joint 
committees
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Restructuring
Employment adjustments
Employment adjustments
Employment adjustments
Employment adjustments
Shifting products, restruc 
turing
Figure 4.2 
Comparative Employee Participation
Countries
Belgium
Germany
Japan
Luxembourg
Sweden
Statutory
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Form of participation
Works council
Works council and 
boards
Labor-management 
committees
Works council
Labor-management 
committees
Relative 
strength
Weak
Strong
Mixed
Strong
Strong
Union 
control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Principal areas of participation 
in restructuring
Work rules, information
Work rules, employment adjustments, plant 
closings
Information
Company strategy, employment adjust 
ments, plant closings
Company strategy, employment adjustments
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restructuring by receiving a commitment that their members would not 
be displaced.
Figure 4.2 presents a comparative summary of employee participa 
tion in downsizing. In those countries where works councils were leg 
islated, employee representatives were often involved in the 
development of corporate strategy related to restructuring, as they were 
in Luxembourg and Sweden. But the direction of the effects of codeter- 
mination on restructuring are mixed. Restructuring was accomplished 
in Sweden without industrial warfare; however, in Belgium and Ger 
many, plant closures and mergers were resisted. What is clear is that 
where there were works councils and codetermination, the workers 
were able to slow down the process of restructuring, often with the 
support of local government, so that the costs did not fall quickly on 
the workers. Instead the workers' representatives were able to obtain a 
commitment of no layoffs for some period or of income guarantees. In 
countries such as the United States, without employee representation at 
the strategic level, the costs of adjustment fell quickly on the workers 
and their communities.
The adjustment strategies used in the cooperative countries were: 
first, stopping new hiring and allowing normal attrition; second, work- 
sharing arrangements; third, transferring and retraining without lay 
offs; fourth, early retirements; and fifth, permanent layoffs with 
income supplements and relocation assistance. The centralized nature 
of collective bargaining in Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, and Swe 
den increased the unions' political power and access to the decision- 
making process during restructuring. Unions in these countries were 
able to influence adjustment.
NOTES
1. Blanpain (1982) for a full review of Belgium labor law.
2. Abe (1989).
3. The Wall Street Journal (September 6,1983). See Peterson (1986; 1987) for a discussion of 
collective bargaining in the first half of the 1980s.

5 
Employment Adjustment
This chapter discusses the private and public programs aimed at 
providing steelworkers with income security. Public programs usually 
address the employment problems of more than one industry, and this 
chapter discusses only those public programs that had a large impact 
on steel. For example, a general discussion of the Canadian Industrial 
Adjustment Service is not included. Post-steel employment activities 
are also discussed. The focus of this chapter is on the outcomes section 
of the conceptual framework. The hypothesis for this chapter, based on 
the typology in figure 1.2, is that adversarial countries can be expected 
to leave the issue of employment security to employers and employee 
representatives, who negotiate narrowly defined benefits. In these 
countries, it is anticipated that companies and workers jointly share the 
costs of downsizing the workforce, and that an important form of 
workforce reduction would be negotiated early retirement. In coopera 
tive countries, it is expected that the government would share in the 
design and cost of labor market programs, and the outcomes would be 
the result of wide-ranging, tripartite discussions. In these countries, it 
is anticipated that the government and firms jointly share the costs of 
downsizing, and the cooperative countries are likely to try to maintain 
employment through transfers and retraining.
Adversarial Systems
Canada
The unemployment experience in Canadian steel was different from 
the other countries in this study, and reductions in the workforce were 
much smaller. Employment in the steel industry has remained rela 
tively stable, except for major layoffs during the recession of 1982-83 
which were followed by rehiring. Between 1975 and 1985, steel jobs 
declined by 9 percent
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At Stelco, in the early 1980s, layoffs during downturns in demand 
were the typical pattern, along with a slow shrinkage of the workforce 
(see table 5.1 for employment at Stelco from 1975-1986). In Novem 
ber 1982, layoffs were announced for 4,000 workers out of 23,700. 
Depletion of inventories was also used as a coping mechanism for 
shortening delivery time. However, this approach required the rebuild 
ing of inventories later on.
A study prepared for the Steelworkers Union indicates that, from 
1978 to 1983, there was a shrinkage of 1,156 workers in steel from 
97,270 to 86,114 or 11.5 percent (Alien 1985). The most pronounced 
decline was between 1980 and 1982. A study of the reemployment his 
tory of the 33,292 workers who left steel between 1978 and 1983 indi 
cates that 21,093 (63 percent) were employed elsewhere, 2,568 (8 
percent) had no job at the time of the study and received unemploy 
ment insurance benefits only, and 9,631 (29 percent) had left the labor 
force. However, following layoff, 54 percent had returned to their pre 
vious employer. This supports the idea that Canada followed a typical 
adversarial pattern of layoff folio wed by recall. Steel was broken down 
into iron and steel mills, pipe and tube mills and wire products in this 
report. Workers leaving jobs in the mills had a slightly higher propen 
sity toward unemployment and withdrawal from the labor force. Well 
over half of those reemployed had found work outside of steel and 
experienced a decline in their income. This decline in income is similar 
to the experience reported in studies outside of steel (Hamermesh 
1987; Jacobson 1978).
The same study looked at interindustry flows. Nearly 21,100 work 
ers left steel between 1978 and 1983. Those who found jobs moved in 
almost equal numbers to the services, other manufacturing, and a cate 
gory called construction, utilities, and primary industries. The highest 
proportion of workers who moved to other jobs in other manufacturing 
remained in metal-related industries.
An analysis of employment and age indicates that the tendency to 
leave the labor force was much more pronounced for older workers, 
69.6 percent for those over 65. Of those who remained in the labor 
force, almost half of those who had been employed, 46 percent of those 
under 55, did not have jobs. As employment reductions took place in 
steel, the age distribution of those who remained has shifted upward. In 
1978, 24 percent were 24 years of age or younger, but by 1983, there
Table 5.1 
Stelco Hourly Employment, 1975-1986
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981a
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Hilton
10,522
11,338
11,634
11,652
12,296
12,093
7,443
10,136
8,974
8,747
8,489
8,207
Fasteners
631
709
770
736
784
607
491
519
562
666
671
697
Division
Wire
1,239
1,094
1,134
1,150
1,195
1,121
920
927
888
893
733
683
East
941
990
1,026
1,155
1,201
1,119
790
943
878
704
801
597
West
541
462
473
678
633
713
1,011
634
577
742
630
592
LEW
276
599
846
893
974
977
1,033
1,049
Total
13,874
14,593
15,037
15,371
16,388
16,252
11,501
14,052
12,853
12,729
12,357
11,825
SOURCE: Stelco.
a. Strike affected employment figures for 1981.
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were only 11 percent in this category. Those over 45 had risen from 30 
to 34 percent. This is a result of seniority clauses where younger work 
ers with less seniority are the first to be laid off, and the greater mobil 
ity of younger workers who choose to move on when employment is 
threatened. Older workers were the focus of a report by the Canadian 
Steel Trade Conference (1985) since they were presumably the least 
reemployable. The report was not aimed at maintaining employment or 
resisting reductions, but rather at the encouragement of community- 
based assistance from federal unions, as well as counseling, industrial 
development monetary assistance, and early retirement.
The Canadian government did not undertake the same employment 
measures specifically geared to steel that were developed in Western 
European countries because Canadian steel has remained quite healthy. 
Employment security measures were left to negotiations between the 
employers and unions, with some government funding. Negotiations 
centered on early retirement benefits. These will be discussed in the 
United States section of this chapter, since the steelworkers in Canada 
are part of the same union as the American steelworkers. In May 1985, 
the steelworkers and the companies formed the Canadian Steel Trade 
Conference, which evolved from a factfinding group into an action-ori 
ented organization with continuous services. In 1987, the name was 
changed to the Canadian Steel Trade and Employment Congress 
(CSTEC). Its activities include research on competitive materials and 
Canada's steel trade, lobbying for steel in multinational trade negotia 
tions, and developing a program to deal with restructuring. The mis 
sion statement explicitly excludes collective bargaining from CSTEC's 
goals.
CSTEC's Employment and Adjustment Committee, made up of 
equal numbers of management and local union representatives, created 
an employment adjustment program called Helping Employees Adjust 
Together (HEAT). This is a job development and job creation program 
assisted by federal government funds. The program offers assessment, 
job search, training and relocation funding. To be eligible for this pro 
gram the local union and the company have to be members of CSTEC 
(CSTEC 1988). Start-up monies, up to $5,000, are available to any 
worker management group that wants to review an employment adjust 
ment situation and develop a project work plan. After the work plan is 
completed, the project is considered for funding. Among the possible
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project areas to be considered are counseling, skills training, reloca 
tion, upgrading, and training for new technology. Average employee 
costs are benchmarked at $5,000. The first projects were at Courtice 
Steel and Frankel Steel and involved career counseling, a workshop on 
job search techniques, employer contacts and assistance in forming a 
job club.
The consequences of workforce reductions in steel have been dealt 
with by a combination of collectively bargained and publicly sup 
ported programs. When Stelco shut down its open hearth, 2,000 work 
ers were laid off in 1981. These workers were assisted by government 
agencies. Since 1981, Stelco has sought to use normal attrition, retire 
ments, contracting out, and overtime.
Great Britain
Great Britain had the largest relative reduction of its steel workforce 
of any of the countries in this study, and these layoffs added to the high 
unemployment levels in the declining northern manufacturing areas. 
Employment security was a combination of private and public initia 
tives. Some of the private programs were begun by management, and 
others were the result of negotiations with the unions. British Steel 
Corporation's (BSC's) strategy was to close inefficient facilities and 
concentrate on production at sites with new technology. Some of the 
inefficient plants were in areas where BSC was the sole employer, and 
plant closures became a politically sensitive issue. The Trades Union 
Congress Steel Committee at first insisted upon employment guaran 
tees, but management offered severance pay, retraining, early retire 
ment benefits and job creation. The company also sought to create a 
climate for change through improved communications with employees 
and what it termed an active social policy.
The company and the unions negotiated an overall manning strat 
egy, and in January 1976, the Joint Statement on Reductions in 
Employment Costs and Improvements in Labor Productivity was 
signed, identifying reduced manning levels as the key to improved per 
formance. The unions agreed to this after receiving reinstatement of 
the Guaranteed Week Agreement which had been suspended in 1975. 
The Agreement specified that overmanning had to be reduced within 
two years. Low-cost plants would receive a preference, as would low
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premium shifts, and flexible worktime began. The level of negotiations 
where the subject of workforce reductions was settled gradually shifted 
from the Steel Committee to the local unions, and negotiations over 
specific crew sizes were concluded at the plant level. The company 
offered severance pay to those whose jobs were eliminated because of 
plant closings. In 1977, the local unions at the Clyde Iron Works, fol 
lowed by the Hartlepool plant, concluded a plant agreement which pro 
vided them enhanced layoff payments for surrendering their jobs. The 
local unions adjusted the method of payment to favor the age structure 
of the workforce. Union members felt that since there appeared to be 
no prospect of keeping the plants open, it would be far better to leave 
with enhanced layoff payments.
The Steel Committee shifted its strategy from requesting alternative 
employment to obtaining the maximum benefits for the workforce. The 
company continued to communicate with the employees and twice bal 
loted the entire workforce in order to test the support among them for 
its policies when these were challenged by the unions. In both cases, 
there was overwhelming support from the workforce for the survival 
plans explained and proposed by management.
In 1978, the Ebbw Vale steelworks and the entire East Moors site 
were closed, and that same year the Department of Industry issued a 
White Paper which endorsed management's view that the plants were 
overmanned and had to be closed. The company unilaterally intro 
duced severance compensation, retirement, retraining, counseling, 
transfers and job creation. Laid-off workers received enhanced statu 
tory layoff payments and earnings protection for up to 148 weeks. 
Under the Employment and Income Security Agreements negotiated 
between the company and the unions, the BSC supplemented statutory 
entitlements by ignoring the statutory limits of normal earnings which 
were above the maximum and supplemented the amount by 50 percent 
for the blue-collar workers and by 25 percent for those over 65 who 
were in other grades.
For those who were moved to other jobs, their new salaries were 
subsidized based on their age as follows: under 55, 20 weeks at 100 
percent and 70 weeks at 90 percent, 55-59, 23 weeks at 100 percent 
and 96 weeks at 90 percent, 60 and over, 26 weeks at 100 percent and 
122 weeks at 90 percent. There were also traveling and resettlement 
grants for those who had to move, and travel expenses for those who
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didn't move but had their travel costs increased. All of these were 
negotiated. Retraining benefits for up to 52 weeks were also possible 
and paid by the European Coal and Steel Community. 1
The BSC received help for the initial cost of layoffs from the gov 
ernment. One author puts payments at an average of $12,000, going as 
high as $40,000 for the highly skilled, and Grieves (1982), who was 
managing director for personnel and social policy at BSC, places pay 
ment at the equivalent of 26 weeks of pay. Early retirement was offered 
for men who had reached the age of 55 and women who had reached 
the age of 50. Many of the employees who opted for this scheme took 
up a second career. It was reported that 65,500 employees took advan 
tage of this between 1977 and 1984, of whom 47,600 were blue-collar 
and 17,900 were white-collar (Mixed Committee for the Harmoniza 
tion of Working Conditions). Benefits for new careers included income 
protection and course fees and could last up to a year at 90 percent of 
previous earnings (Grieves 1985).
The BSC introduced counseling teams drawn from the workforce in 
the plants where layoffs took place. Interview areas were provided for 
counseling, and each employee was interviewed twice. The first inter 
view concentrated on the financial aspects of layoff and provided the 
worker with provisional information on benefits. The second interview 
discussed future employment strategy. Further interviews were con 
ducted if the individual needed additional assistance. In several plants, 
transfer to another plant was offered as an option for some job catego 
ries. The Redcar plant had to be manned when the Hartlepool works 
were closed in 1978, and some workers laid off at Glengarnock went to 
work at Hunterston. The possibility of transferring workers to new 
facilities, originally part of BSC's strategy of closing old plants and 
opening five new plants, was limited because of the large size of the 
layoffs and the smaller number of jobs in the new more automated 
facilities.
Job creation was the task of BSC Industry, established in 1975 as an 
independent subsidiary. The Board of BSC Industry included six union 
representatives, members of the Main Board and the chairman of BSC. 
Its task was to create new jobs in the areas of England, Scotland, and 
Wales affected by the steel plant closures and to supplement the finan 
cial aid made available from British government and EEC sources for 
investors willing to create jobs in those areas in which plant closures
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affected employment (Grieves 1985). The company committed about 
50 million pounds to BSC Industry. It worked with the EEC, central 
government, and regional and local authorities to help local communi 
ties with job creation and regeneration. Incentives to develop new jobs 
included a cash grant from the government of up to 22 percent of the 
cost of buildings, plant and equipment, medium-term loans provided 
by the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Invest 
ment Bank. The government also provided teams for assisting in estab 
lishing new plants.
Local offices identified the areas most affected by the layoffs so that 
aid could be directed to the appropriate places. In each of these offices, 
a small team was established. The individual members of the team 
established contacts in the area to lend a hand to new firms or expand 
ing ventures. Several strategies were developed to create new jobs in 
the regions affected by steel plant closures. One strategy was to obtain 
the assets of BSC-owned land and buildings and rent or lease out the 
land or buildings to firms outside the steel industry. Another strategy 
was to build new industrial units on land owned by BSC or to convert 
old works into small shops for new small businesses. The best known 
of these approaches was the Clyde Workshops Project in Glasgow, 
where 90 units were created for small firms. Rental began in January 
1979, and within a year 60 firms employing 500 people had been 
accommodated; 48 of these were new businesses. This was an impor 
tant success story because it was in an inner city area. Another strategy 
was to invest in firms that came up with a proposal. Investments were 
in the form of financing or renting plants and machines to the firm after 
they had received funds from governmental agencies and banks. BSC 
Industry also provided unsecured loans and assisted businesses in 
exploring other sources of finance, including equity participation from 
venture capitalists, government grants, government loans, European 
Coal and Steel Community loans, and commercial banking facilities. 
BSC Industry is credited with playing a major part in bringing the 
European headquarters of Mitel, the Canadian telecommunications 
company, to South Wales, where it planned to employ some 3,000 
workers.
Another strategy was marketing. Advertising campaigns in the 
national, regional, and local newspapers sought to attract job creation 
projects. BSC Industry, together with the Department of Industry and
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the European Social Fund, offered a package of grants up to almost 80 
percent of the cost incurred by firms conducting training programs at 
their own sites. BSC Industry is credited with handling 20,000 inquir 
ies regarding new projects, helping 2,000 projects to operate, creating 
over 30,000 actual jobs in the areas affected by steel closures, and 
establishing the potential growth of a further 20,000 jobs (Grieves 
1985). It reported that between April 1978 and November 1979, 207 
projects had received support with job commitments of 7,050 and esti 
mated employment of 2,400.
The BSC Industry Board presented a plan to the Main Board of the 
parent company in 1981 to provide funding for three more years. It 
was proposed that this money would be invested in assets for job cre 
ation. The prime objective of this effort was to make BSC Industry 
self-funding. In 1983, BSC Industry merged its local offices with local 
Enterprise Agencies to allow public and private sector resources 
together to support local teams, and nominated one of its senior execu 
tives to sit on the Board of Directors of each Enterprise Agency com 
pany. There were about 250 such agencies in Great Britain; 18 of them 
were in regions affected by BSC restructuring. Local Enterprise Agen 
cies are independent community companies supported at times with as 
many as 40-50 organizations for the purpose of local economic devel 
opment. In April 1984, BSC Industry became self-funding, its income 
derived from property rentals and interest on loans to companies creat 
ing jobs in closure areas. Grieves (1985) claims this increase was suffi 
cient to cover total operating expenses.
An evaluation of BSC Industry by Young (1986) maintains that the 
only organization created as a result of the British steel crisis was BSC 
Industry, and that one of its problems was that attempts to find a pri 
vate purchaser for any steelworks was always resisted by BSC's 
refusal to sell steel plants to the private sector for fear of new competi 
tion. Employment in new projects was also only a small fraction of 
total reductions (OECD 1980). BSC management maintains that it was 
a successful venture creating 90,000 job opportunities, 3,000 start-ups 
or expansions and 8 sites with 293 companies and 1,800 employees.
Public programs were provided by the British government and the 
EEC. These provided general and targeted employment security pro 
grams. Plant closings had to be registered with the Manpower Sources 
Commission. The Redundancy Payments Act of 1965 called for 30
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day's advance notification to the government of individual layoffs and 
90 days notice of layoffs of more than 100 employees. There were 
mandatory lump-sum payments to those affected. Revisions have 
strengthened the requirements for joint labor-management planning to 
avoid layoffs, but the basic structure has remained unchanged. The 
lump-sum payments for steelworkers exceeded the statutory require 
ments because there were "super payments" available from the govern 
ment for the nationalized industries, particularly coal and steel. 
Discharged steelworkers at Port Talbot received an average payment of 
$15,000 in addition to their pension (OECD 1980). These "super pay 
ments" were well above the level of private company plans. In addi 
tion, super continuance plans could provide up to two year's salary or 
salary supplements for those reemployed in a lower paying job. Port 
Talbot workers received income supplements up to 90 percent of their 
former wage for the two years following their job loss. The maximum 
layoff payment was $18,000.
Government assistance was supplemented by EEC programs; there 
is, however, some question about how eagerly the British government 
sought EEC assistance. It was reported in January 1980 by Henk Vre- 
deling, EEC Commissioner for Social Policy, that the government had 
not contacted the EEC for financial help in handling steel layoffs. A 
subsidy of $92 million (1980 $ US) had been turned down by the BSC. 
The government justified its refusal of the aid on the grounds that such 
subsidies might lead to work-sharing and inefficiency (Richardson and 
Duley 1986).
The reemployment experiences of discharged steelworkers were 
studied at three steelmaking facilities: Shotton (North Wales) and Con- 
sett (North East England), which were BSC facilities, and Llanelli 
(South Wales) which was a private firm (Iron and Steel Confederation 
1980). For Shotton, the average age of the laid-off worker was 46. The 
average worker had been employed by the same firm for 18 years. 
Over 97 percent were male and 90 percent were manual workers. 
Twenty-two percent of those eligible for early retirement (470 out of 
2,135) took it, while the rest preferred to look for new jobs. The largest 
percentage (32 percent) who choose retraining were under 30 years of 
age, and 82 percent of these were in the manual trades. At Consett, as 
at Shotton, most of the workforce (80 percent) lived within a three mile 
radius of the plant. Only 15 percent (135) took advantage of the early
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retirement option, and up to October 1983,44.2 percent had undergone 
or were undergoing retraining. Seventy-four (25.5 percent) had found 
alternative employment, and 45.3 percent (1,550) were still registered 
as unemployed.
The authors of the study concluded that local plant management 
objected to the survey and that data on the unemployed and use of EEC 
funds were lacking (Iron and Steel Confederation 1980). They also 
reported that private-sector steelworkers received a much smaller total 
layoff package (when compared with the special payments available to 
the BSC plus an additional payment equal to 50 percent of the amount 
from the Statutory Redundancy Program). All of this was in addition to 
the ECSC Readaptation and Statutory Programs.
United States
The reduction in steel jobs in the United States was drastic. Fifty- 
one percent of the jobs were eliminated between 1970 and 1990. 
American steel companies rarely closed a plant abruptly. Rather, they 
retired individual facilities or mills in the plant after allowing them to 
wear down gradually over a number of years. Eventually, the entire 
plant could be closed, but most of the reductions in the past decade 
have came from partial plant closures (Barnett and Crandall 1986). For 
example, the Bethlehem plant in Lakawanna, New York had 11,200 
employees in 1968. It reduced jobs in 1974, 1977, and 1981, and by 
1984, only a small number of jobs remained (New York State Depart 
ment of Labor 1988). Most of the closures were in integrated plants 
that produced bars and wire rods, two products that came to be domi 
nated by mini-mills. Barnett and Crandall argued that integrated steel 
companies, rather than keeping obsolete steelworks open or building 
new coke ovens, blast furnaces, basic oxygen furnaces and continuous 
casters, appeared to be willing to rely on other producers to feed their 
raw steel requirements for a narrower and narrower line of finished 
steel products (Barnett and Crandall 1986).
Income security programs were negotiated between employers and 
the United Steelworkers. Davis and Montgomery (1986) argued that 
the steel income security network was designed to handle cyclical 
changes rather than the sharp restructuring that took place. There were 
no government programs that dealt specifically with excess steelwork-
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ers. The Trade Adjustment Act comes closest to meeting this criterion. 
Negotiated agreements were more extensive in the United States than 
in most of the cooperative countries where collectively bargaining pro 
grams supplemented government programs targeted at steel.
The guaranteed lifetime income protection programs were the prin 
cipal source of income security for excess steelworkers. Kassalow 
(1984) cites a survey indicating that only workers under 41 years of 
age and with less than 20 years of service lacked lifetime income pro 
tection. All the others received, if social security benefits paid from the 
age of 62 are included in the overall calculation, some form of income 
security from the time their employment was terminated until the end 
of their life. The three programs that made up the guaranteed lifetime 
income protection was the rule-of-65 pension, the 70/80 pension, and 
the special pension window. An employee with 20 or more years of 
continuous service was eligible for a rule-of-65 retirement if age plus 
service added up to 65. An employee who had at least 15 years of con 
tinuous service could retire before 62 if he had reached 55 and age and 
service equaled 80 (rule-of-80). There was also a one-time special 
retirement program during the 1983-1986 contract. Medical insurance 
was also provided. United States Steel paid out over $550 million in 
pensions and medical benefits for retirees in 1985.
Relocation allowances ranged from $600 to $1,450 for married 
employees. Severance pay was calculated on the basis of years of ser 
vice. Supplementary unemployment benefits, in addition to unemploy 
ment insurance (UI), were used for temporary loss of employment. The 
size of benefits and their length of time were calculated on the basis of 
previous earnings, length of service, the worker's family situation, the 
statutory benefits, and possibilities of reemployment. An employee 
with more than 20 years seniority could receive supplementary unem 
ployment benefits for up to two years. These benefits were financed by 
the steel companies through contributions to a special fund.
Individualized bargaining in 1986 resulted in somewhat different 
programs among the large steel companies. The 1986 contract at 
National Steel Corporation established an Employment Security Plan. 
A guarantee was made that no employee would be laid off during the 
contract except under disastrous circumstances. Disastrous circum 
stances were defined as: permanent shutdown of a plant, rejection of 
the Plan in bankruptcy proceedings, or severe financial difficulties con-
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tingent upon agreement from the union. The Employment Security 
Plan also provided for flexible work assignments and reassignments 
across traditional job classifications within each plant. An employee 
who refused reassignment could be placed on a leave of absence with 
out supplementary unemployment benefits. To administer the Employ 
ment Security Plan, each plant was required to establish a joint 
Employment Security Productivity Committee. Other related provi 
sions provided limitations on contracting out and a $1.2 billion invest 
ment commitment from National.
Employment benefits created large pension fund obligations for the 
companies, which affected their operating decisions. A firm operates a 
plant as long as the revenues exceed the out-of-pocket costs, princi 
pally those for materials and labor. Pension plans in the steel industry 
turned part of the operating costs into a fixed cost, since laying off 
workers resulted in a substantial liability that was not affected by sub 
sequent changes in output. It was argued that, since steel companies 
could avoid only part of the workers' wages through layoffs, they 
tended to keep more capacity operating than might otherwise be justi 
fied (Congressional Budget Office 1987). It was also argued that pen 
sion agreements reduced incentives to invest in labor-saving 
equipment because layoffs placed a burden on pension funds. Simi 
larly, to the extent that a company had long-term contracts with materi 
als suppliers requiring it to pay for inputs whether they are used or not, 
these inputs would also be considered fixed costs in making operating 
decisions. Employers' contributions to pension plans are largely based 
on previous experience, and the pension funds' resources may not 
cover obligations created when terminations exceed the historical rate. 
The amount of the deficiency becomes a liability on the firms' books. 
If a company is already in financial difficulty, the increase in liabilities 
can exceed its net worth and cause it to consider bankruptcy. When a 
company chooses bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the federal government's Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 
generally by assignment or transfer, assures that workers covered by 
the plan receive their benefits. The Corporation was established under 
Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. It is 
entitled to certain assets of the bankrupt firm. These benefits can be 
reduced, since the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insures only 
a portion of the benefits. A firm may be relieved of the pension costs of
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laying off workers by declaring bankruptcy, while it continues to oper 
ate under Chapter 11. This policy would appear to subsidize the least 
efficient firms, since they are the ones most likely to go bankrupt; how 
ever, Wheeling-Pittsburgh, a large firm, and LTV, the second largest 
steel producer, both filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. By termi 
nating its pension obligations, Wheeling-Pittsburgh reduced its labor 
costs over $3.00 an hour, which gave it a considerable edge in total 
production costs. In 1986, LTV had three times as many retirees as 
employees. LTV carries its pension obligations in its financial state 
ments as liabilities, which means the company reports losses in some 
years, but if the Guaranty Corporation pays the pensions, these losses 
do not appear on the financial statements. The Steelworkers cited this 
approach and change in the accounting method of reporting pensions 
as liabilities, and pointed out that losses could have had an adverse 
impact on negotiated profit-sharing payments for 1988 (Bureau of 
National Affairs 1988). Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's efforts 
to restore LTV's responsibility for its pension plans, after LTV started 
to earn profits, were initially rejected by the courts. The Corporation 
had involuntarily terminated three pension plans covering 100,000 
workers in January 1987 and tried to restore LTV's obligation in Sep 
tember 1987. They argued that LTV's economic position had 
improved, and the company and the union had negotiated liberal early 
retirement benefits. The Supreme Court upheld the agency's position in 
June 1990. Five of LTV's competitors had filed a brief alleging that 
LTV enjoyed a competitive edge of 20 cents per ton of steel by shifting 
its pension costs to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
In March 1987, 81 percent of all Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora 
tion claims were by steel companies' pension plans and amounted to 
approximately $535 million (USITC 1987). The 182 steel plans repre 
sented about 14 percent of the 1,345 plans terminated. Net claims or 
underftmding for the 182 steel plans amounted to $3.1 billion as 
opposed to $3.9 billion for all 1,345 plans. In 1987, Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation was responsible for providing benefits to 
151,900 workers in steel, 70,875 of whom were already retired. It was 
also estimated that the total underfunded pension for the five major 
steel companies (Bethlehem, Armco, National, USX, and Inland) was 
between $4 billion and $6 billion, which pointed up the possibility of 
more claims on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
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Layoffs in the United States, as in most of the other countries in this 
study, occurred in regions already burdened by high unemployment. 
The closing of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company was 
announced in September 1977 by the Lykes Corporation, which began 
a sequence of mill closings that permanently eliminated over 10,000 
jobs in the Youngstown area in less than three years (Buss and Redburn 
1983). Community groups in Youngstown, rather than the leadership 
of the steelworkers, took the lead in attempting to do something about 
the closing. Joint community and employee ownership through an 
employee stock option plan (ESOP) was explored by the Ecumenical 
Coalition, together with a government loan and a federal government 
guarantee that it would purchase steel from the Campbell Works for 
two years. The United Steelworkers were not yet committed to ESOPs 
and did not support the Coalition's efforts, which included its own 
locals, until 1977 (Fuechtmann 1989).
Government-funded labor market programs that assisted steelwork 
ers were the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, which was 
replaced by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) in 1984. Title III 
of JTPA was used to fund several projects in 1989 targeted at steel- 
workers in Chicago, Allegheny County (PA) and Utah. The Trade 
Adjustment Assistance Program (TAA), provided for under the Trade 
Act of 1974, has been used more than any other government program to 
assist steelmakers (USDOL 1985). In April 1988, around 50,000 work 
ers were receiving TAA assistance (ILO 1986). This program supple 
ments unemployment benefits to workers who become unemployed as 
a result of imports. Under the Act, affected workers may receive 
retraining, job search, and relocation assistance, but the program 
emphasizes cash assistance.
It has been suggested that the costs to the federal government of the 
transition to a smaller steel industry could be minimized by forward 
planning (Barnett and Schorsch 1983). One option would be to focus 
federal policy on workers who had been displaced. The government 
could use its resources to set up a relocation and retraining program for 
such workers. Barnett and Schorsch have argued that reliance on the 
market is not an adequate response to steel industry unemployment, 
and that government help is required to retain relocated workers and 
attract new industry. If the federal government participated in a joint 
government-industry agreement to retire excess steel capacity, retrain-
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ing funds could be targeted to those facilities closed under the agree 
ment. They argue that job retraining could be emphasized in the 
program design, or made mandatory as a condition for unemployment 
insurance payments.
Proponents of retraining programs note that the retraining of work 
ers increases the mobility of economic resources, promoting economic 
change and long-term economic growth. Critics, on the other hand, 
respond that job displacement occurs continually throughout the econ 
omy as a result of changes in tastes, economic conditions, trade, and a 
variety of other factors, and that a special retraining policy for steel- 
workers would be considered arbitrary and inequitable.
Information on the reemployment experiences of displaced steel- 
workers is available from studies by Buss and Redburn (1983), Jacob- 
son (1978), the New York State Department of Labor (1988), and a 
report by the U.S. Department of Labor (1985). Buss and Redburn's 
study of Youngstown, Ohio present a micro view of what happened to 
146 terminated workers. After one year, one-third were reemployed 
and one-fourth were eligible to, and opted to, retire. Some workers 
were offered temporary employment by Youngstown Sheet and 1\ibe 
to close the plant. Small percentages of the laid-off workers sought 
retraining or jobs through relocation. They concluded that the Ohio 
Employment Service did not appear to have the manpower or 
resources to produce labor market information.
Most steel plants are located in declining communities. Jacobson 
(1978) found that steel workers displaced in a local labor market with 
an unemployment rate 1.4 percent above the average suffered income 
losses over the first six years after displacement that were about 8 per 
cent above the average. In a 1975 report, Jacobson estimated earnings 
losses of steelworkers displaced from jobs due to the removal of 
import restrictions. His assumptions are particularly worth restating, 
since they present an insight into the job tenure of steelworkers who 
are characterized as among the most highly paid and reluctant to leave 
the industry for any reason. Jacobson argued that attrition was not an 
adjustment strategy employers could follow in steel. Attrition was high 
among new employees and those near retirement; however, the major 
ity of the steel workforce were in the middle tenure range, and there 
were few workers with low tenure. He concluded that steelworkers, if 
they follow the general experience of blue-collar workers, can be
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expected to suffer large financial losses even when displaced in a 
growing local economy.
The New York State Department of Labor (1988) study of the Beth 
lehem Lackawanna plant characterized the 3,000 discharged workers 
who were surveyed as an older, less educated, highly paid workforce 
with specialized skills that were not easily transferred to other employ 
ment. The respondents were white, male and over 45 years of age and 
averaged 29 years of service when laid off in 1983. Only half of those 
displaced ever worked again, although 90 percent expressed a desire to 
continue working. Their average duration of unemployment before 
finding work was 16 months. Those employed at the time of the study 
had averaged 1.6 jobs since layoff. Three years after the closing of the 
Lackawanna plant, only 38 percent of the displaced workers had found 
employment. Thirty-four percent of Bethlehem's former employees 
were still actively seeking work but unable to find it, while 27 percent 
had left the labor force for early retirement. Of those not currently 
working or retired, 76 percent never found a job. Those most success 
ful at finding work had been laid off from the professional-managerial- 
technical occupational group, followed by electricians and welders.
The U.S. Department of Labor (1985) report cites a BLS survey 
which showed displaced workers in steel at almost 120,000. Steel- 
workers were compared to other displaced workers and were found to 
be disproportionately white, male, and married, with some high school 
education and skills, mainly as factory operatives, and with 10 years on 
the last job. They were unemployed 10-38 weeks after separation. 
Income support for this group came principally from UI and TAA com 
pensation. Around 50,000 were receiving TAA benefits, including 
training, relocation allowances, and cash allowances. One-fourth of 
those who completed training were placed in positions related to their 
training, such as refrigeration, air conditioning, welding, computer 
technicians, truck drivers, mechanics, and electronics. At the time of 
the survey, about half of the displaced steelworkers had found employ 
ment. Reemployment was better for those in the 25-54 age group.
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Cooperative Systems
Belgium and Luxembourg
Income security programs were developed at three levels through 
government programs, industry agreements, and company programs. 
In Belgium and the other European countries in this study, public and 
private programs were integrated and the public contributions reduced 
the employers' costs. The European countries, with the exception of 
Great Britain, preferred not to dismiss steelworkers, but to provide a 
number of alternatives such, as early retirement, voluntary resignations, 
transfers, attrition, and reductions in the workweek. The Belgian gov 
ernment also provided training, a temporary reduction of the employ 
ers' social security payment for new employees, assistance to small 
and medium steel firms for hiring the unemployed, and loans to com 
panies.
Normal retirement is 60 years of age for women and 65 for men, but 
early retirement plans began at 55 and were reduced to 53 and then 50 
during 1984-1986. Early retirement payments amounted to between 70 
and 85 percent of the worker's normal income before retirement and 
were composed of a combination of national UI and a company pay 
ment. UI was indexed to the cost-of-living. The formula for hourly 
workers required that the company contribute 50 percent of the differ 
ence between net income and unemployment insurance up to a ceiling 
of $1,221 a month (1985 $ US). For example, if the average salary was 
$757.83 a month, the retired worker would receive $437.88 from UI, 
and the company would pay $159.99 or one-half of the difference. 
Monthly early retirement income would be $597.84.
The metalworkers unions tried to spread the work through reduc 
tions in the workweek, and between 1981 and 1988, the workweek was 
cut to between 35 and 37 hours, with a continuation of the four-shift 
system. At Sidmar, the majority of those electing early retirement have 
been blue-collar workers, but white-collar workers, who perform less 
physically taxing jobs, do not choose early retirement (Stoop 1984). 
The government has also allowed nonsteel companies to start early 
retirement plans; however, these have been tied to new employment. 
Companies can offer early retirement, but only if they replace a retired
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worker. One estimate is that about 70 percent of the retired workers 
were replaced (Markey 1984). A recent law required 100 percent 
replacement if early retirement is granted.
Early retirement programs were usually negotiated with the unions. 
A national early retirement program for the steel sector, which ended 
in 1984, included men retiring at 58 and women at 53. Between the 
ages of 58-60, they received maximum unemployment insurance and 
$450, and an employer's contribution set at 1/2 of the difference 
between present retirement and full retirement
During the 1970s, Cockerill began to explain to employees through 
its newsletter the need to reduce employment. In May 1977, it pointed 
out that tons produced per worker per year by its competitors were far 
greater than Cockerill's 206 tons. Usinor (Italy) produced 225 tons, 
Arbed (Luxembourg) 240, National Steel (US) 280, Sidmar (Belgium) 
358, Thyssen (Germany) 375, and Nippon Steel (Japan) 524 (Cockerill 
1977). At the end of May 1983, the redevelopment division of Cocker- 
ill-Sambre signed an agreement with a BSC firm, Job Creation, to 
examine possibilities for economic revitalization for 2,000 jobs in 
Charleroi where jobs had been reduced by 48 percent.
The largest reductions in jobs were at Athus and Cockerill (see table 
5.2). Athus closed in September 1979, and 20,000 jobs were lost. The 
metalworkers unions obtained two concessions after a strike. One was 
the creation of an employment cell for 1,150 workers for three years— 
1977-1980. This cell had the administrative responsibility for monthly 
payments to the workers and for ensuring their reemployment. The 
cell's members were entitled to their full previous salary during the 
first year, 90 percent of their salary in the second year, and 80 percent 
in the third year. The cell was jointly managed by the national govern 
ment and the labor unions. At the end of the cell's term, in 1980, 550 
workers were still without jobs (Capron 1986). The contract also pro 
vided for early retirement at age 55, with a supplement until normal 
retirement age. Workers not entitled to early retirement who were 
involved in short-term work or training received a supplementary 
award of $3.42 per day for two years.
The restructuring plan with the greatest impact on the Belgian work 
force was the Gandois Plan of 1983. It called for the reduction of 7,900 
workers by 1986 out of a total of 22,252 employed on January 1,1983. 
Layoffs were to be avoided at Cockerill-Sambre, and reductions were
Table 5.2 
Belgium Steel Employment, 1974-1983
u> to
Year
1974
Percent of total
1975
Percent of total
1976
Percent of total
1977
Percent of total
1978
Percent of total
1979
Percent of total
1980
Percent of total
Cockerill- 
Sambre
9,939,804
62
6,801,499
57
7,220,333
60
6,476,831
58
7,355,420
58
7,909,733
59
6,882,344
56
Sidmar
2,260,605
14
2,102,161
18
2,125,650
18
2,304,211
21
2,667,752
21
2,756,749
21
2,668,667
22
Boel
1,470,095
9
1,470,095
12
1,128,199
9
1,155,036
10
1,191,467
9
1,279,102
10
1,127,861
9
Company
Clabecq
1,296,638
8
748,150
6
846,543
7
820,331
7
962,538
8
1,030,632
8
1,004,276
8
Athus
551,758
3
256,995
2
280,360
2
93,052
8
Fabrifer
444,309
3
358,953
3
322,966
3
255,700
2
285,574
2
276,124
2
313,958
3
Divers
187,106
1
157,529
1
167,144
1
117,491
1
114,890
9
168,774
1
301,374
2
Total
16,150,315
11,895,382
12,091,195
11,222,652
12,577,641
13,421,114
12,298,480
1981
Percent of total
1982
Percent of total
1983
Percent of total
6,461,189
53
4,588,789
51
4,723,833
51
2,876,220
24
2,615,667
29
2,813,254
30
1,154,657 1,016,837
9 8
1,103,789
12
1,088,933
12
397,210
3
339,500
4
275,034
3
360,794
3
378,706
4
411,257
4
12,266 907
9,026,451
9,312,311
SOURCE: Cockerill-Sambre, Evolution Production Oder Usines Beiges, April 4,1984. 
NOTE: Percents may not sum to 100 due to founding.
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to be met through early retirement, retraining and temporary quits. The 
plan was to be funded by the Belgian government, the EEC, and funds 
made available by wage levies on the remaining workforce.
Another aspect of the social contract in cooperative countries is 
extensive legislation regulating the termination of employment, partic 
ularly for salaried workers. This reduces the risk of immediate layoffs. 
The notification period is based on income and years of employment, 
and Belgian employees can appeal their termination to a labor court
The Luxembourg General Statutory Law on Termination applies to 
steel. (See table 5.3.)
Between 1972 and 1983, Arbed cut its workforce in Luxembourg by 
38 percent (see table 5.4). This was accomplished without dismissals 
by using an "anticrisis" model, which included establishment of an 
Iron and Steel Anticrisis Division, short-time work, early retirement, 
labor mobility, including training and retraining, establishment of a 
public works division called "extraordinary works of general utility," 
and establishment of a "new industries" department The government 
supported this model by guaranteeing EEC loans to the steel industry 
of up to 10 billion francs and a subsidy of 30 percent of long-term 
loans for investment programs, and the Anticrisis Division was 
financed by an additional 10 percent subsidy.
The Anticrisis Division supervised a pool of up to 4,000 steelwork- 
ers whose jobs were eliminated (Wagner 1984). This pool was 
employed either on maintenance jobs at Arbed or loaned out to other 
companies at the same wage rate received by the workers at Arbed. 
This rate was subsidized by the government, which agreed to cover 
between 20 and 80 percent of the workers' Arbed wage and to grant a 
subsidy of an additional 5 to 6 percent of monthly wages with a partial 
exemption of employer taxes for up to two years. In January 1983, 
there were 3,700 workers in the Anticrisis Division, but by April 1984, 
the number was down to 1,000. Employees in this division were also 
removed from the cost accounting process of departments and not 
charged to the department
Some of these employees were transferred to a government-run pub 
lic works division, which had been terminated in 1976 and was reintro- 
duced in 1980. By the end of that year, 650 workers had been 
transferred to it, and it also employed many of the Anticrisis Division 
members. Public works activities included maintenance of roads, plac-
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Table 53
Luxembourg Blue-Collar and White-Collar 
Notification Requirements and Severance Pay
Blue-collar
Length of service
Less than 5 years
5-10 years
More than 10 years
Notice by 
worker
2 weeks
2 weeks
2 weeks
Notice by 
employer
4 weeks
8 weeks
12 weeks
Severance pay is:
Years of service
Less than 5 years
5 - 10 years
10 - 15 years
More than 15 years
Amount of pay
0
1 month
2 months
3 months
White-collar
Length of service
Less than 5 years
5-10 years
More than 10 years
Notice by 
worker
1 month
2 months
3 months
Notice by 
employer
2 months
4 months
5 months
Severance pay is:
Years of service
Less than 5 years
5 + years
10 years
15 years
20 years
25 years
30 years
Amount of pay
0
1 month
2 months
3 months
6 months
9 months
12 months
136
Table 5.4 
Arbed Steel Employment, 1972-1983
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981 
1982
1983
Employment8
22,361
23,004
23,180
21,986
20,955
18,928 
(2,696)
18,058 
(1,913)
17,737 
(1,102)
17,273 
(2,129)
16,613 
(2,505)
15,626b 
(2,877)
14,016 
(1,027)
SOURCE: Arbed, Reports to The Annual General Meeting, 1972-1982.
a. Numbers in parentheses are workers in Anticrisis Divisions in Belgium and Luxembourg steel
and mines.
b. Includes mines.
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ing of safety guides along roads, cleaning of rivers, and demolishing of 
old buildings. Schneider (1980) estimated that Arbed lost 20 percent 
on each worker. This removed them from Arbed's payroll for the time 
they were employed in public works. In 1984, the government funded 
a general works program that employed a quarter of the Anticrisis 
Division members, and job property rights were protected for the 
workers registered with the Division.
The workweek was also reduced from 40 to 38.16 hours, and over 
time was discouraged. The government subsidized the pay of workers 
who had their hours reduced. Normal retirement had been age 65, 
while early retirement had been age 60 for blue-collar workers after 40 
years of retirement contributions, age 60 for white-collar males after 
15 years of contributions and age 55 for white-collar females after 15 
years of contributions. This was changed in 1979 to compulsory early 
retirement for all workers age 57 or older. For the first, second, and 
third years, or until age 60, the worker receives 85 percent, 80 percent, 
and 75 percent of gross earnings. This is paid for by the unemployment 
fund, with a small contribution by the employer. After the third year, 
70 percent is paid until age 65 for white-collar workers, and until age 
60 for blue-collar workers. Then, the standard early retirement begins 
with contributions reduced by the missing contribution years. A June 
1984 report estimated that nearly 4,000 steelworkers had received pre 
retirement funds, and that 97 percent of all workers quit at 57 (Arbed 
1984). A recipient of early retirement cannot return to the steel indus 
try except under special circumstances and with approval by the Minis 
try of Social Security. Early retirement expenditures were met by the 
UI fund except where the worker was within three years of normal 
retirement. Under these circumstances, a contribution was also made 
by the European Coal and Steel Community fund. There was also 
vocational training in Luxembourg for new jobs, with two-thirds of the 
cost paid for by unemployment insurance funds. In 1977 and 1978,848 
workers were retrained
The government added a mobility allowance to Arbed's severance 
pay to induce mobility. Mobility was facilitated by temporary pay of 
up to 95 percent of previous earnings for the first six months after mov 
ing, 90 percent for the next six months and 85 percent for the next six 
months. For those in steel, a 1979 law also provided vocational train 
ing financed by the state at two-thirds of the total cost, including 80
138 Employment Adjustment
percent of the lower wages of the workers. The government agreed to 
contribute to training for new jobs, and to guarantee the EEC loans up 
to $341 million (1979 $ US) and 3 percent of the long-term loans.
A 1981 law established government-paid temporary reemployment 
subsidies for up to two years for those reassigned to lower paying jobs 
because they were in danger of being laid off. The subsidies were 100 
percent of the former wages for the first six months, 95 percent of the 
former wages for the next six months, 90 percent of the former wages 
for the next six months, and 85 percent of the former wages for the 
next six months.
Before making a request for assistance from the government, Arbed 
had to inform and consult with the trade union organizations about the 
programmed reduction of employment, and employers had to report 
their vacancies to the National Employment Commission.
Germany
The steel industry in Germany used a large number of approaches in 
adjusting its labor force (Bain 1983). These can be understood only 
within the context of the politics and the nature of the employment 
relationship in Germany. The political background included the over 
riding national demand for political stability since the Second World 
War, which could be seriously shaken by demonstrations over job ter 
minations. The employment relationship more closely resembled the 
Japanese concept of permanent employment than the employment-at- 
will concept in adversarial countries. All employees, including manag 
ers, sign a contract with the company that can only be terminated by 
mutual agreement. An employee who is not satisfied with the com 
pany's terms for separation can and does go to the courts. A large num 
ber of generally accepted special conditions also give the employee job 
protection from discharge. These include length of employment, age, 
sex, and size of family. It is not clear whether the low mobility of the 
German worker is a cause or an effect of this employment relationship, 
but workers are extremely reluctant to change their homes, and the 
shortage and high cost of housing also retard mobility. This translates 
into a desire by the employers and employees to maintain the employ 
ment relationship. In steel, this long-term employment relationship 
was disrupted by the secular decline in demand for steel and a decline
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in the number of jobs by 47 percent between 1970 and 1990 (see table 
1.2).
German steel firms adjusted their employment by a combination of 
a freeze on hiring, short workweeks, short-term layoffs, transfer from 
one plant to another, transfer from one job to another, retraining, trans 
fer of work, early retirement, voluntary separation, and plant closings. 
Hiring freezes, short workweeks and short-term layoffs were used first. 
The company notified the works council and the employees that either 
a shorter workweek (kurtzarbeit) or a layoff of several days or weeks 
would be undertaken. The workers were eligible for unemployment 
compensation if the company had notified the state labor office and 
received its approval. In reality, the action is often taken first and noti 
fication given to the labor office later. The company pays unemploy 
ment compensation, later reimbursed by the state if the plan is 
approved, and the plans were usually approved. In addition to unem 
ployment compensation at 68 percent of previous monthly earnings, 
the laid-off workers received payment from the company of about 22 
percent, which brought their income up to about 90 percent of their 
previous monthly earnings.
Workers were also transferred, either permanently or for a limited 
time, to another plant; however, this approach was not used very often 
nor did it meet with a great deal of success because of the unwilling 
ness of workers to be transferred. The most successful transfers were 
those where workers could keep their homes and merely alter their 
travel routes, such as in the Ruhr where firms had more than one facil 
ity. At Thyssen, employees who transferred to a distant site were 
offered company-owned housing. In transfers between jobs, the works 
councils played a key role in the wage decision. The first goal was to 
transfer the worker to another position at the same rate of pay. If this 
was not possible and the employee was dropped to a lower rated job, 
then the worker was given a "soft landing." This means that the 
employee's present salary was guaranteed for 12 to 18 months. After 
that, the salary was reduced slowly to the level of the new position by 
means of smaller pay increases.
The task of protecting job security was split between the works 
councils and the metalworkers. The works councils sought to preserve 
jobs while supporting modernization which they felt was necessary to 
keep the steel companies competitive and maintain employment. If
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jobs couldn't be preserved, then the works councils sought compensa 
tion. The metalworkers' approach was to negotiate protection against 
rationalization and to oppose plant closures and restructuring. Multi- 
plant companies sought to develop uniform employment policies for 
all their plants; however, uniformity was not always possible because 
of the differences in opinions among the plant works councils as to 
how employment adjustments would take place. These differences 
could be attributed to personalities, the effects of the potential change 
on each plant, the availability of alternative employment, and the eco 
nomic and social impact on the local community.
Several companies also sought to eliminate guest workers first; 
however, this was resisted by the works councils who were elected by 
all the employees. In 1982 guest workers made up 12.6 percent of the 
workforce at Thyssen and Bonier. In the same year Klockner negoti 
ated early retirements instead of the dismissal of guest workers with 
the works councils, which had two Turkish workers (Mirow 1982).
Only a small amount of retraining took place, since management's 
position was that most workers were not capable of retraining. The 
companies preferred to fill new jobs with vocational program gradu 
ates who had received their training in company-sponsored programs. 
Works councils participate on the advisory board of these in-house 
programs.
Thyssen and Krupp adopted radical manpower reduction policies in 
the late 1970s, while Hoesch's policy was to close plants and reduce 
jobs. Arbed's Saarstahl reconstruction in 1978 required approximately 
$20 million from the federal and Saar state governments. Reconstruc 
tion in Saarstahl was accompanied by cutting wages between 10 and 
30 percent and temporarily withholding payment of 50 percent of a 
month's wages. The workers were estimated to have contributed $80- 
$230 a month. The decline in jobs which began in 1978 was acceler 
ated in 1983 when Arbed told the government that bankruptcy could be 
avoided only by placing 5,100 employees on early retirement. This 
included almost everyone over 50 years of age. These workers were 
offered 82 percent of their current earnings, and the unions were 
requested to take a wage freeze for several years. Management also 
volunteered to take a wage cut of 25 percent of their 1983-1985 earn 
ings. After several weeks, the unions accepted the offer, since the loss
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of 5,100 jobs was deemed preferable to losing all 17,000 if the plant 
closed.
The works councils and the metalworkers favored early retirements 
as a method of preserving jobs and opening them up to younger 
employees. Early retirement programs were directed at workers who 
had not yet reached the normal retirement age of 65 for men and 60 for 
women. Under the state retirement system, men who have been cov 
ered for at least 35 years can retire at the age of 63. Early retirements 
were a voluntary program, either introduced by the company or negoti 
ated as part of a social plan. Early retirement usually began at 59. For 
12 months, from 59 to 60, the worker received unemployment com 
pensation and a company payment which brought income close to the 
former wage rate. There was also an implicit understanding that these 
workers would not be offered new jobs by the labor exchange offices. 
At 60, former employees received retirement payments but at a some 
what lower amount than they would have received at the regular retire 
ment age. The unions tended to regard the 59 to 60 payment as a 
subsidy for companies, since unemployment compensation was admin 
istered by the state labor offices out of a general fund contributed to by 
employers and employees; however, beginning in 1982, employers 
paid the entire amount of unemployment compensation from 59 to 60. 
This charge was pressed by the unions to avoid exhausting unemploy 
ment funds.
Voluntary separations were initiated by the company, negotiated 
with the works council, or were part of a social plan. Separations were 
accompanied by a buyout or cash settlement—"the golden handshake." 
The cash settlement was based on the worker's age and length of 
employment with the company. Election of a voluntary separation 
often had a time limit for the employee's acceptance, but voluntary 
separations that were part of a social plan could run for several years. 
When "the golden handshake" was first offered by companies, many 
younger workers took advantage of the opportunity to receive cash and 
then move on to other jobs. Older workers, however, were reluctant to 
leave, fearing they would not find new employment. To avoid the loss 
of their younger workers, companies began to reserve the right to 
refuse a request for separation. The role of works councils in separa 
tions depended on the size of the company and the size of the dis 
missal. In small companies with weak works councils, the companies
142 Employment Adjustment
have often dismissed workers without consulting the works councils; 
but in large firms, when dismissals exceeded 30 workers in a month, 
the works council has been consulted. Reductions in steel production 
and the installation of continuous casting in Thyssen resulted in reduc 
tions in the workforce. The principal forms of reductions at Thyssen 
since 1970 have been smaller Wrings and pensions for those 59 and 
over. Where workers have been needed in the Hamborn facility, they 
have been transferred from facilities in Nederheium and Oberhausen 
within commuting distance. Voluntary separations have been very low.
A social plan, negotiated with the works council and approved by 
the labor exchange, was required by the Works Constitution Acts in the 
case of a plant closing. The first social plans in Germany began in 1957 
in mining and in 1963 in steel. Between 1970 and 1974 in Saar- 
brucken, 92 percent of the social plans were negotiated because of total 
or partial closings. Bosch (1982) reported that personnel measures in 
social plans, in order of importance, were dismissal (87.8), reassign 
ment to other plants (38.8), early retirement (17.4), retraining and 
transfer (17.1), and internal transfer (9.4). In one social plan in steel, 
dismissals for economic reasons had to be explained. Klockner manag 
ers claim that social plans were readily accepted by the steel unions. 
Plant closings were usually carried out over several years with slow 
reductions and employment adjustments which could include all of the 
methods mentioned above—from transfer to separation. The company 
began to close its Hutte-Haspe plant in 1967. The plant was closed 
slowly over a period of 15 years, during which time three social plans 
were negotiated—in 1967, 1978 and 1981—as the plant went from 
7,000 employees in 1967 to 300 in the fall of 1982. The 1967 Hutte- 
Haspe social plan provided for early retirements and dismissals. Early 
retirement provisions for those who reached 59 included payments or 
provisions covering resettlement, a company pension, adjustment pay 
ments, anniversary bonuses, and special bonuses. Dismissal provisions 
included provisions for assistance, an employment anniversary bonus, 
and company housing.
The principal aspects of the early retirement provisions that most of 
the workforce used allowed early retirees to draw 12 months of unem 
ployment compensation, after which they went on social security. 
These early retirees also received a monthly resettlement allowance for 
12 months or until social security began. This allowance was not to
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exceed the present monthly net pay. If social security payments were 
delayed, the company would advance the social security money, which 
would be refunded when the retiree received payment. Disability pay 
ments were deducted from the resettlement allowance. If the recipient 
of an early pension lost unemployment benefits after six months, the 
resettlement allowance was increased. For purposes of the company 
pension, the years between early retirement and age 65 were counted 
as years of service. There was also an adjustment in social security 
paid by the company for those who retired early, because of lower pay 
ments into their benefit fund as follows:
Monthly gross earnings Payment per month 
in German marks for missing years
Up to 1,000 10
1,001 -1,200 12
Over 1,200 14
The adjustment payment was also due to widows and orphans, and 
an anniversary bonus was paid. Christmas bonuses were paid as if 
retired employees were active. After 1967, early retirees received 
Christmas bonuses as other retirees did. They also received their 1967 
vacations. If the early retiree died before 65 and was not reemployed, 
relatives received payments conforming to plant orders in force at the 
time of death. Company housing also continued. The principal claims 
in case of dismissal at Hutte-Haspe included the same assistance as the 
coal-mining industry employees received under the European Coal and 
Steel Contract of July 12, 1966. Severance pay was equal to average 
contract net pay of the last six months net of deductions every month 
until age 65 or up to 12 months. The possibility of company retraining 
was examined with the labor exchange, and company assistance was 
granted. Anniversary bonuses were granted as due on the anniversary 
date if it fell:
within first 3 months 100%
within first 4-6 months 75%
within first 7-12 months 50%
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Company housing continued for at least three years, and company 
loans for home building were renegotiated. The benefits were based on 
expectations of assistance from the government and the EEC. If these 
were not granted, the plan was to be renegotiated. Klockner would 
make advance payments in anticipation of these subsidies. An 
employee who received public support would reimburse the company.
The 1982 social plan, which ran until December 31, 1984, stated 
that the plant would shut down on December 31, 1984 or sooner. The 
principal clauses required that the company would make every effort to 
find work at other plants. A 1980 agreement from another facility was 
extended to this plant because of the manpower structure of this plant, 
which had 90 percent with more than 20 years of seniority, 20 percent 
handicapped, and 70 percent over 50 years of age. The principal differ 
ence between the 1967 and 1982 plans was that those born in 1926 or 
before, age 56 or older, were eligible for early retirement, while all oth 
ers were to be dismissed with a payment of up to two years of net earn 
ings.
Employees at Hutte-Haspe were encouraged to leave voluntarily 
through incentive payments of 50 percent of their final termination pay. 
Because of the plant closing, employees were not eligible for unem 
ployment compensation, and the company made up the difference for 
up to 12 months from a "hardship fund." Workers transferred during 
the last two years into lower paying jobs in the company had their 
compensation tied to the previous rated job. Again, employees on early 
retirement who received maximum monthly benefits also got an addi 
tional payment. Those dismissed under the 1982 plan were eligible for 
retraining, transfer at the old rate, money expenses, and a resettlement 
allowance of up to $826 for those transferred to another division of the 
company (1982 $ US). Those dismissed with at least one-half year and 
less than five years of service received payments as follows: one-half 
year of service (15 percent), one year (20 percent), two years (25 per 
cent), three years (40 percent), and four years (60 percent).
Increases for each additional year were 15 percent a year or a mini 
mum of $721 (1982 $ US). A floor was established. Those without at 
least 10 years of service and 40 years of age received an additional 30 
percent, those over 50, 70 percent. For special hardship cases, a fund 
was established, with the cooperation of the works council, to provide 
up to $206 (1982 $ US) a person. Dismissed employees received their
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vacation, and graduated anniversary money was provided for those 
who would have reached 25 and 40 years of service, respectively, dur 
ing the next two years. Those who left before the formal notice period 
had their payments reduced. Management at Klockner reported that 
payments for early retirement turned out to be more than employees 
would have received without the social plan, since most workers 
would have left between ages 62 and 63 and would not have received 
the maximum retirement pay.
On October 1, 1984, the standard workweek of 40 hours was 
reduced to 38 hours without loss of wages. The German Confederation 
of Trade Unions reported that a survey by IG Metall had indicated that 
this reduction of hours of work had saved or created 7,000 jobs, or 3.3 
percent of the total number of jobs. The Confederation of German 
Employers Associations pointed out, however, that employers did not 
consider this reduction in hours of work an appropriate measure for 
dealing with the problem of unemployment The employers argued that 
the reduction of hours had no significant effect on employment and 
that a survey carried out among steelworkers before the introduction of 
the shorter workweek clearly showed that they would have preferred 
an earlier pension age to a shorter workweek.
Labor adjustment programs were a combination of federal and state 
programs, negotiated plans, and EEC assistance. Hie Employment 
Promotion Act of 1969 regulated training, placement, job creation, and 
unemployment benefits. In the case of workforce reductions, there 
were special allowances to facilitate short-time working arrangements, 
subsidies, and incentives to induce workers to accept early retirement. 
These incentives consisted of a combination of unemployment benefits 
and advance payment of old-age pensions under the general social 
security scheme. Legislation in force since May 1984 provided for the 
possibility of voluntary early retirement. Any firm that agreed to hire 
an unemployed person to replace a worker taking early retirement after 
age 58 received a government subsidy. This allowed the employer to 
pay early retirement benefits until the beneficiary qualified for a full 
old-age pension, normally by age 63. The purpose of the legislation 
was to reduce unemployment. After July 1, 1986 steelworkers who 
were laid off and at least 50 years old received from $1,843 (1986 $ 
US) to $2,469. Transition payments were also raised to narrow the dif 
ference between unemployment insurance and their former income.
146 Employment Adjustment
The politics of plant closings were particularly important in Ger 
many. State and local resistance to closings, when combined with pres 
sures from the metalworkers, altered or delayed management's 
decision to close plants. The legal requirement of a negotiated and gov 
ernment-approved social plan allowed the political process to inter 
vene. Political pressures and the requirement to negotiate layoffs and 
plant closings with the works council increased the costs of layoffs to 
employers and forced policies based on long-term human resource 
planning. Employers tried to neutralize these costs of adjusting the 
labor force by moving to fixed-term contracts, subcontracting, and 
leasing personnel. They also externalized the costs by transferring 
costs to the larger community, the social security system, or the EEC. 
For example, the cost of early retirement was borne for a long time by 
the unemployment insurance system.
Japan
Japanese steelmakers share the internal labor market characteristics 
of other large Japanese employers, that is, a labor force divided into 
regular employees and temporary employees. A permanent employee 
usually enters the company after graduation, receives continuous train 
ing, and remains an employee until retirement at age 55 or 65. When 
Nippon Steel Corporation reduced its workforce by 4 percent in 1975, 
the country was shocked. (Table 5.5 presents NSC steel employment.) 
Steel had symbolized Japan's industrial rebirth. Shortly before the 
reduction, in December 1974, the Employment Insurance Law had 
been introduced. It included an employment subsidy plan to help com 
panies retain excess workers by reimbursing the company for 70-80 
percent of wages to maintain employment. The unemployment insur 
ance fund supported this. To be eligible, a firm had to have one-eighth 
of its workforce on layoff. Employers can alternate the employees it 
places on layoff and this is done in steel. Two other laws were passed 
in 1977 and 1978 which provided temporary measures for workers dis 
placed from specified depressed industries, such as steel.
In spite of the cutback at NSC, steelmakers resisted discharging 
employees. No one was laid off by Kawasaki Steel in 1976, but over 
time was reduced. In fact, the Mizushima plant added 550 workers to 
its 11,500 workforce. The average steelworker was 31 years of age,
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had nine years of employment, and was earning $10,000 a year. How 
ever, reducing overtime from 25 hours to 17 hours a month reduced 
wages by $27.00 per person.
Employment adjustment measures utilized by Japanese steel firms 
have included hiring freezes with normal attrition, long-term transfers 
to other firms, short-term transfers to other firms, voluntary severance, 
dismissal, in-sourcing of work previously subcontracted, subcontract 
ing workers to other companies, permanent transfers, temporary relo 
cation within the firm, and staggered or partial operations. Between 
1971 and 1986, the number of temporary subcontracted workers in the 
five largest steel firms was reduced by 28,715 (17.7 percent) as the 
companies sought to maintain their permanent employees. The number 
of new hires had been reduced by 1978. The retirement age was also 
lowered. The government reported that retirement in steel, by the end 
of 1985, would result in 20 percent leaving at age 55,17 percent at age 
57 and 49 percent at age 60 years.
Transfers to related firms were possible as long as there was expan 
sion, and in 1989 NSC reported that it had transferred 8,150 blue-collar 
and 5,253 white-collar workers to related companies. NSC planned to 
hire only one-tenth the usual number of staff, and for the first time 
since the 1960s, planned to hire no production workers; instead, it cut 
its workforce and increased wages. In an agreement between the top 
five companies and their unions, the compulsory retirement age was 
extended to 60 years. NSC announced in 1984 that the Kamaishi plant 
would close and that it planned to reduce employment by 2,400 at four 
mills over the next few years through attrition.
The policy of the steel firms in Japan has been to consult and coop 
erate with the local unions. Steelworkers have been used in new invest 
ment programs and transferred to other firms owned by the same 
company or to other industries. Nippon Kokan (NKK), when it oper 
ated its Fukuyama site at 41 percent capacity, sent more than 200 
workers to Toyota, Isuzu and Fuji Heavy Industries. NKK currently 
loans about 10 percent of its workforce out of its Ohgishima facility to 
other NKK divisions. About 800 blue-collar and 100 white-collar 
workers are loaned for two or three years. The Ohgishima project of 
NKK, completed in 1979, was carefully planned to achieve the revital- 
ization of the old Keihin steelworks. Even though a reduction of about 
9,000 workers was needed in order to double the productivity of labor,
Table 5.5 
Nippon Steel Employment, 1970-1989"
Blue-Collar
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Steelworks
55,618
55,002
54,694
53,281
51,868
50,261
48,437
46,529
44,964
44,496
43,666
41,671
40,988
Other 
groups
2,349
2,383
2,600
2,562
2,453
2,360
2,264
2,218
2,074
2,067
2,565
2,474
2,480
White-Collar
Steelworks
15,306
15,157
15,215
15,265
15,220
14,902
14,259
13,943
13,830
13,660
13,155
12,553
12,420
Other groups
7,127
7,543
7,901
8,059
8,243
8,642
8,768
8,927
9,058
9,811
10,643
10,747
11,272
Total
Blue-collar
57,967
57,385
57,294
55,843
43,321
52,621
50,701
48,747
47,038
46,563
46,231
44,145
43,468
White-collar
22,433
22,700
23,116
23,324
23,463
23,544
23,027
22,870
22,888
23,471
23,798
23,295
23,692
Total
82,070
84,641
82,655
80,400
80,085
80,410
79,167
77,784
76,165
73,728
71,617
69,926
70,034
70,029
67,440
67,160
1986
1987
1988
1989
1973-1989
Absolute change
Percent change
39,272
38,731
36,464
34,724
-20,894
-37.6
2,349
2,292
2,259
2,099
-250
-10.6
11,896
11,206
9,480
8,791
-6,615
-42.6
11,439
11,964
12,654
12,463
-5,336
-74.9
41,721
41,123
38,723
36,823
-21,144
-36.5
23,335
23,170
22,134
21,254
-1,179
-5.3
65,056
64,293
60,857
58,077
-23,993b
-29.2b
SOURCE: NSC Labor Relations Department, 
a. As of April of each year, 
b. 1970-1989.
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this was done without dismissals through retirement and voluntary 
shifting to the new Fukiyama works.
NSC and Kawasaki announced their first ever layoff of workers in 
1986 in order to reduce labor costs. NSC would cut back its workforce 
by 30 percent, and Kawasaki accelerated its five-year plan to reduce its 
labor force by 24 percent or 4,500 blue-collar workers. NKK, Kobe 
Steel Ltd., and Sumitomo also expected to lay off workers early in 
1987. The companies agreed with the unions that laid-off workers 
would continue to receive 80-90 percent of their wages.
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), in 1987, 
requested a restructuring plan from each of the steel companies based 
upon its projections of reduced capacity. Table 5.6 presents the 
responses of five of the firms to MITTs request for a reduction of their 
workforce of 35 percent by 1990. NSC would cut 19,000 jobs from 
65,000 and announced plans to shut down five furnaces over the next 
four years in an effort to lower its dependence on steel operations. First 
to be shut down would be Ktakyushu, Kamaishi, and Sakai, and later 
Hirohata and Muroran. At NSC, 9000 workers would be retired, 6,000 
shifted to a new business, and the other 4,000 given unspecified 
arrangements. NKK reported a planned reduction of 29 percent from 
28,000, 6,200 from steel operations and 1,200 from shipbuilding and 
the other heavy industrial divisions. Additionally, 600 researchers and 
office workers would be affected. This would be accomplished by attri 
tion and transfers to new businesses. Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd. 
reported that over a three-year period it would reduce the number of 
workers in its steel industry by 22 percent. Again, it would be accom 
plished by moving workers to its new companies and the workforce 
would be reduced from 20,400 to 15,900.
The 19,000-steelworker loss at NSC was based on the following 
projection:
Personnel at the end of 1986 46,000 (a)
Personnel at the end of 1990 27,000 (b)
Redundant personnel 19,000 (c) =(aHb)
Redundant personnel at end of 1986 4,000 (d)
Age limit, retirement, and national decrease 9,000 (e)
Personnel requiring personnel measures 14,000 (f) =(c)+(dMe)
SOURCE: NSC Labor Relations Department.
Table 5.6 
Employment Reduction Plans for Five Japanese Companies
Method of reduction and numbers
Company 
(date of 
announcement)
NSC 
(2/87)
NKK 
(2/87)
Kawasaki 
(2/27)
SumitomoNo. 1 
(12/86)
No. 2 
(3/88)
Kobe 
(11/86)
Change in 
employment 
(dates of change)
46,000-27,000 
(3/87-3/91)
19,400-13,200 
(3/87-3/91)
19,100-13,800 
(3/87-3/89)
25,200-19,200
20,400-15,900
12,000-9,500 
(9/86-3/89)
Number of 
employees
19,000
8,000
5,300
6,300
4,500
6,000
Retirement and 
attrition
9,000
2,500
1,000
1,900
70%
2,000
Transfers to
New New 
affiliates ventures
4,000 6,000
4,500 1,000
3,000 1,300
4, 100 total
30% (3/88)
4,000 total
SOURCE: Industrial Bank of Japan, Research Report No. 239, 1988, No. 5. 
NOTE: Employment includes blue-collar and white-collar.
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The medium-term program to be used for the 14,000 redundant 
workers was temporarily stopping the extension of the age limit for 
retirement which had been extended from 55 to 60 since 1981; trans 
ferring workers to firms outside the company for three to six months; 
and layoffs and training, where all employees are subject to a combina 
tion of layoffs and training for two to three days a month. During this 
layoff, they are paid at 85 percent of their base wage (Abe 1989). In 
1989, NSC reported that it had transferred 8,150 blue-collar workers 
and 5,253 white-collar workers to related companies.
The issue of excess workers occurred at NSC when it shut down 
some of its blast furnaces. Since these excess workers were unevenly 
distributed among the sites, transfers were planned by 1990 from four 
sites in the following manner:
Transferring 
site
Muroran 
Kamaisi
Hirohata
Sakai
Total
Nagoya
70 
50
200
30
350
Kimitsu
500 
200
150
50
900
Oita
80
150
20
250
Total
650 
250
500
100
1,500
SOURCE: NSC Labor Relations Department.
NSC pays a transportation allowance and assists workers in the sale 
and purchase of homes when it transfers blue-collar workers.
Sweden
Income security programs at Swedish Steel Corporation (SSAB) 
were heavily subsidized by the government and the unions. The first 
restructuring plan for SSAB, in 1977, forecast a decline in employment 
between 1978 and 1982 by about 4,000 employees as a result of a drop 
in production capacity of 25 percent, the closing of the blast furnace at 
Domnarvet, and the closing of several lime and sintering plants. The 
1980 and 1983 plans estimated a smaller reduction in employment by 
1987; however, actual employment for the steel group turned out to be 
lower than forecasts. Total job losses during the first stage of restruc-
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Curing for all units of SSAB, including steel, were 2,990 blue-collar 
workers (23 percent) and 792 white-collar workers (15 percent) for a 
total reduction of 3,782 workers or 21 percent of the workforce. If 
1979 is included and only the three carbon steel plants and the mines 
are included, steel-related employment was 15,960 in 1979 and 12,258 
in 1981, and the total reduction was 3,702 or 23 percent of the 1979 
employment base, which is quite close to the original forecast. Table 
5.7 indicates a reduction in employment of 16.7 percent between 1980 
and 1986 for the three steel facilities. SSAB, as most of the integrated 
steel producers in this study, diversified at the same time they were 
restructuring, and the purchase of non-steel-related companies raised 
total employment. Reductions were accomplished without discharges 
because the government, as the price of its financial assistance, 
required that this be carried out in a "socially acceptable" manner, that 
is, through early retirement or work creation for those not willing to 
accept early retirement. The 1983 company report stated that only 50 
employees in the entire company had been terminated through the end 
of that year. The decline in employment impacted most heavily on the 
steel communities, which were dependent on the carbon steel mills for 
local employment, and on the mining areas, which had already been 
depressed by earlier mine closings. In 1978, employment in the plant 
in Oxelo'sund accounted for 26 percent of that town's total population 
(see table 4.2).
The government, through the Labor Market Board and its majority 
ownership in the company, played a major role in influencing the direc 
tion and manner in which employment reductions took place. SSAB 
was asked to extend the notification period to employees beyond the 
required 6 months with an additional 24 months for a total of 30 
months. SSAB, replied that it didn't have the resources necessary to 
support excess personnel and forecast that about a third of the recon 
struction loan would have to be used to finance employment reduc 
tions. The government responded with a special employment subsidy. 
Financial contribution also came from the Job Security Council, a joint 
effort of the Swedish Employers Organization and the Organization of 
Industrial Salaried Employees, in the financing of early retirement for 
salaried workers. The Job Security Council is funded by a one-half of 1 
percent salary deduction from the pay check of all white-collar 
employees who are members of the salaried employees union. Swedish
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unions traditionally cover the unemployment benefits received by their 
members during the first year of unemployment
Employment reduction measures were negotiated and agreed to by 
management, the unions and the government The general labor market 
policy followed at SSAB included a hiring freeze with no new recruit 
ment2 Reassignment vacancies were filled through internal mobility, 
and external recruitment was permitted only when inside recruits could 
not be retained or found. An informal labor market exchange was cre 
ated for this purpose. A special organization was established for each 
department with surplus personnel. The employment costs for surplus 
personnel were borne originally by each division until a program could 
be worked out. Employees were offered three months' pay if they left 
voluntarily.
Table 5.7 
SSAB Steel Group Employment, 1980-1986
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1980-1986
Absolute change
Percent change
Borlange
4,795
4,669
4,194
4,356
4,388
4,293
4,189
-606
-12.6
Facility
Lulea
4,429
4,357
3,882
3,937
3,968
3,931
3,763
-666
-15.0
Oxelosund
4,534
3,366
2,805
2,798
2,857
2,855
2,680
-854
-24.2
Total
12,758
12,392
10,881
11,091
11,213
11,079
10,632
-2,126
-16.7
SOURCE: SSAB, Annual Reports.
SSAB promoted new employment in communities where employ 
ment reductions took place. The Security Fund or wage earners fund 
was used by SSAB to start new businesses in the communities where 
the plants were located, and $19,763 was used successfully (1981 $ 
US). During 1984, a system of five separate employee shareholder 
funds was established within the framework of the National Pension 
Insurance Fund system. Profits were exempted from the funds if they
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totaled less than a half-million Kronen or 6 percent of the company's 
payroll. The Fund came from a 20 percent tax levied only on real earn 
ings. 3
The specific labor market measures agreed to between SSAB and 
the unions fixed employment levels. The 1982 plan forecast a larger 
reduction since it had a 1978 employment base rather than the smaller 
1979 base of the 1980-1982 plan. Surplus personnel were to be given 
the opportunity to voluntarily transfer to new companies where they 
would be given work or retraining. These volunteers had priority rights 
to recall in their old departments. If voluntary transfers over four 
months were not sufficient, SSAB and the unions were to negotiate 
over the number and persons to be declared surplus. All this would 
take place over a two-year period. Early retirement programs, one for 
salaried workers and two for blue-collar workers, were later added to a 
1980-1982 plan and a 1982-1983 plan.
Early retirement with a pension had been introduced in Sweden in 
1972. To qualify for the general program, the individual had to be at 
least 60 years old, have received unemployment compensation during 
the maximum period of 90 weeks, and have little prospect of getting a 
new job with "reasonable qualifications." A firm that wished to reduce 
its workforce could offer its older employees a period of layoff with 
unemployment benefits for 90 weeks and thereafter a pension. These 
laid-off workers were seldom offered a job by the employment office 
while receiving unemployment compensation. The wage replacement 
ratio for the laid-off employees was equal to unemployment insurance 
during the first 90 weeks. Bjorklund and Helmlund (1987) conclude 
that under the government pension, the after-tax replacement ratio is 
between 70 and 85 percent for most workers. From then on until the 
age of retirement, the replacement ratio depends on the individual's 
pensions rights. The after-tax ratio is between 70 and 85 percent.
The SSAB early pension plan meant that persons reaching the ages 
of 58 to 64 during 1981 might be granted pension benefits. This was in 
accordance with the general company plan and usually meant receiv 
ing 70 percent of their pension-entitled salary. For salaried workers, it 
was between 2.0 and 2.5 times the basic pension index or 60 percent. 
At SSAB, three exceptions for blue-collar workers were: (1) early 
retirees received severance pay from age 58 and 3 months to age 60, 
when the government early retirement program took over; (2) from age
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60 to 65 the company supplemented the difference between the gov 
ernment early retirement payment and 80 percent of the retiree's 
former wages; and (3) there was a payment by SSAB to the blue-collar 
union of $197 (1981 $ US) for early retirees to fund the unions social 
activities and the administration costs of these activities.
Early retirement was attractive to the company because it was subsi 
dized by the government The costs of early retirement included sever 
ance pay, commitments to a temporary supplement to the National 
Pension and Compensation pay, and the allowances to the blue-collar 
union for social activities and administration. SSAB paid approxi 
mately 70 percent of the early retiree's salary until age 65, and a sup 
plement to the retiree's government pension after age 65. The 
supplement was agreed to because the government pension was based 
upon the total number of years a person worked, and early retirees 
would have had their pensions reduced. This supplement was equal to 
the difference in the reduction of the pension.
SSAB's financial obligation for early retirement was met by the 
company through payment to a private insurance company plan (Sven- 
skt Personal-Pension Kassan) that covered its employees. The total 
cost of early retirement for SSAB workers between 1978 and 1984 was 
$24,229,256 (see table 5.8). However, SSAB's costs were offset for 
white-collar workers by approximately 30 percent from the Job Secu 
rity Council; the joint Employers Confederation-Federation of Salaried 
Employees fund. For example, for the Lulea works, SSAB paid a total 
premium between 1981 and 1984 for early retirement of salaried work 
ers of $8,966,156: the Job Security Council contribution was 
$2,648,089 or 30 percent of the total (1982 $ US).
The first early retirement program at SSAB for blue-collar workers 
was available from 1980 to 1981 for the mining division workers who 
were between ages 58 and 65. The company's obligations were similar 
to those for the white-collar workers, and the major difference was an 
additional $237 for each early blue-collar retiree to fund various social 
activities by the blue-collar federation. Blue-collar workers received 
70 percent of the normal retirement benefit plus a supplement after 65 
years of age. Early retirements in steel began in the middle of 1982 and 
ended at the beginning of 1983; they affected 738 workers in Lulea 
(251), OxelOsund (131), Borlange (311), and Division (45). There was
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severance pay on the date of retirement by year and a relocation allow 
ance from the Job Security Council.
Table 5.8 
SSAB Early Retirement Costs, 1978-1984
__________________(in$US)__________________
Year Costs
1978 280,365
1979 1,719,082
1980 6,242,645
1981 11,107,518
1982 3,863,050
1983 182,732
1984 833,864 
________Total________________24,229,256_______
SOURCE: SSAB, Group Staff Administration memorandum, April 4,1985.
Once the companywide measures for dealing with employment dis 
locations were decided at the corporate level with the blue-collar and 
white-collar labor federations, plant-level measures were negotiated at 
each of the three sites between local management and the local unions. 
The blue-collar layoff program for Oxelo*sund, dated September 1981, 
required that all layoffs were to be completed by March 31, 1983 
(Zachrisson 1986). There was special treatment for those with chil 
dren. The procedure for agreeing on who would be laid off began with 
a discussion by managers and labor. If there was no agreement, the 
issue would go to the central personnel group, then to negotiation by 
the union and management at the company level or a final decision by 
SSAB's main board. External recruitment was to occur only after inter 
nal recruitment. Employees received time off to work in joint labor- 
management plant working groups. Union working groups would 
decide who got the open position. The committee to decide on layoffs 
would be composed of two employer representatives, one blue-collar 
representative, and one white-collar representative. This committee 
would try to find work, called temporary reserve work, inside or out 
side the company. Outside the company the placement offices in local
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labor markets would be used. Employees could go to work outside the 
company for up to one month without losing their job security. In the 
new company they would receive a subsidy from SSAB's equal to their 
former salary; that is the new company's salary obligation was reduced 
by the amount of SSAB salary. Employees were obligated to take inter 
nal retraining during the normal workweek, and government grants 
were used wherever possible. The company paid for courses, books, 
and travel for study. Early retirement was at 60 or older. At OxelCsund 
the metalworkers were younger, about 38, and better able to be 
retrained while members of the white-collar unions were older, about 
43, and considered not capable of retraining (Zachrisson 1986).
The entire process at Oxelo'sund was supervised by a project com 
mittee composed of personnel department representatives and trade 
union representatives of the Engineers, Foremen and Supervisors, and 
Industrial Salaried Employees. Reassignment and relocation were to be 
attempted first for surplus personnel by reassignment and relocation. 
Employment was guaranteed for two years, and hiring ceased. 
Advance notice of pending dismissals would be given to the Country 
Employment Board, the unions, and the employees. Identification of 
those to be reassigned would be based on persons whose tasks were 
discontinued, persons with the shortest time with the company and per 
sons whose jobs were altered by more than 50 percent Reassignment 
would be to vacant jobs, trainee posts, training programs directed 
towards specific trades and professions, a pension or other measures.
The Domnarvet Steel Works had developed a joint labor-manage 
ment plan before the merger and restructuring (Gutchess 1985). In 
1976, cutbacks at the works were planned for 650 blue-collar and 170 
white-collar workers. The Domnarvet Council, with labor and manage 
ment representatives, supported a main committee, which agreed that 
there would be no dismissals, and that plans for surplus workers had to 
be considered before organization and staffing plans were finalized. 
The measures, which were to be implemented over a two-year period, 
included a recruitment and hiring freeze and voluntary early retirement 
for all white-collar employees between 60 and 62 years and selected 
workers aged 55 to 59. Training was oriented towards specific jobs, 
and new jobs were developed. The plan Domnarvet used to reduce its 
white-collar workforce in 1982 after the reorganization into SSAB was 
quite similar to this earlier plan. The two-year plan for 225 workers
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included early retirement for those between ages 58 and 62, a freeze on 
hiring, internal advertising of job vacancies, training and retraining 
with pay, internal and external transfers with job placement assistance 
for those who were outside the firm, help in starting new businesses, 
and preference for reemployment of those trying outside work.
Table 5.9 presents the costs to SSAB of the labor market programs. 
The largest costs were in 1981 and 1982, when most of the restructur 
ing took place. Divisions were altered, there were shifts in products, 
and no one was laid off. Activities engaged in by the surplus workers 
included painting and improving SSAB property, double-manning, dis 
mantling facilities, retraining for steel and other work, formal educa 
tion, day work, and extension courses. There were also costs for 
severance payments, salary supplements, and administration.
Conclusions
Large reductions in employment occurred in all the countries except 
Canada. If we compare declines in steel production with job losses, the 
first five countries are exactly paired. Starting with the largest declines 
they are Great Britain, the United States, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
and Germany. With regard to who bore the monetary costs of employ 
ment adjustments, the government bore a considerable share of the 
costs in both the adversarial and cooperative countries. There was 
some variation among countries within this broad conclusion, ranging 
from the least government help in Canada, the United States, and 
Japan, and the most in Sweden. The programs are similar in transition 
payments for early retirement, unemployment benefits, training assis 
tance, and salary supplements. Steel companies were able to external 
ize adjustment costs and received direct payments, rather than loans, 
which subsidized their employment security programs. The govern 
ment directly funded early retirement in Great Britain, training in Swe 
den, and public works in Luxembourg. In some countries, support was 
not given directly to steel but to a program such as the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation in the United States, or allowing UI to be used 
in the first year of early retirement in Germany, or the employment sta 
bility program in Japan.
Table 5.9
SSAB©s Costs For Redundant Employees By Program, 1979-1983
(in $ US 000)
Year
Program
Painting & improving property
Double-manning
Dismantling facilities
Retraining - steel
Retraining - other
Education - below H.S.
Education H.S.
Education above H.S.
Third party, public works
Extension courses
Severance payments and salary 
supplements
Administration
Total
1979
44.55
345.92
927.67
234.89
14.00
137.16
179.84
209.70
.69
1,402.81
3,497.24
1980
394.84
458.91
112.30
14.19
74.48
235.25
244.23
1,534.18
1981
3,238.93
3,986.45
1,026.98
882.81
633.96
131.73
234.43
490.97
178.93
1.97
83.94
644.63
1,135.70
1982
1,043.99
2,979.50
1,518.82
1,043.68
1,350.40
336.80
680.45
800.62
298.28
182.89
1,411.84
1,173.08
12,819.69
1983
379.94
533.32
172.82
430.67
383.85
80.60
486.10
492.10
100.95
115.43
287.59
531.49
3,994.86
Total
4,707.41
8,240.03
2,717.96
3,743.74
2,715.40
563.13
1,552.33
2,038.01
1,023.11
300.98
1,783.37
3,996.24
33,381.67
SOURCE: SSAB, Group Staff Administration memorandum, April 4,1985.
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For the EEC countries, the government contribution was enhanced 
by EEC funds for unemployment allowances, retaining and resettle 
ment However, the origin of these funds was mixed, with half coming 
from a tax on the steel firms and half from each government.
Steelmaking is difficult work, and most steelworkers do want to 
retire when they reach their middle 60s; but they are not ready to lose 
their jobs in their 50s. New job creation for unemployed steelworkers 
has not been very successful. The service sector is not attracted to the 
old mill towns. Steelworkers were more likely to be unemployed or to 
have withdrawn from the labor force than the average unemployed 
worker. Those who found new employment were most likely to be 
employed outside of steel at lower pay.
NOTES
1. Local lump sum bonuses are not related to layoffs, but are rather a pay scheme ded to plant 
performance.
2. Larsson (1986), Nyquist (1986), Zachrisson (1986) and SSAB materials.
3. See Flanagan (1987) for a discussion of "wage earner funds."

6 
Conclusions
The introductory chapter posed three questions related to steel 
adjustment. Chapters 2 through 5 then described and evaluated the pro 
cess of restructuring in the eight countries, negotiations between labor 
and management, and the adjustment programs for the displaced work 
force. This chapter summarizes the major findings through an exami 
nation of the three original questions.
1. Are there differences in the adjustment process between systems? 
Economic necessity required major restructuring in steel, including the 
shedding of a large portion of the workforce. The unions could not pre 
vent these changes from occurring, however, what they did was to 
negotiate the pace of change and the size of the costs imposed on 
workers. In adversarial countries, firms had considerable discretion to 
proceed with restructuring, but they bore most of the costs. In the 
cooperative countries, the government restricted the freedom of 
employers to take unilateral action, but the government bore some of 
the costs of the adjustment programs.
Prior to the 1970s, there were stable cooperative relationships 
between management and unions in steel in all the countries studied 
here. Changes in this relationship in the 1970s and 1980s were not part 
of a drift in industrial relations strategy by management, but rather the 
result of competitive pressures. Unions found themselves increasingly 
pressured into accepting settlements they deemed unreasonable. The 
unions' strategies were fragmented either among unions in steel or 
between the national and the plant levels of the union. The Swedish 
white-collar and blue-collar unions had never coordinated their bar 
gaining in the steel companies, and in Belgium the two principal 
unions—one Socialist-dominated and the other Catholic-dominated— 
had opposing political goals. Fragmentation meant the unions were 
either unable or unwilling to work out alternative strategies to plant 
closings. When confronted by management with the choice of either a 
reduction in the number of jobs or the closing of a plant, the steel 
unions in all countries first sought maintenance of the status quo or
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government protection. In the adversarial countries, the unions were 
excluded from the decisions to close plants. Hie Fairfield steelworkers 
refused to believe that USS would abandon a large plant. Only when 
USS reduced Fairfield employment and closed other plants did the 
employees abandon attempts to return to the status quo.
In the cooperative countries, unions were more likely to be included 
in the restructuring strategy. Sweden is the best example of union par 
ticipation at the strategy level. In Sweden, the blue-collar and white- 
collar labor federations sought and gained participation in shaping the 
restructuring plan. The unions were able to do this because of both the 
tradition of tripartite decisionmaking and the support of legislation that 
required employee participation. The German metalworkers were also 
able to block restructuring until they were brought into the decision- 
making process, because codetermi nation legislation required their 
participation. However, even where the unions had some input into the 
strategy level, management was still able to unilaterally implement 
plans to cut the labor force, as in Cockerill-Sambre where 8,000 work 
ers were shed without a joint decision. Discussions between the unions 
and employers were then limited to how to implement the layoffs, 
rather than whether or not there should be layoffs.
The steel unions were unable to mobilize the support of other unions 
or even to mobilize their own base. The labor movement was fraction- 
alized in each country and there was little cooperation. The steelwork 
ers unions had a history of receiving favorable treatment from the 
government in the form of financial assistance and special benefits, and 
other unions were reluctant to assist them.
There were strikes over restructuring in both the adversarial and 
cooperative countries. They were longer in the adversarial countries of 
Great Britain and the United States and considerably shorter in the 
cooperative countries of Belgium and Germany. In Great Britain, the 
government sought to break the unions and move to privatization. In 
the United States, USS sought economic advantage over its competi 
tors. The short strikes were often a local initiative, as in Belgium and 
Germany. The national unions, in the case of these local strikes, were 
either excluded by their local membership or were reluctant to partici 
pate, since the short strikes didn't coincide with their national union 
policies. The principal targets of the unions' demands in cooperative
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countries were often national and local levels of government or the 
political parties, rather than steel company management
Government had been friendly in Europe and North America during 
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when labor-oriented social democratic 
parties reduced labor-management conflict in steel. The steel unions 
had long-standing, well-developed ties to major political parties in 
many of the countries examined in this study: in the United States, the 
Democratic party; in Great Britain, the Labor party; in Belgium the 
Socialists; in Sweden, the Socialists; and in West Germany, the Social 
Democratic party. A number of deals were made. The steel unions were 
often compliant and cooperative in not striking and on some occasions 
agreeing to less than a maximum wage increase. In return, they 
received from the government subsidies, quotas and employment guar 
antees. This view has been advanced in the "corporatist" literature 
(Bruno and Sachs 1985; Crouch 1985; Calmfors and Driffill 1988). 
This arrangement broke down in the 1980s with restructuring and 
shifts to more conservative governments. Cooperation became either 
too financially expensive for the government or too politically expen 
sive for the unions because of the potential loss of jobs of their mem 
bers. At this juncture, the unions were faced with continuing to 
cooperate or face resistance from their members. On the other hand, 
failure to continue to cooperate meant the risk of losing political clout 
and the need to fashion a new political strategy. There was greater 
union activity in the cooperative countries, as in Belgium, or settle 
ment through political exchange, as in Luxembourg and Sweden. 
Where access to political power was denied, as in Great Britain and the 
United States, there were long strikes.
Unions were most effective in steel where management needed their 
support to obtain government aid for financing restructuring or raising 
tariffs in Belgium, the United States, and Sweden. Special steel confer 
ences of a joint or tripartite nature were established to deal with prob 
lems of restructuring and foreign competition. In the adversarial 
countries of Canada and the United States, these conferences were 
joint and private. In the cooperative countries of Belgium and Luxem 
bourg, they were mostly tripartite and public. These steel conferences 
were in addition to the public manpower boards which had tripartite 
representation.
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2. Which approach is more efficient from the point of view of labor 
and of society as whole?
The hierarchy of adjustment strategies from labor's viewpoint (that 
is, the more desirable the option the lower the costs imposed on work 
ers and communities) are:
First, stop hiring and allow normal attrition to reduce employment 
Second, encourage workers to retire early. 
Third, transfer and retrain without layoffs. 
Fourth, establish work-sharing arrangements.
Fifth, lay off workers permanently, with income supplements and 
positive adjustment help.
Both adversarial and cooperative countries used options one and 
two; cooperative countries were much more likely to use options three 
and four, however. Layoffs were unacceptable in the cooperative coun 
tries because of the social contract, as in Japan, Luxembourg, and Swe 
den. In shedding jobs, consultation with the employees was likely to 
occur only in those countries that had a prior history of cooperation. 
Arbed's Anticrisis Division and its related policies represented a 
unique and successful approach to large-scale workforce reductions. 
This was possible because of the tripartite form of treating national 
economic matters and the consultative role of unions at the strategy 
level. Sweden's approach also has a great deal to commend it since 
steel restructured peacefully and quickly and its competitiveness was 
restored.
In adversarial countries early retirement benefits were offered to all 
older, senior workers who were laid off. In cooperative countries, early 
retirement benefits were offered to large groups of older senior workers 
as a mechanism for avoiding layoffs of all workers.
With regard to public efficiency, it could be argued that in adversar 
ial countries employers could be expected to be free to restructure in a 
time-frame suitable to management, to quickly shut down excess 
capacity, restructure, and reap the benefits of gains in productivity. On 
the other hand, it could be argued that, in cooperative countries, the 
time frame could be altered to include the union's and government's 
goal of preserving jobs, which could mean keeping excess capacity 
open while workers were transferred or slowly retired. This could 
retard gains in productivity.
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Two measures of public efficiency of the adversarial and coopera 
tive systems, therefore, are how closely were adjustments in output and 
jobs related to improvements in productivity, and how rapidly did each 
system shed labor? Changes in productivity can be attributed to factors 
other than labor, such as technology and managerial activities. 
Broadly, however, we would expect productivity to improve when 
labor is reduced. Table 6.1 presents steel labor productivity for the 
eight countries over two decades, 1970-1990. Japan, a cooperative 
country, had the largest absolute increase, while Great Britain, an 
adversarial country which had the largest percentage decrease in pro 
duction and employment attained the largest percentage increase in 
labor productivity. Great Britain became much more competitive, 
moving from last place to the middle of the eight countries when 
ranked by productivity. The United States and Germany became rela 
tively less competitive. A better view of what happened may be 
achieved by dividing the two decade of restructuring into four continu 
ous time periods and examining the three dimensions of output, 
employment, and productivity together. Table 6.2 presents the percent 
age change in output (0), employment (E) and productivity (P) for each 
of the four time periods and for 1970-1990.
The results of an examination of the relationship between output, 
employment, and productivity are ambiguous. The largest increases in 
productivity for both adversarial and cooperative countries were usu 
ally accompanied by increases in output coupled with declines in 
employment, as expected; however, this was not true for Canada, 
where employment increased, and for the United States, where output 
decreased. There were no striking differences in the relationship 
between output, employment, and productivity between the adversarial 
and cooperative systems.
There is some difference between the adversarial and cooperative 
systems when the timing of restructuring is examined. The period of 
greatest job shedding for most countries was 1980-85. However, three 
cooperative countries, Belgium/Luxembourg and Sweden, and one 
adversarial country, Great Britain, began large reductions in their 
workforce in 1975-80. This runs counter to expectations that adversar 
ial countries would shed labor first
The data do not support the expectation that adversarial systems are 
more efficient than cooperative systems. The pace of adjustment did
Table 6.1 0\ 00
Steel Productivity in Eight Countries, 1970-1990*
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Canada
240.5
239.6
242.1
300.2
265.7
258.9
273.0
281.9
292.7
313.4
312.3
295.2
291.9
325.5
356.6
Adversarial
Great Britain
127.8
116.7
126.3
136.6
114.2
109.7
124.3
114.9
126.1
141.3
105.4
183.5
197.0
254.4
267.9
Cooperative
United States
218.5
217.4
245.8
265.3
256.6
228.7
251.7
247.3
270.4
266.1
244.7
268.6
219.7
237.9
268.7
Belgium and 
Luxembourg
218.8
214.4
241.1
250.6
262.2
201.7
209.4
213.7
273.5
291.4
291.1
291.8
262.4
271.9
329.7
Germany
192.2
177.6
201.7
223.0
238.7
189.9
202.1
192.7
216.9
240.1
240.0
243.8
226.1
245.7
293.1
Japan
273.0
257.4
293.7
380.2
377.6
332.5
355.9
348.6
364.9
433.1
453.9
424.3
421.9
413.7
460.9
Sweden
137.5
n.a.
n.a.
120.1
127.8
122.3
101.1
117.6
129.6
120.2
117.5
131.7
143.4
169.8
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1970-1990
Absolute change
Percent change
375.2
371.0
381.0
417.5
443.5
431.2
190.7
79.2
292.4
292.1
348.2
388.5
398.3
390.3
262.5
205.4
285.2
296.8
332.9
362.1
359.1
367.5
149.0
68.1
337.9
347.6
371.2
436.4
443.1
463.1
244.3
111.6
305.9
298.7
313.8
361.5
364.2
351.0
158.8
82.6
470.6
454.6
493.4
593.9
631.6
660.6
387.6
'141.9
175.3
180.4
185.1
196.2
194.4
192.4
54.9
39.9
SOURCE: OECD, 1970-1990 printouts, Paris, 1991.
a. Production in ingot equivalents per employee. Not all employees included in all countries and the data is not standardized for differences in the number
of hours worked each year.
n.a.= Data not available.
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Table 6.2 
Percentage Change in Output, Employment, and Productivity in Eight Countries by Five-Year Periods
Adversarial
Period
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1970-90
O
16.34
22.03
-7.92
-16.12
9.64
Canada
E
8.42
3.30
-21.05
-23.09
-32.00
Great Britain
P
7.65
20.63
20.14
14.93
79.29
O
-30.18
-42.97
39.80
13.63
-36.75
E
-17.67
-38.78
-47.28
-11.00
-76.35
P
-14.16
-3.92
177.42
33.48
205.40
United States
O
-11.31
-4.12
-21.08
11.02
-25.49
E
-14.47
-8.68
-29.51
-10.71
-50,84
P
4.67
7.00
16.56
28.86
68.19
Cooperative
Belgium and Luxembourg
Period
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1970-90
O
-10.29
4.50
-13.64
2.73
-16.82
E
-2.18
-25.62
-21.46
-21.82
-55.33
P
-7.82
44.32
16.08
37.05
111.65
O
-10,26
8.46
-7.62
-5.11
-14.68
Germany
E
-6.65
-11.04
-23.61
-15.78
^6.57
P
-1.20
26.38
27.46
14.74
82.62
0
9.63
8.88
-5.49
4.80
18.23
Japan
E
-6.03
-16.46
^t.28
-25.02
^13.66
P
21.79
36.51
3.68
40.37
141.98
Sweden
O E P
2.00 11.71 -7.05
-24.42 -16.38 -5.95
13.44 -18.28 45.84
-7.48 -15.02 9.75
-19.09 -35.12 39.93
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not occur sooner in the adversarial countries, and adversarial systems, 
with the exception of Great Britain, did not achieve larger percentage 
increases in productivity relative to their reductions in employment. 
The Canadian and U.S. peak periods of employment reductions 
yielded productivity increases of 20 percent and 17 percent, respec 
tively, compared with Belgium/Luxembourg (44 percent), Germany 
(27 percent), Japan (40 percent), and Sweden (48 percent). Nor did 
they achieve these productivity increases sooner.
3. Who bore the costs of adjustment? In the adversarial countries of 
Canada and the United States, the companies bore the monetary costs 
of the adjustment through negotiated early retirement and severance 
pay; however, employees bore the personal cost of dismissal. Those 
who retired early still wanted to work, but they remained unemployed 
for long periods and only returned to work at lower pay. In cooperative 
countries, particularly Sweden, government bore the major monetary 
costs of adjustment as companies were able to externalize the costs 
through government aid in the form of partial or full ownership and 
income security assistance. In Japan, Luxembourg, and Sweden, per 
sonal costs were very low as companies retained their workers through 
transfers and retraining.
Both in the adversarial and cooperative countries, there was consid 
erable assistance from government Most governments did not have a 
specific steel policy, but there is no doubt that steel had a great deal of 
political influence and that governments viewed their role as preserv 
ing the steel industry through a trigger pricing mechanism in the 
United States, state loans in Germany, and planning guidance in Japan.
• • •
The market forces of new competition and new products that 
prompted the banking of furnaces and restructuring of the steel indus 
try occurred outside of the collective bargaining process. Government 
action also prodded the earliest restructuring in both types of systems. 
Employment reductions were large and occurred in both systems 
whether they were a single-tier system of collective bargaining or a 
two-tier system of collective bargaining and employee participation. 
There was a difference between the two systems on the matter of cost 
to employees and the effects on a country's ability to compete. Cooper 
ative countries were more likely than adversarial countries to retain
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employees, or to retrain and transfer them. This not only benefited the 
worker and his family but also the country, because it had retained a 
productive worker. However, the bottom line with regard to the steel 
industry of these eight countries and world class competitiveness has 
yet to be filled in.
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